Frantz v. US

• Decision Date: 13 April 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-483-JLL.
• Citation: 791 F. Supp. 445
• Parties: Florence L. FRANTZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Frantz (Deceased), and individually as widow of James Frantz; James F. Frantz III, surviving son of James F. Frantz; and Robert E. Frantz, surviving son of James F. Frantz; and Thomas E. Frantz, surviving son of James F. Frantz, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL, a Delaware hospital, Brian M. Benson, Jr., M.D.; Christopher Giles, M.D.; Jarrell, Benson & Giles, M.D.'s, P.A., a Delaware professional association; and Jarrell, Benson, Giles & Sweeney, M.D.'s, P.A., a Delaware professional association, Third Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

791 F. Supp. 445

Florence L. FRANTZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Frantz (Deceased), and individually as widow of James Frantz; James F. Frantz III, surviving son of James F. Frantz; and Robert E. Frantz, surviving son of James F. Frantz; and Thomas E. Frantz, surviving son of James F. Frantz, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL, a Delaware hospital, Brian M. Benson, Jr., M.D.; Christopher Giles, M.D.; Jarrell, Benson & Giles, M.D.'s, P.A., a Delaware professional association; and Jarrell, Benson, Giles & Sweeney, M.D.'s, P.A., a Delaware professional association, Third Party Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91-483-JLL.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

April 13, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Jacobs and Marla Eskin of Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiffs.

William C. Carpenter, Jr., U.S. Atty., and Patricia C. Hannigan, Asst. U.S. Atty., Wilmington, Del., for defendant and third party plaintiff.

Mason E. Turner, Jr. of Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Wilmington, Del., for third party defendant Kent General Hosp.

F. Alton Tybout of Tybout, Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, Del., for third party defendants Benson, Giles, Jarrell, Benson & Giles, and Jarrell, Benson, Giles & Sweeney.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LATCHUM, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs filed this action for wrongful death against the United States of America pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. ("FTCA"). The FTCA, a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, conditions judicial action on the presentation of an administrative claim. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 356-57, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Dondero v. United States, 775 F.Supp. 144, 147 (D.Del.1991); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2675. The FTCA is designed to ease court congestion, expedite fair settlement, and provide equitable treatment to the injured individual. Dondero v. United States, 775 F.Supp. at 147 (citing Tucker v. United States Postal Service, 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir.1982)).

This Court's subject matter jurisdiction depends upon the filing of a proper "claim," one which gives notice as to the nature/amount of the claim and, if filed on behalf of another, evidence of representative authority. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1990); Dondero v. United States, 775 F.Supp. at 148-9; Martinez v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 298, 302 (D.N.J.1990). If multiple claimants exist, each claimant must individually satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing a proper claim, unless another is legally entitled to assert such a claim on their behalf. Estate of Santos v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 982 (D.Puerto Rico 1981); Pennsylvania v. Nat'l Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975). If multiple claims are asserted on a single claim form, the form must give "constructive notice" sufficient to warrant investigation of each claim. Dondero v. United States, 775 F.Supp. at 148. Mere reference to a related cause of action, based upon the same facts, will be insufficient when it fails to provide the Government notice of the nature and amount of the claim. Id.; Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808 (D.C.Cir.1984).

The pending issue is whether all six plaintiffs have complied with the prerequisites necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. The administratrix of the estate filed a standard claim form with the U.S. Air Force and the plaintiffs contend that this claim form secures jurisdiction for all plaintiffs in the action. The plaintiffs contend that they gave sufficient notice to the Government as to the nature and amount of all claims and, even if the notice was insufficient, the lack of prejudice to the Government precludes dismissal. The United States maintains that the only claim adequately presented to the Air Force was the survivorship claim filed by the administratrix for the estate and that the single administrative claim form did not provide constructive notice of each plaintiff's wrongful death claim. Therefore, the Government argues that all claims except the administratrix's claim are jurisdictionally barred and that a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.

For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant by dismissing from this action all claims of the named plaintiffs other than Florence F. Frantz as Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Frantz.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A sixty-three year old man was admitted to Dover Air Force Base Hospital with a diagnosis of pneumonia on October 30, 1988, transferred to Kent General Hospital on November 1, 1988, and died on November 2, 1988.¹ The decedent left a wife, Florence Frantz, and four adult sons. (Docket Item "D.I." 39 at 11; 40 A-1.)

