Franklin v. Omaha Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:21CV101 |
| Parties | MICHAEL FRANKLIN, Plaintiff, v. OMAHA HOUSING AUTHORITY, CARMELA SMITH, and GENERAL ASSISTANCE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff lived in a subsidized low-income apartment in Omaha, Nebraska. Plaintiff claims he never failed to pay rent on time, but the Omaha Housing Authority ("OHA")1 wrongfully terminated his lease because of the false accusation that Plaintiff used threatening language to OHA staff. Plaintiff claims that, in reality, his lease was terminated after he reported apartment site manager Carmela Smith forreceiving and stealing Plaintiff's housing-assistance money and then attempting to charge Plaintiff for rent for which Smith and the OHA had already received payment.
Plaintiff alleges that after he realized that OHA and Smith were "involved in an illegal and fraudulent act of receiving Plaintiff's housing assistance welfare funds in the name of Plaintiff," Plaintiff reported the situation to Defendant General Assistance2 in an effort to "get documents regarding Plaintiff's housing assistance welfare funds." Instead of helping Plaintiff, General Assistance supported OHA and Smith and threatened and harassed the Plaintiff for withholding housing assistance welfare funds. (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 8.)
Attached to Plaintiff's Complaint is a copy of a June 30, 2021, order from the Douglas County Court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's attempt to dismiss an October 21, 2020, judgment3 entered in favor of the OHA for possession/eviction and writ of restitution with regard to the same premises at issue here. (Filing 8.) TheJune 30, 2021, order noted that although Plaintiff had the opportunity to appeal the eviction judgment, he chose not to do so, so he was barred from relitigating the merits of that claim.
Here, the Plaintiff demands $15,000 from the OHA, Smith, and General Assistance for discrimination, wrongful termination of lease, breach of contract, harassment, fraud, and violation of the Eighth Amendment and the "Equal right Amendment." (Filings 1 & 7.)
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiff's challenge to his eviction through his claims for the wrongful termination of his lease, breach of contract, and fraud is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to state-court judgments and state proceedings. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005). See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Specifically, the doctrine "bars federal courts from hearing cases brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging 'injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.'" Mosby, 418 F.3d at 931 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)). Put simply, a federal district court does not possess authority in a civil rights case to review or alter a final judgment of a state-court judicial proceeding. See West v. Crnkovich, No. 8:12CV273, 2013 WL 2295461, at *3 (D. Neb. May 24, 2013); see also Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (). As alleged, Plaintiff essentially asks the court to reject the state court's eviction determination, and this court lacks jurisdiction to do so.
Plaintiff asserts, presumably under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Defendants discriminated against, harassed, and retaliated against him contrary to federal law and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the "Equal right Amendment" of the United States Constitution by terminating his lease. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must showthat the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations are perhaps meant to suggest discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (Westlaw 2021). Under the FHA, a tenant subject to unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation can bring a private cause of action seeking damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3613; Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp, 351 F.3d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 2003).
The FHA prevents discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). "Disparate-treatment claims under the FHA are tested under the same framework as Title VII disparate-treatment claims." Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff fails to state a discrimination claim under the FHA because he makes no allegations regarding his race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or that such characteristics were the basis for his eviction. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts indicating that the OHA subjected him to unwelcome harassment based on such characteristics and that this unwelcome harassment was sufficiently severe to deprive him of his right to enjoy his home. Neudecker, 351 F.3d at 364 (); see also United States v. Hurt, 676 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2012) ().
In addition to claims based on discrimination and harassment, the FHA also makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyedany right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 3617; Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 838 (8th Cir. 2010). Unlawful conduct under this section includes "[r]etaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint . . . under the Fair Housing Act." 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5). See, e.g., Mehta v. Beaconridge Improvement Ass'n, 432 F. App'x 614, 617, 2011 WL 3203441, at *3 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ().
"To state a claim for retaliation under the FHA, Plaintiff must show: (1) [he] engaged in a protected activity; (2) Defendant was aware of the activity; (3) Defendant took adverse action against [the plaintiff]; and (4) there is a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity." United States v. Edmunds, No. 15-CV-2705, 2016 WL 7670605, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-2705, 2017 WL 102964 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2017). Here, Plaintiff alleges that because he complained that his site manager (Defendant Smith) stole his government-issued rent subsidy and then double-billed him, Defendant Omaha Housing Authority then evicted him. Liberally construing Plaintiff's Complaint, and assuming that Plaintiff's complaint about his site manager was "protected conduct" under the FHA, this would be enough to allege a FHA retaliation claim.
However, documents filed by Plaintiff (Filing 8) and judicially noticed by the court show a state-court judgment in favor of the Omaha Housing Authority and against Plaintiff for restitution of the subsidized premises at issue. Because Plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of the FHA is based on the same eviction, the state-court judgment precludes consideration of such a claim. See Young v. Jackson, 417 F....
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