Franklin v. Sessions, Case No. 3:16–cv–36

• Decision Date: 21 December 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:16–cv–36
• Citation: 291 F.Supp.3d 705
• Parties: Alton C. FRANKLIN, Plaintiff, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General of the United States; Thomas E. Brandon, Acting Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Christopher A. Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and The United States of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

291 F.Supp.3d 705

Alton C. FRANKLIN, Plaintiff,

v.Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General of the United States; Thomas E. Brandon, Acting Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Christopher A. Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and The United States of America, Defendants.

Case No. 3:16–cv–36

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed December 21, 2017

Joshua Prince, Prince Law Offices, P.C., Bechtelsville, PA, for Plaintiff.

Bailey W. Heaps, Dena M. Roth, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

KIM R. GIBSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I.Introduction

Presently pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.(ECF Nos. 31, 36.)DefendantsAttorney GeneralJefferson B. Sessions, III, Acting Director Thomas E. Brandon, Director Christopher A. Wray, and the United States of America move for summary judgment on all currently pending counts² of the Second Amended Complaint.(SeeECF No. 34at 9.)PlaintiffAlton C. Franklin("Mr. Franklin") likewise moves for summary judgment on all remaining counts of the Second Amended Complaint.(See generallyECF No. 40.)These motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.(SeeECFNos. 31–43, 47–52.)

This case arises from Defendants' determination that Mr. Franklin's less-than–24–hour involuntary stay in a hospital for an involuntary emergency mental health examination pursuant to Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("Section 302 of the MHPA"), 50 Pa. Stat.andCons. Stat. Ann. § 7302, resulted in a complete prohibition of Mr. Franklin's ability to ever legally acquire, possess, or use a firearm in his private capacity for the purposes of federal law, namely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)(" Section 922(g)(4)").Mr. Franklin challenges Defendants' position on numerous grounds—on most of which the Court will not now offer an opinion.However, the Court is persuaded that, by its own terms, Section 922(g)(4) does not restrict Mr. Franklin's ability to possess firearms based on a brief emergency mental health examination pursuant to Section 302 of the MPHA that was justified by only the ex parte decisions of a police officer, an unspecified official in the county administrator's office, and a single physician.

Section 922(g)(4) bars firearms possession for only "any person ... who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution."18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).Under the undisputed material facts presented to this Court, Mr. Franklin is not such a person.Therefore, similar to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Rehlander,666 F.3d 45(1st Cir.2012), this Court concludes that Mr. Franklin's right to acquire, possess, and use firearms is unaffected by Section 922(g)(4) because Mr. Franklin was not "adjudicated as a mental defective" or "committed to a mental institution."18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

This Court offers no opinion on any of the remaining claims or arguments of the parties, including, inter alia, alleged violations of Mr. Franklin's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Second Amendment.Rather, the undisputed material facts before this Court show that, by its plain terms and under the canon of constitutional avoidance, Section 922(g)(4) simply does not provide for a restriction of Mr. Franklin's ability to acquire, possess, or use firearms.

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment(ECF No. 36) is GRANTED only as to the inapplicability of the restrictions of Section 922(g)(4) to Mr. Franklin.Otherwise, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment(ECF Nos. 31, 36) are DENIED AS MOOT at this time.

II.Jurisdiction and Venue

All of Mr. Franklin's claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States.The Court, therefore, has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.And, because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Mr. Franklin's claims—namely, his emergency mental health examination—occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania, venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

III.Procedural History

Mr. Franklin initiated this action by filing his Complaint on February 3, 2016(ECF No. 1), which he followed with his First Amended Complaint shortly thereafter on March 15, 2016.(ECF No. 3.)Mr. Franklin's First Amended Complaint alleged four counts against all Defendants: (1) two separate violations of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act ("NIAA"), (2) a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, (3) a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (4) a violation of the Second Amendment.(ECF No. 3.)

On April 11, 2016, Defendants filed their Partial Motion to Dismiss.(ECF No. 5.)By Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 18, 2016, the Court dismissed Count I and Count II of the Amended Complaint.SeeFranklin v. Lynch,No. 3:16-CV-36, 2016 WL 6879265(W.D. Pa.Nov. 21, 2016).The Court granted Mr. Franklin leave to replead his claim under Section 101 of the NIAA, which Mr. Franklin did in his Second Amended Complaint filed on November 30, 2016.(ECF No. 26.)

