Franklin v. Franklin Cnty.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-00050-GFVT-CJS |
| Parties | ASHLEY FRANKLIN, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Ashley Franklin and Defendants Franklin County, Rick Rogers, and Wes Culbertson. [R. 54; R 57.] When transporting her to Franklin County Regional Jail former jail sergeant Brandon Price had sexual contact with then-inmate Ashley Franklin. Ms. Franklin brought this action against Franklin County, Brandon Price, and jail staff Rick Rogers and Wes Culbertson, alleging constitutional violations, battery, and negligence. [R. 1.] Ms. Franklin now moves for partial summary judgment for her claims against Mr Price, while Franklin County, Mr. Rogers, and Captain Culbertson move for summary judgment for Ms. Franklin's claims against them. [R. 54; R. 57.] For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In January 2019, Ms. Franklin was an inmate at Franklin County Regional Jail. [R. 57-2 at 7.] One evening, Ms. Franklin became lightheaded and dizzy from issues with her blood pressure. [R. 53-1 at 27.] Brandon Price, then a jail sergeant, confirmed that Ms. Franklin had elevated blood pressure. [R. 57-2 at 10.] Mr. Price then drove Ms. Franklin to the emergency room for treatment in a van. [R. 64-1 at 5.]
Mr. Price alone took Ms. Franklin to the hospital. During the transport, Mr. Price wore a normal jail uniform with a duty belt that held pepper spray, handcuffs and a handgun holster. [R. 53-2 at 80.] Jail policy also required Mr. Price to carry a firearm when transporting an inmate. Id. at 89. After the hospital discharged Ms. Franklin, Ms. Price put handcuffs and shackles on her and placed a belt around her waist that attached to the handcuffs and shackles. [R. 64-1 at 15-16.] He then escorted her to the van and placed her in the back. Id. At that time, Mr. Culbertson, a Captain at the jail, approached Mr. Price in the parking lot of the hospital. [R. 64-1 at 8-9.] Mr. Price and Captain Culbertson had a brief conversation, then Captain Culbertson left. Id. at 10.
Mr. Price then left the hospital with Ms. Franklin in the back. At some point on the way back to the jail, Mr. Price pulled into a parking lot and stopped the van. [R. 53-2 at 66.] Mr. Price climbed in the back of the van and exposed himself without taking his pants off completely. [R. 53-2 at 124-25.] Ms. Franklin then performed a sexual act on Mr. Price, although the parties contest the nature of the act. Ms. Franklin alleges that she performed oral sex on Mr. Price, while he alleges that Ms. Franklin masturbated him with her hands. [R. 64-1 at 7273; R. 64-2 at 10.]
The next day, Ms. Franklin's cellmate told jail staff that Ms. Franklin had sexual contact with Mr. Price. [R. 54-2 at 1.] Jail staff then interviewed Ms. Franklin's cellmate, Ms. Franklin, and Mr. Price. Id. at 1-2. Ms. Franklin and Mr. Price both denied having sexual interaction at first, but jail staff decided to conduct second interviews after reviewing camera footage and driving the route between the hospital and the jail. Id. Mr. Price and Ms. Franklin then admitted to having sexual contact during their second interviews. Id. at 3. After Mr. Price's admission, the jail terminated his employment for the sexual encounter with Ms. Franklin. [R. 54-12.] Rick Rogers, the Franklin County jailer at the time, reported the incident to Frankfort police and requested that a detective take over the investigation. [R. 65-2 at 52-53.] Mr. Price was later convicted of sexual abuse. [R. 54-7.]
Ms. Franklin brought this action against Mr. Rogers, Mr. Price, Captain Culbertson, and Franklin County. [R. 1.] She now moves for summary judgment against Mr. Price on Counts One and Three for violating her constitutional rights and battery. [R. 54.] Defendants Mr. Rogers, Captain Culbertson, and Franklin County also move for summary judgment on all claims against them. [R. 57.] Mr. Price did not file a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). A genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its burden by showing that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non- moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue in dispute. Chao, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In other words, a “scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Court then must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, “the court must evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991)). However, self-serving, conclusory statements from the non-moving party are not probative. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, the court cannot satisfy the burden for a party. It would be “utterly inappropriate for the court to abandon its position of neutrality in favor of a role equivalent to champion for the non-moving party: seeking out facts, developing legal theories, and finding ways to defeat the motion.” Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992).
In her complaint, Ms. Franklin alleges that the Defendants violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.[1] See U.S. Const. amend. VIII 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against public officials who violate a person's federal rights while acting under the color of state law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The parties do not dispute that the Defendants acted under color of law, so the inquiry focuses on whether there was a deprivation of Ms. Franklin's Eighth Amendment right. Ms. Franklin alleges that Captain Culbertson and Mr. Price's deliberate indifference to a high risk of harm violated her constitutional rights. [R. 1 at 6-7.] Against Franklin County, Ms. Franklin alleges that its policy of inaction violated her constitutional rights. Id. at 7-8.
Ms. Franklin alleges that Captain Culbertson and Mr. Price violated her Eighth Amendment right by subjecting her to a strong likelihood of serious harm through their deliberate indifference. Because the action is against Captain Culbertson and Mr. Price in their individual capacities, the Court must determine whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Under federal law, qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In other words, this doctrine requires the Court to apply a two-step analysis: First, the court considers whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the court asks whether the right at issue was clearly established. Id.
If the answer to either question is “no,” the defendant is immune from suit. Id. at 236. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity, though the Court still construes facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). Qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that “reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct,” and thus it shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” from suit. Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Ms Franklin argues that Price and Culbertson violated her Eighth Amendment right through deliberate indifference. To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff and that the defendant disregarded the risk by...
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