Franklin v. Brown, E-268

• Decision Date: 07 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. E-268,E-268
• Citation: 159 So.2d 893
• Parties: H. B. FRANKLIN d/b/a H. B. Franklin, Realtor, Appellant, v. Freddie L. BROWN, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 893

159 So.2d 893

H. B. FRANKLIN d/b/a H. B. Franklin, Realtor, Appellant, v. Freddie L. BROWN, Appellee.

No. E-268.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 7, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1964.

Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Dye, Tucker & Joanos, Tallahassee, for appellee.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Appellant sues appellee in an action at law for damages suffered as a result of the alleged tortious acts of appellee. From a final judgment dismissing the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action, this appeal is taken.

The sole question presented for our decision is whether the amended complaint on which appellant relies for recovery states a cause of action. In determining the sufficiency of the complaint, all well pleaded allegations must be taken as true. ¹

The complaint contains allegations of the following ultimate facts. Appellant is a duly licensed and practicing real estate broker in Leon County. He entered into a non-exclusive listing contract with Welton Smith, Inc., a Florida corporation, whereby appellant agreed to use his best efforts and the facilities of his office in procuring a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy a residence property owned by Welton Smith for the stipulated purchase price of $27,400.00. It was agreed that the purchase price included a five per cent commission to be paid appellant upon the successful completion of his brokerage undertaking.

While engaged in the performance of his contract with Welton Smith, appellant was approached by one Marie Dawson who advised that appellee, then a resident of Pensacola, contemplated moving his residence to Leon County and was interested in purchasing a home there. At that time Dawson was the secretary, and appellee was the president, of a corporation operating under the corporate name of Motors Management Company, Inc. Arrangements were made by Dawson for appellant to meet appellee on his arrival in Tallahassee and show to him certain residence properties which he might be interested in purchasing as a home. Numerous residences listed with appellant were subsequently shown to appellee, including the property owned by Welton Smith concerning which the listed sale price of $27,400.00 was quoted to appellee. On the following day, appellee again contacted appellant and they made a second inspection of the Welton Smith residence. On this visit the owner was present and furnished appellee additional information concerning the property. During these inspections of the Welton Smith property, appellee inquired as to possible methods of financing a part of the purchase price, and appellant advised him the names of two mortgage brokers who, at appellant's request, inspected the Welton Smith property in order to be in position to present a financing proposal to appellee. Appellee departed from appellant's office with the expressed intention of considering the purchase of the Welton Smith residence, and agreed to communicate his decision to appellant in the immediate future.

Instead of fulfilling his agreement to communicate with appellant upon reaching a decision concerning the purchase of the Welton Smith Residence, appellee enlisted the services of Dawson, secretary of the corporation of which appellee was then president, who at appellee's request directly contacted the president of Welton Smith, Inc., and offered to purchase the residence for the sum of $26,000.00, the net amount which the owner would receive after payment of a brokerage fee had the transaction been handled by appellant; in so doing, Dawson intentionally concealed from Welton Smith the fact that she was acting as the agent of appellee. Welton Smith did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that Dawson was connected in any manner with appellee, or was acting as appellee's agent in the transaction. It is alleged that appellee and his agent, Dawson, withheld from and failed to disclose to Welton Smith the fact that Dawson was acting as agent for appellee in the transaction in order to deprive appellant of the opportunity of earning the real estate brokerage commission to which he would have been entitled under his listing contract with Welton Smith; that both appellee and his agent, Dawson, knew that if the owner, Welton Smith, had been informed or otherwise learned that Dawson was acting as the agent for appellee in her negotiations for the purchase of the property, that he would not have sold it for the price of $26,000.00, but would have required payment of the full listed price of $27,400.00 so that appellant could have been paid from the proceeds of the purchase price the real estate brokerage commission which he had earned.

As a result of the artifice practiced by appellee and his agent, Dawson, Welton Smith conveyed the property in question to the corporation, Motors Management Company, and received in consideration therefor the offered cash price of $26,000.00. On the same day this transaction was closed, Motors Management Company conveyed the property to appellee for an alleged consideration of $30,000.00.

The complaint further alleges that appellant had performed all the services required of him to entitle him to his brokerage commission, which commission had been earned and would have been paid except for the unlawful conspiracy between appellee and his agent, Dawson, and that had not the conspiracy instigated and carried to a conclusion by appellee been effective, appellee would have purchased the Welton Smith property through appellant as broker for the listed price of $27,400.00, out of which appellant would have been paid his agreed commission in accordance with his contract with the owner.

By the allegations of his complaint, appellant seeks recovery in the amount of his lost commission under three separate theories. By count one of the complaint, appellant seeks judgment for the damages suffered as a result of appellee's unlawful interference with appellant's business relationship under his brokerage contract with Welton Smith. Count two of the complaint seeks damages on the theory of unjust enrichment, and count three on the theory of fraud and deceit.

The intentional and unjustified interference with the advantageous business relationship existing between others which results in injury constitutes a tort under the law of this State. As said by the Supreme Court in the Dade Enterprises case: ²

'The weight of modern authority holds that interference with any contract amounts to a tort. * * * In such cases the injured party has an action against the party in default upon the contract, but he is not limited thereto. He may also maintain an action against the wrongdoer who induced such breach.'

The decision in Dade Enterprises refers to the origin of the rule in Florida as first announced by the Supreme Court in Chipley v. Atkinson. ³ The Chipley case makes it clear that for one to have a cause of action in tort against a wrongdoer who has willfully or maliciously interfered with the injured party's favorable business relationship with another, it is not necessary that the business relationship be founded upon an enforceable contract, or that the interference result in a breach of a contract which would give rise to a cause of action by the injured party against the one defaulting under the contract.

Appellant in the case sub judice does not allege that Welton Smith breached its brokerage contract with him. According to the allegations of the complaint, Welton Smith had no knowledge that Dawson was acting as agent for appellee. The complaint alleges that under these circumstances, Welton Smith committed no breach of its non-exclusive brokerage contract with appellant when it sold the property direct to Motors Management Company without adding to the sale price an amount sufficient to pay appellant's commission. Even though appellant asserts no cause of action against Welton Smith for breach of contract, this in itself does not bar appellant from asserting a cause of action against appellee if the latter's conduct constitutes a tortious interference with appellant's business relationship with Welton Smith. If by his wanton conduct appellee intentionally destroyed the subject matter of the contract existing between appellant and Welton Smith, or otherwise unlawfully rendered the latter's performance under the contract impossible, appellee would be liable in tort to the same extent...