Franklin v. Chapman
Decision Date | 29 November 2021 |
Docket Number | CIVIL 2:20-CV-12746 |
Parties | DAJEON FRANKLIN, Petitioner, v. WILLIS CHAPMAN, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Dajeon Franklin, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Macomb Correctional Facility in New Haven, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction for first-degree felony murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316(1)(b), two counts of first-degree home invasion, M.C.L.A. 750.110a(2) conspiracy to commit second-degree home invasion, M.C.L.A 750.110a(3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, [felony-firearm], M.C.L.A. 750.227b. For the reasons that follow, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Washtenaw County Circuit Court. “The facts as recited by the Michigan Court of Appeals are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).” Shimel v. Warren, 838 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2016). The facts are as follows:
People v. Franklin, No. 325551, 2016 WL 1391305, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2016)(internal citations omitted).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed. Id., lv. den. 500 Mich. 933, 889 N.W.2d 269 (2017).
Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment. The motion was denied. People v. Franklin, No. 14-181-FC (Washtenaw County Circuit Court, Nov. 19, 2018). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Franklin, No. 347139 (Mich. Ct. App. June 6, 2019); lv. den. 505 Mich. 975, 937 N.W.2d 651 (2020).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11. “[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
A. The procedural default issue.
Respondent urges this Court to procedurally default petitioner's first through fifth claims and his ninth claim because petitioner raised them for the first time in his post-conviction motion and failed to show cause and prejudice, as required by M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3), for failing to raise them on his appeal of right.
Petitioner argues in his sixth claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these claims on his appeal of right. Ineffective assistance of counsel may establish cause for procedural default. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000). Given that the cause and prejudice inquiry for the procedural default issue merges with an analysis of the merits of the defaulted claims, it would be easier to consider the merits of the claims. See Cameron v. Birkett, 348 F.Supp.2d 825, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Petitioner could not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because post-conviction review was the first opportunity he had to raise this claim. See Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010).
Respondent also argues that a portion of petitioner's seventh claim alleging the improper admission of other acts evidence is defaulted because petitioner failed to object at trial. Because the same legal analysis applies to both the preserved and unpreserved 404(b) claims, it would be easier to simply address the merits of the unpreserved claim.
B. Claims # 1...
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