Franzosa v. Franzosa

• Decision Date: 05 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-P-777,19-P-777
• Citation: 98 Mass.App.Ct. 179,153 N.E.3d 404
• Parties: Patricia Ann FRANZOSA v. Steven Dominic FRANZOSA.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

98 Mass.App.Ct. 179

153 N.E.3d 404

Patricia Ann FRANZOSA

v.Steven Dominic FRANZOSA.

No. 19-P-777

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex..

Argued March 10, 2020.

Decided August 5, 2020.

Mary-Ellen Manning for the husband.

Daniel P. Tarlow for the wife.

Present: Milkey, Lemire, & McDonough, JJ.

MCDONOUGH, J.

Steven Dominic Franzosa (husband) and Patricia Ann Franzosa (wife) were divorced on December 7, 2017, pursuant to a judgment of divorce nisi (judgment nisi) incorporating their separation agreement of the same date. The husband thereafter filed a statement of objections, pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 58 (c), seeking to prevent certain aspects of the judgment nisi from becoming absolute¹ on the basis that the wife had allegedly misrepresented her financial circumstances to procure a more favorable property and alimony settlement. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, a judge of the Probate and Family Court issued an order dismissing the husband's statement of objections, from which the husband now appeals. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts found by the judge, supplementing them with undisputed evidence in the record. See Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288, 916 N.E.2d 330 (2009). The parties were married in 1983. During the marriage, the husband was the primary wage-earner, working full-time as a firefighter. The wife was the primary caregiver to the parties' three children, and also worked part-time in a public school cafeteria. The parties enjoyed a modest, "middle income" lifestyle during their long-term marriage.

In 2006, the wife's parents executed a deed transferring their interest in a house located in Revere (Revere home) to the wife and her two siblings, Michael and Camille.² In September 2016, Michael purchased Camille's interest in the Revere home and took out a mortgage on the property, which the wife signed as a "Non-Applicant Title Holder."

In December 2016, the wife initiated a divorce action. On December 7, 2017, the parties executed a separation agreement and presented it to the Probate and Family Court, along with their financial statements listing their respective incomes, expenses, assets, and liabilities. The separation agreement provided, in relevant part, that: (1) the husband would pay the wife weekly alimony of $300, which obligation would be secured with a $100,000 life insurance policy benefiting the wife; (2) the parties would share equally in the net proceeds from the sale of the marital home; (3) the wife would retain her interest in the Revere home; (4) the parties would equally divide the husband's pension and annuity; and (5) in consideration of the parent plus education loan incurred by the husband on behalf of the parties' children, the wife would pay the husband $10,000 from her share of the marital home proceeds, waive her one-half share (worth $23,056.72) of the husband's 457 plan, and pay the husband an additional $7,665, upon the sale or refinance of the Revere home. On December 7, 2017, the parties and their respective attorneys appeared for a hearing before a judge of the Probate and Family Court, during which both parties testified that they understood and voluntarily executed the separation agreement, they had an opportunity to discuss the agreement with their attorneys, they believed the agreement was fair and reasonable, and they had accurately reported their incomes, expenses, assets, and liabilities. On the same day, the judge approved the separation agreement and incorporated it into the judgment nisi.

In February 2018, the husband filed a statement of objections pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 58 (c), with supporting affidavits, seeking to prevent the judgment nisi from becoming final as to (1) the amount and duration of alimony; (2) the treatment, value, and division of the Revere home; (3) the parties' contributions to the parent plus loan; and (4) the division of marital assets, other than the husband's pension. In support thereof, the husband alleged that the wife made several misrepresentations regarding her income, assets, and liabilities, upon which the husband relied to his detriment when executing the separation agreement. A two-day evidentiary hearing on the husband's statement of objections was held before the same judge who approved the parties' separation agreement. Both parties, and the wife's brother, testified at the evidentiary hearing. On September 28, 2018, the judge issued an order, with supporting findings, dismissing the husband's statement of objections. The present appeal by the husband followed.

