Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CV-0150.,97-CV-0150. |
| Citation | 89 F.Supp.2d 270 |
| Parties | Olof FRANZON, M.D. and Women's Medical & Surgical Health Care, P.C., Plaintiffs, v. MASSENA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Board of Managers of Massena Memorial Hospital, Medical Executive Committee of Massena Memorial Hospital, Jayant J. Jhaveri, M.D., James B. Watson, Bedros Bakirtzian, Christine Rowe-Button, M.D., Sateesh K. Goswami, M.D., Steven Schwam, M.D., Melchiore L. Buscemi, M.D., Edward Burke, M.D., Kenneth Maxik, M.D., Tae-Sik Choi, M.D., Michael Maresca, M.D., Lois Nicandri, and Tina Corcoran, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Mitchell G. Mandell, Pollack, Green Law Firm, New York City, for Plaintiffs.
Donald P. Ford, Jr., Thuillez, Ford Law Firm, Albany, NY, Mae A. D'Agostino, Christine K. Krackeler, D'Agostino, Krackeler Law Firm, Menands, NY, Stephen T. Helmer, Mackenzie, Smith Law Firm, Syracuse, NY, Alvin O. Sabo, Donohue, Sabo Law Firm, Albany, NY, James D. Lantier, Smith, Sovik Law Firm, Syracuse, NY, Frances A. Ciardullo, Fager, Amsler Law Firm, Syracuse, NY, Terence P. O'Connor, O'Connor, O'Connor Law Firm, Albany, NY, Thomas S. Brett, Office of Thomas Brett, Syracuse, NY, James P. Bessette, Fischer, Bessette Law Firm, Malone, NY, Mark W. Blanchfield, Bouck, Holloway Law Firm, Albany, NY, for Defendants.
The instant matter has been the subject of several prior Memorandum—Decision & Orders ("MDOs"), see Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp., 189 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.N.Y.1999); Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp., 32 F.Supp.2d 528 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Franzon II"); Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 160 (N.D.N.Y.1997), and the more recent Decisions & Orders dated August 9, 1999, October 19, 1999, and October 26, 1999, Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp., 97-CV-150, familiarity with which are assumed. The Court will not now rehash the facts or procedural history surrounding this litigation. Rather, the reader is referred to the prior decisions.
In short, as is pertinent to the instant motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has commenced the instant litigation against Defendant Tae-Sik Choi, M.D. ("Choi,"), and other Defendants, alleging that Choi participated with other Defendants in a conspiracy to deprive him of his First Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated against him for speaking in favor of offering nurse-midwifery services at Massena Memorial Hospital ("MMH") and speaking out about the high rate of Caesarian section deliveries at MMH. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have engaged in a campaign of overt and malicious acts to silence him consisting of: (1) making defamatory statements about his competence as a physician; (2) refusing to provide patients with insurance referrals; (3) maliciously filing false or de minimis complaints in his credentials files; and (4) refusing to renew his medical privileges at the MMH. Plaintiff also asserts claims against Choi for defamation and the tortious interference with business relations.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Choi's motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 seeking dismissal of the Complaint against him in its entirety.
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled and need not be restated here. This Court has set forth the appropriate summary judgment standard in several reported decisions, see, e.g., Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.Supp.2d 195, 205 (N.D.N.Y.1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.2000), and will apply that same standard to Choi's pending motion.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Choi, along with the other Defendants, engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his First Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Choi and the others retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech. Choi moves for summary judgment on the ground that he was not a state actor and, thus, cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment arguing that Choi conspired with the other Defendants, who were state actors, to deprive him of his First Amendment rights and, accordingly, his actions can be considered to have been taken under color of state law.