Upon death, two distinct causes of action may exist: (1) a survival action under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3704 (1977) and (2) a wrongful death action under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3724(d) (Supp.1990). Shively v. Klein, C.A. No. 84C-JL-112, 1986 WL 15432 (Sept. 9, 1986). See Drake v. St. Francis Hospital, 560 A.2d 1059, 1060-62 (Del.1989) (actions can be brought simultaneously; Magee v. Rose, 405 A.2d 143 (Del.Super.Ct.1979) (both actions enacted in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed). A survival action, filed by the personal representative of the estate, recovers any damage sustained by the decedent between the injury and his/her death, for which the decedent could have recovered had he/she lived. Magee v. Rose, 405 A.2d at 147. Thus, a survival action compensates the estate.

A wrongful death action is maintained for the benefit of specified individuals for damage sustained as a result of the decedent's death. It is a derivative claim and, if the action is permitted, each statutory beneficiary is entitled to separate damages upon proof of his/her loss. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3724; Drake v. St. Francis Hospital, 560 A.2d at 1061 (action subject to same limitations as action brought by decedent); Shively v. Klein, C.A. No. 84C-JL-112 at 2 (damages are measured by value of the decedent's life to the person or persons entitled to damages). Thus, a wrongful death action compensates the decedent's loved ones rather than the estate.

On August 6, 1990 Mr. Robert Jacobs of Jacobs & Crumplar sent an administrative claim form² to the Air Force asserting a medical negligence claim by the estate of James Frantz and his heirs. ("D.I." 40 A-3; 45 A-29.) The attorney's cover letter referred to a single "claim" and the undated and unsigned claim form listed the decedent, James Frantz, as the claimant. The claim form indicated that the law firm of Jacobs & Crumplar was the claimant's representative. (D.I. 40 A-33, A-30.) As a result of the alleged negligence, the form stated that the claimant suffered a wrongful death and that the claimant's wife and children, listed as witnesses, suffered economic loss as well as pain and suffering. (D.I. 40 A-33.) The claimant sought to recover in excess of $1,000,000 for personal injury and in excess of $1,000,000 for wrongful death.

Three days later Mr. Jacobs sent a substantively identical administrative claim form, which he signed as the attorney for the claimant. (D.I. 40 A-1, A-2.) Mr. Jacobs stated in his cover letter that he was submitting the claim on behalf of his client, "Florence Frantz who is the spouse and the executrix³ of the estate of the deceased, James Frantz." The cover letter's line of referral specifically addressed James Frantz. (D.I. 40 A-2.) In the cover letter, the attorney again referred to a single "claim" and to an enclosed contract evidencing the law firm's representative capacity for Florence Frantz. (D.I. 40 A-1, A-2, A-9, A-30.)

However, Florence Frantz was not listed on the form as a claimant and she submitted no evidence of authority to act on behalf of the estate of James Frantz.⁴ Because the claim forms, referring to a single deceased claimant, were not accompanied by evidence of legal representation, the Air Force notified Mr. Crumplar of this deficiency. (D.I. 40 A-6; 45 A-2.) Mr. Jacobs had a telephone conversation with the claims officer concerning this deficiency and allegedly informed the officer that he represented Florence Frantz and the decedent's children. Mr. Jacobs filed another claim form on September 12, 1990. (D.I. 45 A-30.) This claim form, substantively identical to the previous forms, was signed by Florence Frantz as Administratrix of the Estate of James Frantz and by Mr. Jacobs as her attorney. (D.I. 40 A-7, A-30; 45 A-3, A-5.) The attorney enclosed evidence of Florence Frantz's status as administratrix of her husband's estate and evidence of his status as attorney for Florence Frantz. (D.I. 40 A-8, A-9.)

The Air Force denied the administrative claim for "the estate of James Frantz" brought by "Florence Frantz, Administratrix of the estate of James Frantz." (D.I. 45 A-6.) The Air Force found "no fault with the care rendered by Air Force doctors." (D.I. 45 A-6.) On August 30, 1991, plaintiffs filed this action under the FTCA alleging wrongful death as a result of medical negligence. (D.I. 1.) The complaint asserts wrongful death claims by the estate of James Frantz, the decedent's four children and by his widow, Florence Frantz. (D.I. 1.)

II. DISCUSSION

The Government contends that, while the administratrix of the estate asserted a proper survivor claim under the FTCA, the mere mention of additional wrongful death claims for unidentified individuals for unspecified amounts does not constitute adequate notice. In response, the plaintiff contends that the claim form gave constructive notice to warrant investigation into the wrongful death claims. Allegedly, this constructive notice arose from: (1) the stated injury suffered by the claimant's wife and children in the second sentence of question # 10; (2) the listing of the wife and...