Discussion. A defendant may seek relief from a judgment of divorce nisi by filing a statement of objections pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 58 (c), "for any cause sufficient in law." Sheffer v. Sheffer, 316 Mass. 575, 577, 56 N.E.2d 13 (1944).³ Here, the "cause sufficient in law", id., as asserted by the husband in his rule 58 (c) statement of objections, was the wife's alleged misrepresentation of her income, assets, and liabilities at the time of the divorce. See Sampson v. Sampson, 223 Mass. 451, 457, 112 N.E. 84 (1916) (misrepresentation permissible ground to support statement of objections). Essentially treating the husband's misrepresentation claims as though they had been raised in a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974),⁴ the judge ultimately concluded that the husband was not entitled to relief under either rule 58 (c) or rule 60 (b). See Honer v. Wisniewski, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294, 720 N.E.2d 38 (1999) (motions decided according to substance rather than label). See also Giner v. Giner, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 1023, 1025-1026, 420 N.E.2d 5 (1981) (claim of fraudulent misrepresentation raised in wife's statement of objections could be raised in rule 60 [b] motion). Cf. Innis v. Innis, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 118, 616 N.E.2d 837 (1993) (applying rule 60 [b] [6] principles to claims raised in statement of objections). We review the judge's decision for an abuse of discretion or other error of law. See Gaw v. Sappett, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 405, 414, 816 N.E.2d 1027 (2004).⁵

To prevail on a claim of misrepresentation raised in a rule 60 (b) (3) motion, the moving party has the burden of establishing, by "clear and convincing evidence," Gaw, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 408, 816 N.E.2d 1027, "a false statement of a material fact made to induce the [moving party] to act, together with reliance on the false statement by the [moving party] to the [moving party's] detriment." Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 77, 575 N.E.2d 70 (1991). Here, the judge made the following relevant findings, based on her assessment of the witnesses' credibility and the documentary evidence submitted at trial. See Gaw, supra at 409, 816 N.E.2d 1027. The judge found that the wife's December 7, 2017 financial statement (submitted to the court on the same day that the parties executed the separation agreement) contained inaccuracies as to both the wife's income and assets. The judge specifically found that the wife underreported her income and incorrectly listed her brother's $178,000 mortgage as an encumbrance on the Revere home, artificially reducing the equity value of her one-third interest in the property.⁶ Although the husband claimed that the wife also misrepresented the value of the Revere home by listing its assessed value, rather than its actual fair market value, the judge disagreed, finding that the wife had clearly disclosed that the value listed was the property's "assessed value," subject to "a certified appraisal."⁷ The judge found that the wife was financially "unsophisticated," and that her finances had historically been managed by others (including the husband). The judge ultimately concluded that the wife did not "knowingly" misrepresent her income and assets at the time of the divorce, and that the inaccuracies in her financial statement "were not material to the ultimate division of assets or award of alimony." The judge also implicitly declined to credit the husband's claim that the inaccuracies "interfered with the settlement process" and caused him to agree to an excessive alimony award and an inequitable property division. Instead, the judge found that the husband's claims were merely a " ‘morning after’ effort to retreat from an agreement now thought to be ill-advised." Innis, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 118, 616 N.E.2d 837.

The husband contends that the judge, in concluding that the wife's inaccurate financial disclosures did not amount to misrepresentation, improperly focused on the wife's lack of intent to deceive. The husband further contends that the judge erred as a matter of law in finding that the inaccuracies were not material. We address the husband's arguments in turn.

1. Intent. In establishing the elements of misrepresentation, "[w]here the plaintiff proves ‘a statement made, as of the party's own knowledge, which is false, provided the thing stated is not merely a matter of opinion, estimate, or judgment, but is susceptible of actual knowledge ... it is not necessary to make any further proof of an actual intent to deceive.’ " Zimmerman, 31 Mass. App. Ct. at 77, 575 N.E.2d 70, quoting Snyder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 368 Mass. 433, 444, 333 N.E.2d 421 (1975). The husband argues that the judge improperly focused on the wife's lack of knowledge regarding the errors on her financial statement.⁸

While it is true, as a general matter, that "[t]he speaker need not know ‘that the statement is false if the truth is reasonably susceptible of actual knowledge, or otherwise expressed, if, through a modicum of diligence, accurate facts are available to the speaker,’ " Zimmerman, 31 Mass. App. Ct. at 77, 575 N.E.2d 70, quoting Acushnet Fed. Credit Union v. Roderick, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 604, 605, 530 N.E.2d 1243 (1988), this court has, on at least two prior occasions, expressed doubt as to whether an unintentional misstatement may warrant relief under rule 60 (b) (3). See ...