Fraser v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 14 September 1990 |
| Citation | 588 So.2d 442 |
| Parties | Russell M. FRASER v. R. Scott REYNOLDS, et al. Bobby R. LEWIS v. R. Scott REYNOLDS, et al. 88-1466, 88-1522. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
F.A. Flowers III and Paul P. Bolus of Burr & Forman, Birmingham, for appellant Russell M. Fraser.
H. Harold Stephens of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, Huntsville, for appellant Bobby R. Lewis.
Gary L. Rigney of Rigney, Garvin & Webster, Huntsville, for appellees R. Scott Reynolds, et al.
The defendants, Bobby R. Lewis and Russell M. Fraser, appeal separately from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, R. Scott Reynolds, Gregory S. Windham, Kenneth Tichansky, and Teresa Scholz, in this action to recover damages for fraud. We affirm in part, but remand the case for a determination as to the question of excessiveness of the damages, in accordance with Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989).
This is the second time these parties have been before this Court. In Reynolds v. Mitchell, 529 So.2d 227 (Ala.1988), the plaintiffs appealed from a judgment entered for them on the jury's verdict, arguing that the damages award was too small (i.e., that the damages award was not supported by the evidence), and the defendants cross-appealed, contending that the trial court had erred in submitting the fraud question to the jury. We rejected the defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence of fraud to submit the question to the jury; however, we reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because the damages awarded by the jury were not supported by the evidence. The present appeal is from the judgment entered following the second trial. Our review of the record indicates that the evidence presented in both trials was substantially the same. See Reynolds v. Mitchell, supra, at 229-30, for a detailed statement of the evidence presented at the first trial.
The plaintiffs were the limited partners in Margaret Clara Apartment Complex Group, Ltd. ("the partnership"). The defendants were two of the three general partners in that partnership. 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to invest in the partnership. The plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, the defendants' motions for a directed verdict were denied; the jury returned the following verdict by filling in the blanks on forms that were approved both by the parties and the trial court:
Lewis moved for a remittitur, and both defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. Those motions were denied.
The defendants first contend that there was no basis for a finding of fraud on their part and, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We have previously rejected this contention. See Reynolds v. Mitchell, supra, at 230-33, for a thorough discussion of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. After carefully reviewing the record, we hold, once again, that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of fraud in the inducement and, therefore, that the trial court did not err in submitting the fraud issue to the jury.
The defendants also contend that the trial court erred in denying their request for a new trial. They argue that the jury unlawfully apportioned the damages; that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the law of fraud; that the trial court unconstitutionally instructed the jury that they could be found vicariously liable for punitive damages as a result of the false representations that may have been made by Mitchell in regard to the partnership business; and that the damages award was excessive.
As the verdict forms set out previously reveal, the jury did apportion the damages in this case. The defendants argue that the verdict was the result of an erroneous instruction from the court that the jury could apportion the damages. Because apportionment of damages among joint tort-feasors is not permitted in Alabama, see, e.g., Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1988), and Vanguard Industrial Corp. v. Alabama Power Co., 455 So.2d 837 (Ala.1984), the verdict would be illegal and, thus, would have to be set aside but for the fact that the record shows the issue to have been waived by the defendants at trial. The defendants neither objected to the trial court's oral charge nor submitted any requested written jury instructions regarding the apportionment of damages. Furthermore, as previously noted, the defendants consented to the verdict forms that were provided to the jury, and those forms required an apportioned verdict. Accordingly, the apportionment of damages by the jury did not constitute reversible error under the law of this case. See Alfa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northington, 561 So.2d 1041, 1047 (Ala.1990) (); see, also, E & S Facilities, Inc. v. Precision Chipper Corp., 565 So.2d 54 (Ala.1990), where this Court held that consent to the form of a verdict at trial bars attack on appeal.
With regard to their argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law of fraud, the defendants maintain 1) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the general rule that a mere statement of opinion cannot constitute actionable fraud; and 2) that the trial court, when it instructed on the law of reckless fraud, should have instructed the jury that it had to find a false representation concerning a "material existing fact" instead of a false representation concerning a "material fact."
The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
This instruction is a correct statement of the law, Reynolds v. Mitchell, supra, and it told the jury in a clear and concise manner everything that it needed to know in this case as to when a statement of opinion can constitute actionable fraud. 2 Therefore, the trial court's refusal to instruct as to the general rule was not error.
The trial court instructed the jury on the...
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