Franz v. Little Black Mutual Ins. Co.

• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Franz v. Little Black Mutual Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 504, 220 Wis.2d 357 (Wis. App. 1998)
• Decision Date: 27 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2719,97-2719
• Parties: NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Mark A. FRANZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LITTLE BLACK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

Page 504

582 N.W.2d 504

220 Wis.2d 357

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES.

Mark A. FRANZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LITTLE BLACK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 97-2719.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

May 27, 1998.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Taylor County: GARY L. CARLSON, Judge. Affirmed.

Before CANE, P.J., and MYSE and HOOVER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Mark Franz appeals a summary judgment that dismissed his insurance claim lawsuit against his property insurer, Little Black Mutual Insurance Company. Vandals damaged Franz's rooming house, and he submitted a property damage claim to Little Black. The damage required the building's demolition, and each party had the vandalism damage appraised. The Little Black policy required this traditional two-appraiser process for property damage claims, with an umpire to resolve disputes between the appraisers. Two appraisers reached different appraisals, and in compliance with the policy, the parties submitted their conflicting appraisals to an umpire for resolution. In a letter-ruling, the umpire chose the Little Black appraiser's valuation over Franz's. The trial court rejected Franz's attempt to overturn the umpire's decision. Franz claimed relief because of: (1) Little Black's appraiser's failure to co-sign the umpire's decision as required by the Little Black policy, and (2) the umpire's failure to adopt a specific dollar award for the property damage. The trial court also refused to allow Franz to amend his complaint to attack the substance of the umpire's analysis.

On appeal, Franz raises three arguments: (1) the umpire's letter was not a proper written decision within the meaning of the policy, which required the umpire to set a specific dollar award for damages and the umpire-endorsed appraiser to co-sign the umpire's decision; (2) the trial court should have allowed him to amend his pleading; and (3) the umpire incorrectly chose the appraisal of Little Black's appraiser over Franz's. As part of the third argument, Franz treats the umpire like an arbitrator; he claims that trial courts may upset the umpire's decisions not only for fraud, but also for mistake or perversity. He sees the umpire's decision to undertake the kind of mistaken, perverse analysis that courts have the power to remedy. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment if there was no dispute of material fact and Little Black deserved judgment as a matter of law. See Powalka v. State Life Mut. Assur. Co., 53 Wis.2d 513, 518, 192 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1972). We agree with Franz that umpires' decisions are reversible in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, we reject Franz's arguments and affirm the summary judgment.

Umpires are third parties chosen to resolve disagreements between two arbitrators. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed.1979). Insurance appraisers are not full-fledged arbitrators. See Toledo S.S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 F. 391, 402-07 (6th Cir.1911). They are essentially one-issue decision makers who deal solely with valuation. See id. Nonetheless, courts use the same basic scope of review for appraisers and umpires as they do for arbitrators. See Dechant v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 194 Wis. 579, 582, 217 N.W. 322, 322-23 (1928); Chandos v. American Fire Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 184, 191, 54 N.W. 390, 391-92 (1893). Courts may overturn their decisions for fraud, mistake, or perversity. See Joint Sch. Dist. v. Jefferson Educ. Asso., 78 Wis.2d 94, 116-18, 253 N.W.2d 536, 547 (1977). Moreover, courts give appraisers and umpires a large degree of freedom in their judgments on value; many " 'honest and sensible judgments' " rest on " 'an intuition and experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions--impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth.' " See Eau Claire v. Eau Claire Water Co., 137 Wis. 517, 529-30, 119 N.W. 555, 560 (1909) (quoting Chicago B. & . Q.R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598, 27 S.Ct. 326, 51 L.Ed. 636 (1907) (Holmes, J.)).

We first conclude that the umpire's letter-ruling sufficiently met the policy's twin requirements that the umpire set a specific sum and that the umpire-endorsed appraiser co-sign the umpire's ruling. The umpire's ruling reviewed and incorporated Little Black's appraiser's valuation in substance, even if the ruling never set a specific sum. The umpire's ruling implicitly adopted and incorporated that appraisal's damage sum when his ruling endorsed that appraiser's valuation methods and found that appraisal to be "an appropriately supported conclusion of value."

The umpire also seems to have inadvertently overlooked the co-signing formality. Errors on immaterial points provide no basis to overturn the umpire's decision. See Donaldson v. Buhlman, 134 Wis. 117, 119-20, 113 N.W. 638, 639 (1908). We cannot perceive how the co-signing defect, if a real defect, was material to the umpire's ruling...