Frasca v. US, 86-1130.
Decision Date | 12 January 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 86-1130.,86-1130. |
Citation | 702 F. Supp. 715 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Parties | Lucille A. FRASCA and Rudolph A. Frasca, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, and Thomas Wesley Johnson, Defendants. |
Larry Johnson, Champaign, Ill., for plaintiffs.
K. Tate Chambers, Peoria, Ill., James A. Lewis, Asst. U.S. Attys., Springfield, Ill., for defendants.
At the continuation of the bench trial in this case on October 28, 1988, the Court orally indicated its finding that the Michigan No Fault statute, M.C.L.A. § 500.3135, is inapplicable in this case unless the automobile insurance policy held by Avis car rental agency, from whom Plaintiffs rented their car, would provide them with personal protection benefits. On January 5, 1989, this Court considered the question of whether or not Avis' insurance did provide such coverage to Plaintiffs, and found that it did not. The Court indicated to the parties that it would set forth the reasons for its ruling in a written order. In accordance with that representation, the Court submits this Memorandum Opinion.
The relevant statutory language is as follows:
M.C.L.A. §§ 500.3135, 500.3113.
Upon examination of the Michigan No Fault statute, it is apparent to the Court that the policy behind the statute is to reduce litigation for injuries sustained in automobile accidents. Because those who are required to be registered under the provisions of the Act must carry personal protection insurance, recovery for minor injuries sustained in automobile accidents is to be obtained from the registered party's personal protection carrier. However, in the case of an accident which results in injury that "seriously impairs bodily function," the Michigan No Fault statute permits, upon a showing of liability on the part of the other party involved in the accident, recovery of damages from such party.
In Gersten v. Blackwell, 111 Mich.App. 418, 314 N.W.2d 645 (1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted the statute as follows:
Because in the instant situation neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants were residents of the State of Michigan and the rental car that they were driving was registered in Ohio, it would seem that the exception to the Michigan No Fault statute contained in § 3113 would apply in this case, so that the Michigan No Fault statute itself would be inapplicable. Although Defendants urge that, on the basis of the cases which they have cited to the Court, Lee v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 412 Mich. 505, 315 N.W.2d 413 (1982); Gersten v. Blackwell, 111 Mich. App. 418, 314 N.W.2d 645 (1982); Drake v. Gordon, 644 F.Supp. 376 (E.D.Mich.1986); Zotos v. U.S., 654 F.Supp. 36 (E.D.Mich. 1986), the statute is the relevant standard for application in this case, the Court finds otherwise. The Court finds significant the fact that in each of the cases cited by Defendants in support of their argument that the Michigan No Fault statute applies in this case, one of the parties was a Michigan resident. Due to the involvement in those cases of a Michigan resident who, at least presumably, was covered by the Michigan No Fault statute, the question as to the statute's applicability was different than in the case at bar.
The Michigan residents in the cases cited by Defendants had purchased the insurance mandated by the Michigan No Fault statute. Pursuant to the language of § 3113, the parties involved in those cases could recover personal protection benefits for accidents which resulted in less than "serious impairment of bodily function." Because the parties involved in those cases were entitled to personal protection benefits, the injustice of applying the "serious impairment of body function" limitation to their recoveries was non-existent. The same cannot be said of Plaintiffs in this case.
The Court believes that § 3135 and § 3113 of the Michigan statute must be read together. That is, if a party is not entitled to personal protection benefits, it would be manifestly unfair to apply the complementary provision to the Michigan statute,...
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