Fraser v. Blanchard & Crowley
| Decision Date | 26 March 1910 |
| Citation | 75 A. 797,83 Vt. 136 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | FRASER v. BLANCHARD & CROWLEY. |
On rehearing. Former judgment affirming a judgment for plaintiff adhered to.
For former opinion, see 73 Atl. 995.
The action was for injuries to a servant by the falling of a derrick upon him while he was assisting to raise it, plaintiff claiming that it fell because not properly secured at the foot of the derrick mast.
The judgment in this case was entered in vacation. At the October term the defendants filed a motion for re-argument on several points. It was sustained as to only one, that of the defendants' negligence; and on that reargument was had at the January term. It is now pointed out and shown that we erred in saying in the opinion, as we did, that the testimony on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that, in order to hold the butt of the mast against the outside rim of the socket to keep it from slipping, "it was necessary to fasten that end with a chain on either side, and to attach to it a third chain and hitch it to some suitable object to keep the mast from slipping endways, but that Crowley had only one chain attached when the mast was being raised, and that a side chain." Counsel agree that if we had said that the plaintiff's testimony tended to show that two side chains, or a chain to keep the mast from slipping endways, should have been used, it would have been correct, and that is true.
The defendants now claim, this error being seen, that there is no evidence of actionable negligence on their part in proof of which they vouch the transcript, and select therefrom all the testimony they think material to the question. It is not, of course, necessary to consider all the testimony, for it is not a question of the weight of evidence, but only of its tendency; and, if there is some evidence tending to show such negligence, it was enough to carry that question to the jury, and that there is some is reasonably clear, we think, for the plaintiff testified that he had nothing to do with hitching the side chains, but that Crowley was doing that and directing the men who were helping him; that, after the men were sent to the ends of the guys, Crowley gave directions for hoisting the mast, and, when it was up 10 or 12 feet, Crowley directed it stopped, and directed him to signal the engineer to stop, as there was a chain loose, and he signaled, and then Crowley went in and fixed the chain, and sent him for a set of tackle blocks, and told him to hitch them on there to the foot of the derrick; that he went and got them, and then went in under the mast within some two or three feet from the foot of it, to hitch the blocks to a chain there was in there, as Crowley had told him, but that he did not hitch them on; that Crowley said there was some slack in that chain, meaning, as the plaintiff understood, the chain they pulled on the day before when they were pulling up the derrick, and which was then hitched to a big stone back quite a ways up under the derrick, but not hitched to the derrick itself in any way; that, after making some remark to Crowley about the chain he tried to straighten up to get out of there, as he thought there was some danger when Crowley spoke about it, but, before he could straighten up, the stick came down and struck him on his hand, which was lying across the stone somewhere; that as near as he could tell he was about half straightened up, with his hand on the stone, trying to straighten up, when the stick struck him; and that neither Crowley nor any one else gave any warning of danger before nor after he went in there.
On cross-examination he was asked if he did not know that he was 12 or 15 feet further up under the mast where a chain was fastened to a big stone near the middle of the mast, and was pulling a block up there to fasten to that chain, and he answered that he was going to hitch the pulleys to some chain that was hitched on there. He further testified that, when he got up there, Crowley said there was some slack there, but that he did not reply that there was none, nor...
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Tinney v. Crosby
...to be considered. Cummings v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 101 Vt. 73, 85, 142 A. 82; Fraser v. Blanchard, 83 Vt. 136, 147, 73 A. 995, 75 A. 797. An examination of the record with the foregoing principles in mind shows that it was open to the jury to find these facts: The purpose of the ......
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Tinney v. Crosby
...considered. Cummings v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 101 Vt. 73, 85, 142 A. 82; Fraser v. Blanchard and Crowley, 83 Vt. 136, 147, 73 A. 995, 75 A. 797. examination of the record with the foregoing principles in mind, shows that it was open to the jury to find these facts: The purpose of the bl......
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Fred v. Perkins v. Vermont Hydro-Electric Corporation
...its weight is to be considered. Cummings v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., supra; Fraser v. Blanchard, 83 Vt. 136, 147, 73 A. 995, 75 A. 797. But, on the other hand, the evidence supporting the must be more than a scintilla. Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 349, 107 A......
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Perkins v. Vt. Hydro-Elec. Corp.
...its weight is to be considered. Cummings v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., supra; Fraser v. Blanchard, 83 Vt 136, 147, 73 A. 995, 75 A. 797. But, on the other hand, the evidence supporting the claim must be more than a scintilla. Gilman v. Central Vermont R. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 349, 1......