Mr. Franklin's Second Amended Complaint added some additional content and reorganized its prior claims.(SeeECF No. 26.)The Second Amended Complaint is organized into five counts: (1) a violation of Section 101(c)andSection 105 of the NIAA;(2) a violation of Section 101(a)(4)(D)andSection 101(b)(2)(B) of the NIAA;(3) a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution;(4) a violation of Franklin's Fifth Amendment right to due process; and (5) a violation of the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.(Id.at ¶¶ 49–109.)However, Mr. Franklin concedes that Count I and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint were dismissed by the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 18, 2016(ECF No. 23) and explains that he included those two counts only "to preserve the issue for appeal, should it become necessary."(SeeECF No. 26at 12 n. 3, 19 n. 7.)Mr. Franklin's request for relief is extensive, featuring various forms of declarative and injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs.(Id. at 26–29.)

Most pertinent here, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 31, 2017.(ECF No. 31.)Mr. Franklin responded with his own Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2, 2017.(ECF No. 36.)All briefing and responses to these two motions concluded on April 14, 2017.(SeeECFNos. 31–43, 47–52.)

IV.Factual History

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.³

The present case arises from Mr. Franklin's involuntary stay in two Pennsylvania hospitals for an emergency mental health examination, in accordance with Section 302 of the MPHA.(ECF No. 35 ¶ 1;ECF No. 43 ¶ 1;ECF No. 42 ¶ 1;ECF No. 50 ¶ 1.)On September 22, 2002, Mr. Franklin arrived at a local police station in Bedford, Pennsylvania with approximately 20 cuts on his arms.(ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 2–4;ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 2–4;ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 1, 3;ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 1, 3.)These lacerations resulted from a "drinking game" in which Mr. Franklin, who was distraught from a recent breakup, and a friend would hit the other person with a butter knife during the course of a card game.(ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 2–4;ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 2–4;ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 1, 3;ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 1, 3.)

Upon arrival at the police station, Mr. Franklin spoke with Officer Chris Simons("Officer Simons") and said that he"need[ed] to talk to someone."(ECF No. 35 ¶ 2;ECF No. 43 ¶ 2;ECF No. 42 ¶ 4;ECF No. 50 ¶ 4.)Officer Simons noted that Mr. Franklin "appear[ed] distraught from a recent break-up in a relationship" and "appear[ed] to be delusional," at which point Officer Simons completed "an application for involuntary commitment."(ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 3, 5;ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 3, 5;ECF No. 42 ¶ 4;ECF No. 50 ¶ 4.)By completing the application, Officer Simons attested that Mr. Franklin was "severely mentally disabled" and "pose[d] a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself."(ECF No. 35 ¶ 5;ECF No. 43 ¶ 5.)Officer Simons's application indicated that Mr. Franklin had "[s]ubstantially mutilated [himself] or attempted to mutilate [himself] substantially and that there is [a] reasonable probability of mutilation unless adequate treatment is afforded."(ECF No. 35 ¶ 6;ECF No. 43 ¶ 6.)Officer Simons's application further stated that Mr. Franklin:

has acted in such manner as to evidence that [he] would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy [his] need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under the act[.]

(ECF No. 35 ¶ 6;ECF No. 43 ¶ 6.)

James W. Redmond, "an official in the county administrator's office,"⁴ reviewed Officer Simons's application and completed a warrant for Mr. Franklin to be admitted to a medical facility for treatment for up to 120 hours.(ECF No. 35 ¶ 8;ECF No. 43 ¶ 8.)Officer Simons then transported Mr. Franklin to UPMC Bedford Memorial Hospital ("UPMC Bedford"), where Franklin was involuntarily admitted for a mental health examination at approximately 1:50 a.m. (ECF No. 35 ¶ 10;ECF No. 43 ¶ 10;ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 4–5;ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 4–5.)

Mr. Franklin's treating physician, Dr. Christine M. Pluto("Dr. Pluto") observed Mr. Franklin's lacerated arms, opined that Franklin "is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment," and added that "[Mr. Franklin] should be admitted to a facility designated by the County Administrator for a period not to exceed 120 hours."(ECF No. 35 ¶ 10;ECF No. 43 ¶ 10.)Dr. Pluto diagnosed Mr. Franklin...