Franklin v. Woodmere at the Lake

• Decision Date: 10 February 2012
• Docket Number: 2100692.
• Citation: 89 So.3d 144
• Parties: Nue Cheer FRANKLIN v. WOODMERE AT THE LAKE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

89 So.3d 144

Nue Cheer FRANKLIN

v.WOODMERE AT THE LAKE.

2100692.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 21, 2011.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2012.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 10, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1110455.

Nue Cheer Franklin, pro se.

Submitted on appellant's brief only.

PER CURIAM.

Nue Cheer Franklin appeals from the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court entered in favor of Woodmere at the Lake (“Woodmere”) ¹ after a jury trial. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

In December 2008, Franklin began leasing and residing in an apartment located in an apartment complex known as Woodmere at the Lake. On July 21, 2009, Woodmere filed an unlawful-detainer action against Franklin in the Montgomery District Court. It alleged that Franklin had breached her lease agreement by failing to make rental payments under the agreement. It demanded possession of the apartment. Franklin, acting pro se, filed a counterclaim against Woodmere, asserting, among other things, that Woodmere had breached the lease agreement, had breached its “fiduciary duty” to her by failing to make repairs she had requested to the apartment, had been negligent in its maintenance of her apartment and of the apartment grounds, had constructively evicted her, and had invaded her privacy by repeatedly entering her apartment without her consent.

In August 2009, the district court held a trial. On December 11, 2009, it entered a judgment awarding possession of the apartment to Woodmere and finding in favor of Franklin on her counterclaims. The district court set a hearing on damages for February 4, 2010. After Franklin did not appear for the hearing, the district court reset the hearing. Franklin did not appear at the second hearing. On March 3, 2010, after it had held the second hearing, the district court entered a judgment for Woodmere in the amount of $8,540; it awarded nothing to Franklin on her counterclaims. Franklin filed a motion to set aside the district court's order, asserting that she had been 10 minutes late to the first hearing, arriving just after Woodmere's counsel had left, and that she had never received notice of the setting of the second hearing. The district court denied Franklin's motion. Franklin filed a timely appeal to the Montgomery Circuit Court.

On August 9, 2010, Franklin, who continued to act pro se, filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. The circuit court set the case for a jury trial on February 7, 2011. On February 7, counsel for Woodmere sought a continuance because one of Woodmere's two witnesses was unavailable. Over Franklin's objection, the circuit court continued the trial until February 9, 2011. The circuit judge stated that the parties could depose any witness who had appeared for the trial on February 7 and would not be able to return on February 9.

At the trial, the parties called several witnesses. Following the presentation of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Woodmere on its unlawful-detainer claim, awarding it $7,715. The jury also found in favor of Woodmere on Franklin's counterclaims. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Woodmere based on the jury's verdict. Franklin filed a postjudgment motion, which the circuit court denied. Franklin also filed a motion seeking to have the circuit judge presiding over the action recuse himself on the basis that he had “demonstrated personal prejudice and disdain for Franklin and pro se litigants in general” and that he “allows his contempt to influence his overtly bias[ed] rulings when presiding over cases.” The circuit court denied that motion as well. Franklin filed a timely appeal to our supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7, Ala.Code 1975.

Franklin contends that because Woodmere did not file an appeal to the circuit court from the district court's holding in her favor on her counterclaims, the district court's holding on her counterclaims became “the law of the case” and the relitigation of her counterclaims in the circuit court was therefore barred. Similarly, she contends that, based on the doctrine of res judicata, the district court's holding in her favor on the merits of her counterclaims barred the relitigation of the merits of her counterclaims in the circuit court. We disagree.

