Franklin v. Frid

• Decision Date: 23 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1:97-CV-80.,1:97-CV-80.
• Citation: 7 F.Supp.2d 920
• Parties: Kathy and Wayne FRANKLIN, Individually and as Legal Guardians of Craig and Eric Franklin, Minors, Plaintiffs, v. Margaret FRID, Eve Dalton, Thomas Cutler, James McQueen, Kevin D. Magin, Jon McCarthy, jointly and severally, in their personal and professional capacities, and Muskegon Board of Education, a Michigan educational corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

7 F.Supp.2d 920

Kathy and Wayne FRANKLIN, Individually and as Legal Guardians of Craig and Eric Franklin, Minors, Plaintiffs, v. Margaret FRID, Eve Dalton, Thomas Cutler, James McQueen, Kevin D. Magin, Jon McCarthy, jointly and severally, in their personal and professional capacities, and Muskegon Board of Education, a Michigan educational corporation, Defendants.

No. 1:97-CV-80.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

January 23, 1998.

Regina A. Brice, Kentwood, MI, for Plaintiffs.

William Vogelzang, Jr., Robert Francis Mirque, Jr., Kluczynski, Girtz & Vogelzang, Grand Rapids, MI, Gary T. Britton, Britton & Bossenbroek, PC, Muskegon, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION

QUIST, District Judge.

In this civil rights action, Plaintiffs Kathy and Wayne Franklin (the "Franklins"), on their own behalf and as legal guardians of Craig ("Craig") and Eric ("Eric") Franklin, allege that Defendants deprived Craig of his right to a free and appropriate public education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (the "IDEA"). The Franklins have alleged claims against Defendants for deprivation of their federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, violation of their rights under the Michigan Constitution, violation of the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.1101-37.1607, and state law torts of assault and battery. Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Facts

Craig Franklin is a handicapped minor child who suffers from cerebral palsy. Craig and his brother, Eric, began attending Holton Middle School in the Holton Public School District ("Holton") at the start of the 1995-96 school year. At that time, Craig received an Individualized Educational Program ("IEP") in which he attended regular classes with other students and received personal tutoring and assistance.

Craig was assisted during his first year of school at Holton by Dawn Alverson ("Alverson"). The Franklins allege that Craig performed well under Alverson's care and made substantial progress in his education. Alverson left Holton at the end of the school year. Holton hired defendant Margaret Frid ("Frid") to replace Alverson as Craig's aide during the 1996-97 school year.

The Franklins allege that Craig's performance in school began to decline as a result of Frid's conduct toward Craig. In particular, the Franklins allege that Frid intentionally humiliated and tormented Craig by poking him to get his attention, taking away utensils, and taunting him; that Frid intentionally hit and slapped Craig without justification; and that Frid verbally abused Craig. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32, and 36.) As a result of Craig's apparent decline in performance, the Franklins had Craig evaluated by a psychologist, Dr. Patricia J. Dauser. Dr. Dauser concluded that Frid had probably assaulted Craig on more than one occasion.

The Franklins allege that they brought their concerns about Frid to Defendants' attention through parent-teacher meetings and parent daytime interaction with teachers and staff, but Defendants failed to take any action. On December 4, 1996, an Individual Evaluation Plan Committee ("IEPC") meeting comprised of the Franklins and Defendants was held to address the Franklins' concerns about Frid. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Franklins, who were unsatisfied with the outcome, requested a due process hearing. The Franklins also removed Craig and Eric from Holton and home-schooled them until they were admitted to Mona Shores Schools.¹

On February 13, 1997, James Flaggert, the Special Education Due Process Hearing Officer appointed by the Michigan Department of Education to hear the dispute, arranged a conference call between the Franklins' counsel and Defendant Kevin Magin, Director of the Special Education program at Holton. During the conference call, the Franklins' counsel took the position that the due process hearing should be dismissed as moot because Craig had withdrawn from Holton with no intent to reenter. (See Pls.' Mem. Fed. Ques. Juris. Ex. C at 1.) Subsequently, the hearing officer determined in a written opinion that the matter was moot and dismissed the proceeding. The Franklins filed the instant action on February 4, 1997, one week before the conference call took place.

Legal Standard

Defendants bring their motion under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(c). If matters outside of the pleadings are considered on a motion under that rule, the Court must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Latecoere Int'l, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356 (11th Cir.1994). If the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to present summary judgment evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); see also Krijn v. Pogue Simone Real Estate Co., 896 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir.1990).

Both parties have submitted evidence outside of the pleadings in their respective arguments in support of and in opposition to Defendants' motion. In addition, the Franklins cite summary judgment standards and contend that the motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment. (See Pls.' Br. Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 3-4.) The Court concludes that summary judgment is the proper procedure for resolving Defendants' motion because neither party's arguments are limited to matters solely contained in the pleadings.

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.1992)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Discussion

I. The IDEA

The IDEA, originally enacted by Congress in 1970 as the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), makes funds available to states for special education on the condition that states implement policies assuring a "free appropriate public education" for all handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). The primary mechanism for assuring a free appropriate public education is the development of a detailed, individualized instruction plan known as an Individualized Education Program ("IEP"). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18)(D), 1414(a)(5). To the extent possible, however, a school must "mainstream" disabled children into regular education settings. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).

The IDEA also provides certain procedural safeguards to parents. For example, parents may examine all relevant records regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of their children; must receive prior written notice if a school proposes or refuses to alter the child's identification, evaluation, or educational placement; may contest in an impartial due process hearing decisions regarding the education of their disabled child; and may obtain judicial review of an administrative decision regarding the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C), (b)(2), and (e)(2).

Michigan has implemented the IDEA through the Mandatory Special Education Act, M.C.L. §§ 380.1701-380.1766 ("MSEA"). The MSEA provides detailed procedures for seeking administrative review of a violation of the IDEA by a school district. See Waterman v. Marquette-Alger Intermed. Sch. Dist., 739 F.Supp. 361, 365-66 (W.D.Mich.1990)(summarizing administrative review process under MSEA). The IDEA does not preclude a disabled child from pursuing other available remedies under federal law in state or federal court, provided that the child first exhausts all administrative remedies available under state law where the relief sought is available under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f);² see also Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (6th Cir.1989)(holding that parents were required to exhaust EHA (now IDEA) review procedures before seeking review of proposed IEP in federal court).

The importance and policy goals of the administrative process, especially the fact-finding aspect, were summarized by the Sixth Circuit in Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933 (6th Cir.1989):

The policies underlying this exhaustion requirement are both sound and important. States are given the power to place themselves in compliance with the law, and the incentive to develop a regular system for fairly resolving conflicts under the [IDEA]. Federal courts — generalists with no expertise in the educational needs of handicapped students — are given the benefit of expert factfinding by a state agency devoted to this very purpose. Such a mechanism is necessary to give effect to a fundamental policy underlying the [IDEA]: "that the needs of handicapped children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child's education". Were federal courts to set themselves up as the initial arbiters of handicapped children's educational needs before the administrative process is used, they would endanger not only the procedural but also the substantive purposes of the Act.

Id. at 935 (citation omitted)(quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984)).

II. Application of IDEA Exhaustion Requirement

Defendants' primary contention is that the Franklins' § 1983 claim seeks relief available under the IDEA and, therefore, the Franklins' § 1983 claim should be dismissed without prejudice because they have not exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. In responding to Defendants'...