Franklin v. Franklin, 332

Decision Date05 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 332,332
PartiesRegina M. FRANKLIN v. Kenneth P. FRANKLIN.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Emanuel Klawans and Noah A. Hillman, Annapolis, for appellant.

George B. Woelfel, Jr., Annapolis, for appellee.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.

McWILLIAMS, Judge.

Little will be gained by recounting the trivia attending this domestic brouhaha. We shall affirm the decision of the trial judge, Melvin, J., and in so doing we shall draw generously upon his version of what happened.

The appellant (Regina) is 43; the appellee (Kenneth) is 52. They were married in 1946. The elder son, Kenneth, Jr. (Junior), is 21. The younger son, Richard, is 12. On 4 April 1968 Regina filed her bill for a divorce a mensa and the usual ancillary relief. Kenneth's cross-bill for a divorce a mensa was docketed not long thereafter. The case came on for trial on 2 January 1969. Two full days were required to produce the 250 pages of testimony. In the words (slightly edited) of Judge Melvin:

'Regina left the marital home in March 1968. (She says March 19th and Kenneth says March 5th.) I find that when she left she did so deliberately and with the intention on her part that the marriage relation would no longer exist. The principal question in the case is whether she was legally justified in leaving. She says she was so justified. It is significant that she did not allege in her bill of complaint that the separation was mutually voluntary.

'Regina's chief complaint and the reason given by her for leaving was the conduct of Junior and the failure of Kenneth to remove him from the home. There is little doubt that the boy left much to be desired in his conduct, both in and outside the home. Nor is there any doubt that his attitude towards his mother and his treatment of her were for the most part reprehensible. Apparently, ever since he was sixteen years old he showed little respect or devotion towards her. She admits, however, that Kenneth 'would try to reason with him' and 'tried to straighten him out,' sometimes even by 'fighting him.' According to Kenneth, the ill-feeling between Regina and Junior was mutual and, on her part, she 'showed no love' for her son, 'cursed him,' and in general 'treated him like a dog.' He says he tried to reason with her about the way she treated the boy but 'never got a civil answer from her.' In spite of this he told Junior that she was 'still his mother and (that he) must show her respect' and reprimanded him for his conduct towards her. As noted above his efforts in this regard were admitted by Regina.

'The situation with the son, and the fact that for other reasons the parties were not getting along too well with each other, resulted in a visit together to an attorney's office. This visit took place approximately one month before Regina finally left. At this meeting a separation was discussed. She said she wanted Junior out. According to her Kenneth told the attorney he wanted her out and she could have the furniture. He denies making such a statement, saying a 'lot of things' were discussed 'but nothing materialized.' In any event, they agreed to try to make a go of their marriage 'for a while' longer. But approximately one month later Regina left, taking the furniture with her. There is no evidence that, at the time she left, Kenneth was aware that she was leaving, by agreement or otherwise. Nor is there evidence of any mistreatment of her by either the son or husband during that interim.

'No doubt the relationship between Regina and Junior resulted in much unpleasantness for her. But the responsibility for this unpleasant relationship can not be placed entirely on Kenneth, nor indeed entirely upon Junior-although Junior's general conduct is certainly not to be condoned. As the parties themselves recognized when they entered into a reconciliation agreement in 1963, their responsibility as parents is a 'joint responsibility.' Kenneth's attempts to 'straighten out' Junior have already been mentioned. Admittedly it is the father's lot to discipline an unruly son, but the mother can be helpful also, and there is no evidence in the case of any efforts or suggestions on Regina's part to deal constructively with the situation. Her only solution to the problem was to get Kenneth to put Junior out of the house. I do not find that Junior's conduct toward her was such as to pose a serious threat to her personal safety, and there is no evidence corroborating her testimony that he has ever inflicted any physical injury upon her.'

'Regina further contends that even though her leaving may have been without legal justification, Kenneth has acquiesced in the separation and therefore he should be denied a divorce. In short, she claims that Kenneth's conduct after the sepration evidences a willingness on his part that the separation continue. The evidence claimed to support this is the testimony of Regina that on two occasions, once through counsel and once by telephone to his place of employment, she offered to get together with him to discuss their differences, but he refused. Kenneth admits these overtures to 'settle their differences' and that he told her they came 'a little too late.' He said they were made in December, 1968. It will be noted that this was approximately nine (9) months after the separation and (that they) came at a time when the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Davis v. Davis
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 12, 1977
    ...265 A.2d 755, 756 (1970) (per curiam); Goldschmiedt v. Goldschmiedt, 258 Md. 22, 26, 265 A.2d 264, 266 (1970); Franklin v. Franklin, 257 Md. 678, 684, 264 A.2d 829, 832 (1970); Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 12, 261 A.2d 759, 761 (1970); Hardisty v. Salerno, 255 Md. 436, 438, 258 A.2d 209, 2......
  • Silseth v. Levang
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 3, 1974
    ...an award of child custody. For cases to the same effect see Spencer v. Spencer, 258 Md. 281, 265 A.2d 755 (1970), and Franklin v. Franklin, 257 Md. 678, 264 A.2d 829 (1970). In Morris v. Morris, 439 S.W.2d 317 (Ky.1969), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (Kentucky's highest court), affirmed ......
  • Ferguson v. Ferguson
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1972
    ...been appropriately dealt with on appeal as findings of fact. Spencer v. Spencer, 258 Md. 281, 265 A.2d 755 (1970); Franklin v. Franklin, 257 Md. 678, 264 A.2d 829 (1970); Meredith v. Meredith, 91 Idaho 898, 434 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1967); Ingram v. Ingram, 385 S.W.2d 69 (Ky.1964). We adopt this ......
  • Rudel v. Rudel, 9593
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1979
    ...been appropriately dealt with on appeal as findings of fact. Spencer v. Spencer, 258 Md. 281, 265 A.2d 755 (1970); Franklin v. Franklin, 257 Md. 678, 264 A.2d 829 (1970); Meredith v. Meredith, 91 Idaho 898, 434 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1967); Ingram v. Ingram, 385 S.W.2d 69 (Ky.1964). We adopt this ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT