Franson on Behalf of Franson v. Micelli

• Decision Date: 23 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 78421,78421
• Citation: 217 Ill.Dec. 250,666 N.E.2d 1188,172 Ill.2d 352
• Parties: , 217 Ill.Dec. 250 Bonnie FRANSON, on Behalf of Elizabeth FRANSON, a Minor, Appellant, v. Philip MICELLI, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1188

666 N.E.2d 1188

172 Ill.2d 352, 217 Ill.Dec. 250

Bonnie FRANSON, on Behalf of Elizabeth FRANSON, a Minor, Appellant, v. Philip MICELLI, Appellee.

No. 78421.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 23, 1996.

Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney, Chicago (Robert F. Lyons, Leonard N. Foster, Sharon Johnson Coleman and Zeophus Williams, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.

Paul C. Gridelli, of Martin, Breen & Merrick, Oak Park, and Marc W. Martin, of Genson, Steinback, Gillespie & Martin, Chicago, for appellee.

Matthew J. Piers, Jonathan A. Rothstein and Frederick S. Rhine, of Gessler, Hughes & Socol, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae Genetic Design, Inc.

Steven Saltzman, Chicago, for amicus curiae American Association of Blood Banks.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and William D. Leslie and Barbara L. Greenspan, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Department of Public Aid.

Terrence Hegarty and Dennis A. Rendleman, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Bar Ass'n.

Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

Bonnie Franson filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 2501 et seq.) to obtain a judicial determination that Philip Micelli was the natural father of her child, Elizabeth, and to compel Micelli to pay child support and provide health insurance for the child. The issue of paternity was decided by a jury, which returned a verdict finding Micelli to be Elizabeth's natural father. The circuit court entered judgment on that verdict and denied Micelli's post-trial motion.

Micelli then brought an appeal pursuant to Rule 301 (155 Ill.2d R. 301), arguing that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to consider DNA evidence. The appellate court agreed, holding that the DNA evidence should not have been presented to the jury because the statistical method employed by the testing lab to assess the relative frequency of genetic patterns did not satisfy the Frye test (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)) for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Based on this conclusion, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 269 Ill.App.3d 20, 206 Ill.Dec. 399, 645 N.E.2d 404. We then granted Franson's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill.2d R. 315.

The case was argued at this court's November 1995 term and taken under advisement at that time. In preparing a disposition for the case, we discovered that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court had ever ruled on Franson's requests for child support and health insurance for the child. From the materials before us, it appeared that the circuit court's rulings were limited to the question of paternity and that these other matters were still pending. Indeed, Franson's brief specifically requested that in reversing the appellate court's disposition, we should reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand "for proceedings on the issue of support."

In Deckard v. Joiner, 44 Ill.2d 412, 416-17, 255 N.E.2d 900 (1970), this court held that an order establishing fatherhood in a statutory paternity action is not final and appealable where the circuit court has reserved for future determination the amount of child support and expenses for which the father is liable. Based on Deckard and the record before us, we concluded that there was no final judgment and that Micelli, the father, had no basis for invoking the appellate court's jurisdiction.

Where, as here, the appellate court has considered the merits of a case when it had no jurisdiction to do so, we must vacate that court's judgment and dismiss the appeal. Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 162 Ill.2d 205, 205 Ill.Dec. 147, 642 N.E.2d 1264 (1994). This is so even though the jurisdictional defect has not been raised by the parties, for as with any court of review, we have an independent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction is proper. Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill.2d 436, 96 Ill.Dec. 47, 490 N.E.2d 1252 (1985).

Although we could have disposed of the case summarily in accordance with these principles, the proceedings had reached such an advanced stage that we thought it prudent to defer action until the parties had an opportunity to respond. We afforded them such an opportunity by issuing a rule to show cause why the appellate court's judgment should not be vacated and the appeal dismissed. In response, Micelli sought and was granted leave to supplement the record to include additional orders entered by the circuit.

The additional orders, whose authenticity has not been questioned, show that the circuit court did make a ruling on support before Micelli filed his notice of appeal in this case. According to the supplemental record, the circuit court required Micelli to make child support payments of $200 per month, commencing September 22, 1993. In so doing, however, the court expressly deferred ruling on whether Micelli should also be required to provide medical insurance for the child or make retroactive child support payments.

The duty to provide health insurance is an integral part of a parent's current and future support obligations. Under Illinois law, the matters are intertwined. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, pars. 2514, 505.2. Accordingly, where health insurance coverage is requested, the question of support cannot be regarded as fully resolved until the court has ruled on the health insurance as well.

We note, moreover, that our appellate court has held that even after a circuit court has entered an order for support in a paternity action, there is still no final judgment within the meaning of Rule 301 (155 Ill.2d R. 301) if the court has reserved for future consideration issues such as retroactive child support or reimbursement to the mother for the expenses of pregnancy and delivery. See Department of Public Aid ex rel. Chiapelli v. Viviano, 195 Ill.App.3d 1033, 142 Ill.Dec. 747, 553 N.E.2d 97 (5th Dist.1990); Department of Public Aid ex rel. Corrigan v. Hawkins, 187 Ill.App.3d 139, 135 Ill.Dec. 82, 543 N.E.2d 317 (2d Dist.1989); People ex rel. Driver v. Taylor, 152 Ill.App.3d 413, 105 Ill.Dec. 416, 504 N.E.2d 516 (4th Dist.1987). The reason is that these issues are not merely ancillary or incidental, as would be the case with enforcement of a support order or an increase in the amount of...