Franklin v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole

Decision Date19 June 1984
Citation83 Pa.Cmwlth. 318,476 A.2d 1026
PartiesSamuel FRANKLIN, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent.
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Timothy P. Wile, Asst. Public Defender, Norristown, for petitioner.

Robert Greevy, Chief Counsel, Arthur R. Thomas, Asst. Counsel, Jay C. Waldman, General Counsel, Harrisburg, for respondent.

Before CRAIG, PALLADINO and BARBIERI, JJ.

PALLADINO, Judge.

Samuel Franklin (Petitioner) has appealed from a decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying his request for administrative relief and affirming its prior decision to rescind Petitioner's parole. Petitioner has filed a motion for summary relief asserting that there is no genuine issue of fact and that judgment should be entered in his favor.

On February 24, 1979, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five to twenty years for robbery. The effective date of Petitioner's sentence was July 2, 1978, at which time he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (Institution). By Board action dated May 10, 1983, Petitioner was granted parole subject to an approved plan, 1 effective July 2, 1983. An approved plan was not received by the Board until August 13, 1983 at which time Petitioner was still incarcerated. At about the same time, the Board received two reports from a psychiatrist and another member of the staff at the Institution stating that Petitioner could be "dangerous to others", and requesting that Petitioner undergo further evaluation before being released from the Institution. Based on these reports, the Board on September 13, 1983 ordered that Petitioner be listed for "further interview". The Board interviewed Petitioner and on October 11, 1983 issued an order rescinding its parole order of May 10, 1983 pending receipt of an updated psychiatric evaluation and recommendation from the Institution.

On October 19, 1983, Petitioner, represented by counsel, filed a petition requesting that the Board overturn its order rescinding his parole because he was not provided the minimum due process guarantees outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). On October 27, 1982, the Board denied Petitioner's request.

In Morrissey, the Supreme Court stated these minimal requirements of due process for parole revocation:

(a) [W]ritten notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.

Id. at 489, at 2604. In Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973), our Supreme Court relied on Morrissey in holding that constitutional due process requires that both convicted and technical parole violators be entitled to certain procedural guarantees, such as a hearing, before parole may be revoked. 2

Because Petitioner was never released from the Institution prior to the Board's action rescinding his parole and thus had not reached the status of a parolee, it is our view that he does not acquire the procedural guarantees established in Morrissey and Rundle. 3 See Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, --- Pa. Commonwealth Ct. ----, 473 A.2d 247 (1984). Thus, Petitioner was not denied due process.

Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for summary relief is denied and the order of the Board is affirmed.

ORDER

AND NOW, June 19, 1984, Petitioner's motion for summary relief is denied and the order of the Board is affirmed.

1 The Board's order provides:

[a] Parole 7-2-83 to an approved plan.

[b]...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Boone v. Nose
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • March 5, 2013
    ...does not attain the status of a "parolee" until the grant of parole is actually executed. Franklin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw. 318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984); Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 81 Pa. Commw. 194, 473 A.2d 247 (1984). In Pennsylv......
  • Green v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • October 1, 1986
    ... ... 135] the Board could properly rescind or suspend its parole order without affording Green a due process hearing or counsel representation. See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 102 S.Ct. 31, 70 L.Ed.2d 13 (1981); Franklin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984) ...         In Franklin, we held that a prisoner does not reach the status of a parolee with its attendant due process guarantees until the Board's order granting parole is fully executed and ... ...
  • Johnson v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • October 8, 1987
    ... ... Our case law has consistently held that a prisoner does not attain the status of a "parolee" until the grant of parole is actually executed. See e.g., Dinkins v. Department of Justice, --- Pa.Commonwealth Ct. ---, 523 A.2d 1218 (1987); Franklin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984); Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 194, 473 A.2d 247 (1984). In Green, we held that a grant of parole is not executed until the prisoner signs the ... ...
  • Counts v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • January 30, 1985
    ... ... It is now well-settled that a prisoner does not have a right to a Morrissey due process hearing prior to having his parole application denied or having an unexecuted parole rescinded. Jago v. Van Curen; Franklin" v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984); Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 81 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 194, 473 A.2d 247 (1984). The parole interview afforded Counts by the Board is sufficient to satisfy due process ...  \xC2" ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT