Fraser Twp. v. Linwood-Bay Club

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: Per Curiam
• Citation: Fraser Twp. v. Linwood-Bay Club, 715 N.W.2d 89, 270 Mich. App. 289 (Mich. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 16 March 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 258601.
• Parties: FRASER TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Maple Leaf Golf Course, Inc., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. LINWOOD-BAY SPORTSMAN'S CLUB, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.

715 N.W.2d 89

270 Mich. App. 289

FRASER TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Maple Leaf Golf Course, Inc., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. LINWOOD-BAY SPORTSMAN'S CLUB, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.

Docket No. 258601.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 7, 2006, at Lansing.

Decided March 16, 2006, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication May 24, 2006.

Seward, Tally & Piggott, P.C. (by Mark J. Brissette), Bay City, for Fraser Township.

Beggs & Schisler, P.L.C. (by Paul F. Beggs), Bay City, for Maple Leaf Golf Course, Inc.

Foster Zack & Lowe, P.C. (by J. Kevin Winters), Okemos, for Linwood-Bay Sportsman's Club.

Burleson & O'Neill, PLLC (by Julie A. O'Neill), Lansing, for the Michigan United Conservation Clubs.

Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., WHITBECK, C.J., and O'CONNELL, J.

PER CURIAM.

In this action involving the scope of the sport shooting ranges act¹ (the Act), defendant Linwood-Bay Sportsman's Club (Linwood-Bay), owner of land used for a sport shooting range, appeals as of right a judgment permanently enjoining Linwood-Bay "from building, continuing construction and/or using its proposed outdoor pistol and/or rifle range," which the trial court entered following a bench trial. We affirm.

I. Basic Facts And Procedural History

Plaintiff Fraser Township filed suit for an injunction to prevent Linwood-Bay from "operating an outdoor pistol or rifle range." In a motion filed simultaneously, the township alleged that Linwood-Bay was impermissibly "proceeding with plans to construct an outdoor pistol or rifle range on Defendant's property within Fraser Township." Linwood-Bay opposed the injunction, arguing that the Act authorized its activities "notwithstanding contrary zoning" and that its activities were neither in violation of the zoning ordinances nor inherently dangerous.

At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to allow Maple Leaf Golf Course to intervene as a plaintiff and did not object to Michigan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC) filing a brief amicus curiae. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction, precluding any outdoor pistol or rifle shooting and any further construction on the outdoor rifle range. The order permitted "[o]utdoor archery, skeet shooting, and trap shooting. . . as they are performed without pistols or rifles." The order also permitted firing muzzle loading weapons, subject to later objections by either plaintiff.

Maple Leaf then filed its complaint, which included the following allegations:

6. Plaintiff has owned and operated [its course] for more than forty years at its present location. Many thousands of golfers utilize the golf course on an annual basis. At least three (3) of the holes are in harm's way of a stray shooting from the range.

7. In June, 2001, a patron of the course was struck by a stray bullet. Other golfers have complained from time to time of bullets grazing through the course. Most recently, in august, 2003, [sic] no less than four golfers have indicated that bullets have whizzed past them or they've been in earshot of a ricocheting bullet. It would appear that these shots are coming from the use or misuse of the proposed new outdoor range.

Maple Leaf also alleged that Linwood-Bay's range was both a nuisance and an attractive nuisance. After Linwood-Bay answered and counterclaimed against Maple Leaf, the trial court conducted a one-day bench trial and took the case under advisement. After trial, Linwood-Bay moved to enter stipulated facts by proposing an order with stipulations that its operations complied with the "generally accepted operations practices" (GAOP) referred to in the Act, that its outdoor range complied with GAOP "as constructed to date," and that, if completed, "the outdoor range will be inspected by an NRA-RTTA [National Rifle Association Range Team Technical Advisor] to determine compliance with GAOP." The township filed an objection, but the proposed stipulations were eventually entered with the following handwritten stipulation added below the typed ones: "The Plaintiffs reserve any legal rights they may have to address future use and construction at Defendant's site."

When it issued its opinion, the trial court summarized both its factual findings from the trial and its conclusions of law, ruling "in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ...," and granting a permanent injunction against the defendant's building, construction, or use of the proposed range. Linwood-Bay moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied this motion. This appeal followed.

