Franklin v. State

• Decision Date: 30 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC03-413.,SC03-413.
• Citation: 887 So. 2d 1063
• Parties: Corey FRANKLIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

887 So.2d 1063

Corey FRANKLIN, Petitioner, v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC03-413.

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 30, 2004.

Rehearing Denied November 19, 2004.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Lisa Walsh and Billie Jan Goldstein, Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, C.J.

The issue in this case is the constitutionality of chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida(the "Act"), designated by the Legislature as the "Three-Strike Violent Felony Offender Act."The specific constitutional question presented is whether the fourteen provisions of the Act"embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith" as mandated by article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, the single subject clause.¹We have jurisdiction based on certified conflict among the district courts of appeal.²For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that the Act does not violate the single subject clause of the Florida Constitution.

I.SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 99-188

Chapter 99-188, enacted during the 1999 legislative session, became effective July 1, 1999.Chapter 99-188 is identified at the beginning of its full title as "an act relating to sentencing."The remainder of the full title sets forth the statutory provisions that are enacted or amended in the Act.³A lengthy preamble, consisting of twenty-one "Whereas" clauses, follows the full title.⁴The Act contains fourteen separate sections, twelve of which are substantive.Section one sets forth the citation name of the Act as the "Three-Strike Violent Felony Offender Act"⁵ and section fourteen provides an effective date of July 1, 1999.The remaining twelve sections, which are set forth in forty-one pages, may be summarized as follows:

Section 2: expands the definition of "prison release reoffender" in section 775.082, a sentencing statute.

Section 3: amends section 775.084 to redefine "habitual felony offender," to define "three-time felony offender," and to require the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences on persons fitting the definition of "three-time felony offender."

Section 4: amends section 784.07 to provide mandatory minimum sentences for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer.

Section 5: amends section 784.08 to provide a mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated assault on a person 65 years or older and for aggravated battery on a person 65 years or older.

Section 6: amends references to section 775.084 found in section 790.235, in conformity with section 3.

Section 7: creates section 794.0115, which defines "repeat sexual batterer," provides procedures for determining repeat sexual batterer status, and creates a mandatory minimum sentence for persons who qualify.

Section 8: amends section 794.011, wherein the crime "sexual battery" is defined, to refer to new section 794.0115 in punishment provisions.

Section 9: amends section 893.135, which criminalizes trafficking in certain drugs, to expand the definitions of certain trafficking offenses and provide a minimum mandatory sentence for certain trafficking offenses.

Section 10: amends various statutes to incorporate references to section 893.135, as amended bysection 9.

Section 11: amends section 943.0535 to require clerks of court to transmit to the appropriate United States immigration officer records pertaining to aliens who are convicted or who enter a plea to any crime.

Section 12: requires the Governor to publicize the penalties contained in the Act.

Section 13: amends section 810.011 to expand the definition of "conveyance," as used to define burglary, to include a "railroad vehicle,"the statute previously referencing only a "railroad car."

Thus, only two of the Act's twelve substantive sections relate specifically to the "Three-Strike" violent felony provisions: section 3, which amends section 775.084 to define "three-time felony offender" and provide mandatory minimum terms for persons meeting the criteria, and section 6, which amends references to section 775.084 found in section 790.235 to conform to section 3.However, three of the other sections, sections 2,4, and5, establish harsher sentences for violent and repeat offenders.

Four of the remaining sections involve substantive criminal offenses.Section 7 creates the new offense of "repeat sexual batterer" and establishes a mandatory minimum sentence for offenders meeting the criteria for that crime.Section 8 adds references to the new statute defining "repeat sexual batterer" to the sexual battery statute, section 794.011, wherein "sexual battery" is defined.Section 9 modifies the drug trafficking statute to allow prosecution on the basis of the number of cannabis plants that a person possesses, sells, or delivers, and modifies the weight benchmarks for prosecution.Section 9 also establishes minimum mandatory sentences for drug offenses corresponding to a certain quantity.⁶Section 13 amends the definition of conveyance in the burglary statute to include a railroad vehicle.

Finally, the Act contains two administrative provisions.Section 11 requires the clerk of the court to transmit to the appropriate United States immigration officer records pertaining to aliens who are convicted of or who enter a plea to any crime.Section 12 requires the Governor to publish the penalties contained in the Act.

II.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Franklin was convicted of armed robbery and resisting arrest based on acts that occurred after the effective date of chapter 99-188.He received a sentence of forty years in prison as a habitual felony offender, pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes(1999), which had been amended by section 3 of the Act.Franklin's prior criminal history consisted of one felony conviction (possession of cocaine) and one felony for which adjudication of guilt was withheld (burglary of a dwelling).Prior to the Act's amendment to section 775.084, an offense for which adjudication of guilt had been withheld would not have qualified as a predicate for habitual offender sentencing unless the subsequent offenses pending for sentencing was committed while the offender was on probation or community control after the withhold of adjudication.See§ 775.084(1)(a)(2)(b), Fla. Stat.(Supp.1998).

Franklin appealed.While his appeal was pending, the Second District held in Taylor v. State,818 So.2d 544(Fla. 2d DCA2002), that the Act violated the single subject requirement of article III, section 6.Relying on Taylor, Franklin filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).The trial court granted the motion and the State appealed to the Third District.In State v. Franklin,836 So.2d 1112(Fla. 3d DCA2003), the Third District held that the Act did not violate the constitutional requirement of a single subject.The Third District also certified conflict with Taylor on whether the Act violates the single subject requirement.

III.DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS

We begin with a review of the different approaches employed by the district courts of appeal that have addressed the single subject challenge to chapter 99-188.In Taylor, the Second District began its analysis by identifying the topics to which the various provisions relate.See818 So.2d at 546.In attempting to discern the single subject, the Taylor court noted that the Act's lengthy preamble "evinces the legislators' concern with the crime rate in Florida and the fact that felons, particularly violent and repeat offenders, are not being sentenced to the maximum terms allowed under Florida law."Id. at 547-48.The Second District observed that most of the sections of the Act address sentencing and impose minimum mandatory terms.Seeid. at 548.According to the district court, of the sections that do not address sentencing, one creates an offense involving repeat crimes of violence punishable by a mandatory minimum term, and four merely implement changes made in other provisions of the Act.Seeid. at 549.The Second District then determined that all of the sections but two address a "single subject because they are naturally and logically related to each other and to the legislatively stated purpose of the act."Id.

The Second District concluded that section 13, which amended the substantive definition of conveyance in the burglary statute to include a "railroad vehicle," is not a sentencing provision, and does not concern violent or repeat offenders.According to the Second District,

[t]his slight expansion of a substantive criminal offense has only an attenuated relationship to sentencing or to the other sections of the act, in that it might be argued that under the broader definition of a conveyance more felons could be convicted of "armed burglary," one of the qualifying crimes for three-strikes sentencing.But that relationship is so tenuous, so dependent on the happenstance of individual cases, that it simply cannot be characterized as natural or logical.

Id. at 549(citation omitted).

The Second District further concluded that section 11, which concerns a purely administrative subject, bears even less relationship than section 13 to the Act's other provisions and that it impermissibly combines civil and criminal subjects in violation of the single subject rule.Thus, the court ruled the entire Act unconstitutional.Seeid. at 549-50.⁷

Directly contrary to Taylor, the Third District, sitting en banc, held in Franklin that there was no single subject violation.SeeFranklin,836 So.2d at 1114.⁸Rather than specifically define the single subject, the Third District focused on the purpose of the Act.Noting that the statute is designed to "protect the public from repeat and serious violent felony offenders," the Third...