It hardly need be said that claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have two "essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of her federal statutory rights, or her constitutional rights or privileges." Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir.1998). For purposes of the instant motion, only the first element—whether Choi was acting under color of state law—is at issue.1
Ordinarily, "substantive claims under § 1983 are ... brought only against state officials." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189, 116 S.Ct. 1676, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996). However, an ordinary citizen who conspires with a state agent to violate a plaintiff's civil rights may also be liable. See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998); Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. Thus, assuming for purposes of this motion that Plaintiff has suffered a constitutional injury, the question is whether there are sufficient facts before the Court from which a jury reasonably could conclude that Choi conspired with Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
"To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999). "While conclusory allegations of a § 1983 conspiracy are insufficient, ... such conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations, and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has instructed that:
[T]o state a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, the complaint must contain more than mere conclusory allegations.... And while a plaintiff should not plead mere evidence, he should make an effort to provide some details of time and place and the alleged effect of the conspiracy. Thus, complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Choi moves for summary judgment claiming that he did not participate in any alleged conspiracy and that there is no evidence suggesting that he acted in furtherance of any such conspiracy. In support of his motion, Choi submits portions of Plaintiff's deposition testimony wherein Plaintiff states that (1) Choi was not a member of the Medical Executive Committee ("MEC") that recommended that Plaintiff's hospital privileges not be renewed; (2) Choi was not a member of the credentials committee that recommended that Plaintiff's hospital privileges not be renewed; (3) he is unaware of any input Choi had into the recommendation of the credentials committee; (4) he is unaware of any instance when Choi filed any complaints against him; (5) Choi did not testify against him at the fair hearing; (6) Choi did not provide expert testimony on any of the patient charts discussed at the fair hearing; (7) Choi did not provide expert testimony whether Lynn Wheeler, a nurse midwife, exceeded the delineation of her privileges; (8) there was no criticism of Plaintiff at the fair hearing by Choi; (9) none of the charges brought by the MEC dealt with Choi; and (10) Choi was not involved in the MEC's recommendation with respect to, or development of, the nurse midwifery protocol. See June 8, 1998 Franzon Dep. at 582-93. Choi also submits an affidavit stating that he was never a member of any hospital board or committee that considered Plaintiff's reappointment, he did not have any input into the preparation or filing of any charges by the MEC against Plaintiff or the decision not to renew his privileges, and he never filed any charges or complaints against Plaintiff. See July 16, 1999 Choi Aff. at ¶¶ 4-7. The minutes of the various hospital committees submitted by Choi supports his contentions. See Nov. 15, 1999 Ford Aff.Exs. C, D, K. This evidence offered by Choi is sufficient to sustain his burden on summary judgment demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. It, therefore, is incumbent on Plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to support the inference that an improper conspiracy took place. See Scotto, 143 F.3d at 114.
In opposition to Choi's motion, Plaintiff contends that: (1) Choi and the other Defendants had a unity of purpose and that Choi stood to benefit from the conspiracy because he was the Chief of Obstetrics and MMH's only other OB/GYN practitioner; (2) Choi and Plaintiff had a hostile work relationship; (3) Franzon made public statements regarding Choi's "inexplicable and outrageous" Caesarian section rate, see Pl.Mem. of Law at 13; (4) Choi, as Chief of Obstetrics at MMH, embarked on a "surreptitious effort to recruit Franzon's replacement ... well before the determination by the Hospital to revoke Franzon's privileges," Pl.Mem. of Law at 13; (5) MMH granted hospital privileges to the "replacement physician" the very same day the MEC finalized the "revocation of Franzon's privileges," Pl.Mem. of Law at 13; (6) Choi...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cusamano v. Sobek
...in reviewing evidence that he should have made the Court aware of in the first place. 23. See, e.g., Franzon v. Massena Mem'l Hosp., 89 F.Supp.2d 270, 275 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (McAvoy, C.J.) (noting that "while there is clear evidence of dislike between [Defendant] and Plaintiff, that evidence al......
-
Molecular Diagnostics Lab. v. Hoffmann-La Roche
...is inapposite. Both Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel S.A., 861 F.Supp. 653 (N.D.Ill.1994), and Franzon v. Massena Mem'l Hosp., 89 F.Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y.2000), are cases decided on motions for summary 12. In addition, the complaint alleges coordinated enforcement of the '818 pate......
-
Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hosp.
...ten-year old litigation has been the subject of several prior Memorandum — Decision and Orders. See e.g., Franzon v. Massena Memorial Hospital, 89 F.Supp.2d 270 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (dismissing Franzon's claims for defamation and tortious interference with business relations against defendant Cho......
-
Mahmud v. Kaufmann, 05 Civ. 8090(WCC).
...this basis alone, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's tortious interference claim. See Franzon v. Massena Mem'l Hosp., 89 F.Supp.2d 270, 281 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (Granting summary judgment on plaintiff-physician's tortious interference with business relations claim where, a......