II. Preemption

A. Standard Of Review

At issue is the legal question whether the Act preempts all township regulation of sport shooting ranges or whether the Act merely bars nuisance actions based on noise and zoning regulations that are intended to stop sport shooting ranges from continuing activities that they were engaged in when the Act was passed. "We will not disturb the trial court's findings of facts unless clearly erroneous."² "However, we review questions of law de novo."³

B. Ray Twp v. B & BS Gun Club

The Act has not been the subject of extensive litigation at the appellate level. Indeed, there is only one published opinion concerning the Act, Ray Twp v. B & BS Gun Club.⁴ In that case, this Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the Act did not violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution and was not unconstitutionally vague.⁵ Thus, whether the Act prohibits all nuisance actions against sport shooting ranges, or only those based on noise complaints, and whether the Act exempts sport shooting ranges from all local zoning ordinances are issues of first impression.

C. Principles Of Preemption

In Michigan, the following principles apply to the issue of preemption:

A municipality may not enact an ordinance if (1) the ordinance directly conflicts with the state statutory scheme, or (2) the state statutory scheme preempts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation. Preemption may be established (1) where state law is expressly preemptive; (2) by examination of the legislative history; (3) by the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme, although this factor alone is not generally sufficient to infer preemption; or (4) where the nature of the subject matter regulated demands exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state's purpose or interest.[⁶]

Here, the Act is not expressly preemptive of all local regulation. To the contrary, the Act expressly provides for local regulation of certain aspects of sport shooting ranges "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act."⁷ Thus, the Act is not one that completely occupies the field of regulation, thereby excluding regulation by local governments. Rather, the Act leaves local government regulation of sport shooting ranges intact, except where such regulation is specifically limited by another section of the Act.

Given the plain language of the Act, we cannot agree with Linwood-Bay's arguments for complete preemption. Linwood-Bay and the MUCC rely almost entirely on the Act's legislative history to argue that, despite the language of the Act, the Legislature intended to occupy the field of sport shooting regulation entirely and also to prohibit any nuisance action of any kind against range operators. But, given the language of the Act, the legislative history cited is neither authoritative nor convincing.

As the Court of Appeals noted in People v. Tolbert, 216 Mich.App. 353, 360, n. 5, 549 N.W.2d 61 (1996):

"It has been observed in the federal context that resort to `legislative history' in the search for legislative intent is a perilous venture. Marposs Corp. v. Troy, 204 Mich.App. 156, 167-168, n. 2, 514 N.W.2d 202 (1994)[⁸] (Taylor, P.J dissenting), quoting Address by Justice Antonin Scalia before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986). This enterprise is doubly fraught with danger in Michigan which, unlike Congress, has failed to create an authoritative legislative record. Id."

The problem with relying on bill analyses is that they do not necessarily represent the views of even a single legislator. Rather, they are prepared by House and Senate staff. Indeed, the analyses themselves note that they do not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.[⁹]

The state's regulatory scheme is not especially pervasive either. The Act has two main components: protection from nuisance actions and regulation related to noise¹⁰ and a provision limiting local government regulation of existing sport shooting ranges.¹¹ Even if one reads the protection from noise restrictions expansively, that section does nothing to establish a pervasive regulatory scheme for range operations. Rather, it provides only protection from noise restrictions.

Further, neither the "state's purpose or interest" nor the "nature of the subject matter regulated" require that the state be the exclusive regulator over sport shooting ranges. A sport shooting range is a particular land use that is subject to extensive control by townships under the Township Zoning Act.¹² Linwood-Bay argues that part of the Act preempts the township zoning ordinance entirely because it authorizes shooting range operators to

[d]o anything authorized under generally accepted operation practices, including, but not limited to:

(i) Expand or increase its membership or opportunities for public participation.

(ii) Expand or increase events and activities.[¹³]

However, statutes must be read as a whole:

[T]o read the law as a whole, it must, in fact, be read as a whole. The interpretative process does not ... remove words and provisions from their context, infuse these words and provisions with meanings that are independent of such context, and then reimport these...