Generally, an appeal from district court to circuit court results in a trial de novo. See§ 12–12–71, Ala.Code 1975 (“Except as provided in Section 12–12–72 and in subsection (e) of Section 12–15–120, all appeals from final judgments of the district court shall be to the circuit court for trial de novo.”).² Recently, this court described the effect of a de novo appeal from district court to circuit court:

“Section 12–12–71, Ala.Code 1975, provides that, with certain exceptions that are not applicable in this case, ‘all appeals from final judgments of the district court shall be to the circuit court for trial de novo.’ ‘ “Alabama cases have consistently held that a trial de novo means an entirely new trial, ‘as if no trial had ever been had, and just as if it had originated in the circuit court.’ Cloverleaf Land Co. v. State, 276 Ala. 443, 163 So.2d 602 (1964).” ' State v. Reynolds, 887 So.2d 848, 853 (Ala.2004) (quoting Ex parte Palughi, 494 So.2d 404, 408 (Ala.1986)). ‘A trial de novo ... means “trying anew the matters involved in the original hearing as if they had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously entered.” ’ Neal v. First Alabama Bank of Huntsville, N.A., 440 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (quoting Rudolph v. State, 286 Ala. 189, 190, 238 So.2d 542, 543 (1970)) (emphasis omitted).”

Petersen v. Woodland Homes of Huntsville, Inc., 959 So.2d 135, 139 (Ala.Civ.App.2006). Furthermore, “[b]ecause the circuit court tries de novo the case appealed from the district court's judgment, the district court's judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata.” Id. at 140.

The effect of Franklin's appeal to the circuit court was to bring the entire case to the circuit court, including all the claims that were part of the proceeding in the district court. See Thurman v. Thurman, 454 So.2d 995, 997 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). In Thurman, a father filed an action against his son in district court to recover personal property in the son's possession. The son filed an answer and a counterclaim, asserting ownership of the property, seeking the return of certain property the father had taken, and seeking an award of damages. The district court ruled in favor of the son on the father's claim and in favor of the father on the son's counterclaim. The son filed an appeal to the circuit court; the father did not. The circuit court tried the case de novo and entered a judgment awarding some of the property at issue to the father, awarding some of the property at issue to the son, and finding in favor of the father on the son's counterclaim.

On appeal, this court discussed the effect of the son's appeal from the district court to the circuit court, holding that both parties' claims in the district court, not just the son's, were part of the case in the circuit court. After reviewing the applicable legal principles, we stated:

“Applying these principles to the case at bar, we observe that the son's appeal of the district court's judgment had the effect of bringing up to the circuit court the entire judgment of the district court, not just the ruling on the counterclaim. This means that the case was to be retried completely in the circuit court. The father was required to prosecute his complaint and the son was required to prosecute his counterclaim. The case could be tried on pleadings filed in the district court or amendments could be made to those pleadings or additional pleadings could be filed in the circuit court. Vinyard v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 205 Ala. 269, 87 So. 552 (1921).”

Thurman, 454 So.2d at 997.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Franklin's appeal to the circuit court from the district court's judgment rendered the district court's judgment ineffectual for res judicata purposes and brought the entire case before the circuit court for a trial de novo. The judgment entered in the district court did not have a preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata with regard to any of the claims in the circuit court, and Woodmere itself was not required to file a notice of appeal to the circuit court for that court, based on Franklin's appeal, to acquire jurisdiction over all the claims at issue in the district-court case. See Petersen, 959 So.2d at 139–40;Thurman, 454 So.2d at 997. Franklin's contentions to the contrary are therefore without merit.

Franklin next contends that the circuit court erred when it denied her motion for a summary judgment. Specifically, she argues that she had moved the circuit court to strike the affidavit Woodmere had submitted in opposition to her summary-judgment motion and that the circuit court erred in failing to do so. She argues that, because the affidavit Woodmere submitted was inadmissible, she was entitled to a summary judgment.

This court does not review the denial of a summary judgment after a trial on the merits has been held. See Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196, 1205 (Ala.2006) (“ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits. See Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); see also Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (11th Cir.2001).’ ” (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003))). Because this case was tried on the merits after the circuit court denied Franklin's summary-judgment motion, the denial of that motion is not subject to review. Id.

Even if we were to review the denial of Franklin's summary-judgment motion, we would conclude that she has...