Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co.
| Citation | 959 F.2d 628 |
| Decision Date | 26 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1929,89-1929 |
| Parties | 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,362 Shirley FRANZEL; and Fred Franzel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KERR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Allen J. Counard (argued and briefed), Trenton, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald A. Van Suilichem (argued and briefed), Van Suilichem & Brown, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for defendant-appellee.
Before: KEITH and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; and JOHNSTONE, District Judge. *
Plaintiffs, Shirley and Fred Franzel, appeal a judgment in favor of defendant, Kerr Manufacturing Company, on various employment related claims. Because the overriding issue on appeal concerns the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court after removal of the claims from a state court, an issue which was not raised before the trial court and has not been directly addressed in our circuit, we discuss it below. All other issues raised by the appeal are addressed in an unpublished appendix to this opinion.
According to both the unverified complaint filed in state court and defendant's verified petition for removal, plaintiffs are citizens of the State of Michigan. The complaint alleges that defendant is a "New Jersey corporation ... doing business in ... Michigan." The petition for removal, however, says defendant "is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in ... New Jersey and ... is not a citizen of ... Michigan." The complaint names "Kerr/Division of Sybron Corporation" as the defendant, while the petition for removal refers to "Kerr Manufacturing Company, a subsidiary of Sybron Corporation, a Delaware corporation." Neither document alludes to whether Kerr is a separately incorporated subsidiary.
Shirley Franzel accepted a position as a sales representative with defendant in 1981, and was promoted to district manager two years later. While she was considered an excellent salesperson, defendant terminated her employment in 1986, due to what the company considered deficiencies in her managerial skills.
In response to the termination, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Wayne County, Michigan, Circuit Court, alleging wrongful discharge, negligent evaluation, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and loss of consortium. Upon a timely petition by defendant, the action was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and plaintiffs did not seek to remand the case to state court.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on the negligent evaluation, sex discrimination, and harassment claims. Following a twenty-one day trial, the jury decided all the remaining claims in favor of defendant.
On appeal, plaintiffs for the first time argue that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because diversity of citizenship was lacking. They contend that defendant's principal place of business was not New Jersey, as stated in the removal petition, but rather Michigan, since the company's "worldwide headquarters and United States manufacturing operations are housed in facilities in Romulus, Michigan."
District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). A corporation is deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated, and of any state in which its principal place of business is located. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A multi-state corporation therefore is invested with dual citizenship--it "must be treated as a citizen both of its state of incorporation and of the state of its principal place of business." Schwartz v. Electronics Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 284 (6th Cir.1990). Accordingly, even though defendant may be incorporated in Delaware or New Jersey, if its principal place of business is in Michigan, diversity is lacking, since plaintiffs are citizens of Michigan.
While it offends one's sense of fairness and disrupts the efficient administration of the courts when a party waits for an unfavorable outcome before questioning subject-matter jurisdiction, a long line of federal cases accords unique status to challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982) (); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 390, 394 n. 3, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972) (); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tyree v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co.
...we must take note of want of jurisdiction in the district court even though neither party has raised the point."); Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that "subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or even sua sponte by the court it......
-
Norris v. Schotten
...Ry. Co., 13 F.3d 184, 189 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1084, 114 S.Ct. 1835, 128 L.Ed.2d 463 (1994); Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628, 630 & n. 1 (6th Cir.1992).6 Section 1 of Article III states that:The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Cou......
-
U.S. v. Andreas, 96 CR 762.
...Citing United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Faurote, 749 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1984); Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628 (6th Cir.1992); and United States v. Chaudhry, 850 F.2d 851 (1st Cir.1988), Wilson and Andreas argue that the admission of the Whitacre......
-
Adland v. Russ
...210 (1998); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908); Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628, 630 & n. 1 (6th Cir. 1992). "[R]ipeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refu......