Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery Cnty.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 45, Sept. Term, 2015.,45, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Parties: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, et al. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

446 Md. 490

132 A.3d 311

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, et al.

v.MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al.

No. 45, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 23, 2016.

William J. Chen, Jr. (Chen & McCabe, LLP, Rockville, MD; Martha L. Handman, Martha L. Handman, P.C., Gaithersburg, MD), on brief, for Petitioners/Cross–Respondents.

Edward B. Lattner, Chief, Division of Government Operations (Charles L. Frederick, Associate Co. Atty., Haley M. Roberts, Assistant Co. Atty., Marc P. Hansen, Co. Atty., Rockville, MD), on brief, for Respondents/Cross–Petitioners.

Michael E. Rosman, Esquire, Christopher J. Hajec, Esquire, Center for Individual Rights, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae brief of the Center for Individual Rights in Support of Petitioners/Cross–Respondents.

Jan I. Berlage, Esquire, Gohn, Hankey, Stichel & Berlage, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Steven J. Andre, Esquire, Counsel (Pro Hac Vice), for Amici Curiae brief of Mark Dierolf and Angie Morfin in Support of Petitioners.

Molly A. Elkin, Esquire, Woodley & McGillivary LLP, Carey R. Butsavage, Esquire, Butsavage & Durkalski, P.C., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae brief of Montgomery County Career Fire Fighters Association, International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1664 and Montgomery County Government Employees Organization, United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1994 in Support of Petitioners.

M. Andee Green, Esquire, Co. Atty., William A. Snoddy, Esquire, Deputy Co. Atty.—Litigation, Prince George's County Office of Law, Upper Marlboro, MD, George A. Nilson, Esquire, City Solicitor, William A. Phelan, Jr., Esquire, Chief Solicitor, Frederic Smalkin, Jr., Assistant Solicitor, Baltimore City Department of Law, Baltimore, MD, Nancy McCutchan Duden, Esquire, Co. Atty., Anne Arundel County Office of Law, Annapolis, MD, for Amici Curiae brief of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and Prince George's County, Maryland.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned) and ALAN M. WILNER (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ.

ALAN M. WILNER

(Retired, Specially Assigned), J.

There are several issues presented in this appeal. The principal one is whether a charter county—Montgomery County in this instance—is authorized to use its human and fiscal resources to encourage the electorate of the county to support, or oppose, a ballot measure that may have a significant impact on the operations of the county government. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County said "no," the Court of Special Appeals said "yes," and we also shall say "yes."

BACKGROUND

The Battle Over Effect Bargaining

Sections 33–75 through 33–85 of the Montgomery County Code provide for collective bargaining between the county and the certified representative of county police officers below the rank of lieutenant which, in this case, is petitioner, Lodge 35 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). The provisions most relevant to this appeal are §§ 33–80 and 33–81.

Section 33–80(a) lists the matters that are subject to mandatory collective bargaining. Section 33–80(b) lists certain rights and responsibilities of the county that are not subject to mandatory collective bargaining but, under subsection (c), may, in the county's discretion, be discussed with the union. They include such things as determining the overall budget and mission of the police department; maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the department; determining the overall organizational structure, methods, processes, means, job classifications, or personnel by which operations are to be conducted; directing and supervising employees; hiring, selecting, and establishing standards governing promotion of employees; transferring, assigning, and scheduling employees; and taking actions to carry out the mission of government in situations of emergency.

The items listed in § 33–80(a), for the most part, are those common in collective bargaining laws—salary and wages; pension, retirement, and other benefits; hours and working conditions; a grievance procedure; and matters relating to the health and safety of employees. Prior to 2011, there was an additional matter (§ 33–80(a)(7)) that also was subject to mandatory bargaining—"the effect on employees of the employer's exercise of rights listed in subsection (b)." That provision, insofar as Montgomery County was concerned, was unique to collective bargaining with the police union. It was not part of the county collective bargaining law pertaining to firefighters or county employees generally.

Indeed, an attempt to add it to that law in 1986 was rejected by the County Council.¹

Subjection of the "effect" of the county's exercise of rights reserved to it under § 33–80(b) to mandatory bargaining had particular significance because of § 33–81(c)(2), which dealt with the procedure for resolving impasses in bargaining over such "effects." The procedure was a form of final offer arbitration. Under that section, if the county notified FOP that it "intends to exercise a right listed in Section 33–80(b), the exercise of which will have an effect on members of the bargaining unit," the parties were required to choose an impasse neutral, and, unless they were otherwise able to resolve the dispute, each was required to submit a final offer to the neutral. The neutral was then empowered to select what he or she believed was the more reasonable offer and, if appropriate, to provide retroactive relief.

Section 33–80(a)(7) was part of the original collective bargaining law for police officers enacted in 1982. The legislative history of that law indicates that the intent of the provision was not to subject the " decision to exercise a management right" to bargaining, but only the method of implementing that decision. The county personnel director at the time stated, by way of example, that a decision to lay off employees would not be subject to bargaining, but the decision as to whom to lay off first would be. At least one councilmember disagreed with that interpretation, but an attempt to delete the provision failed.

On January 31, 2011, the Montgomery County Organizational Reform Commission, created in 2010 by County Council Resolution to recommend changes that would increase the efficiency of county operations, filed its Final Report which, in Recommendation 21, urged that § 33–80(a)(7) be amended to make it consistent with the scope of bargaining for firefighters and other county employees. The Commission noted that, in practice, effect bargaining "has become the exception that makes most management decisions subject to bargaining" and "has hampered the ability of the Police Department to issue directives to govern how police officers must operate." It added that "FOP has recently delayed the implementation of all directives by refusing to respond to them."²

Responding to the Commission's recommendation, the County Council President introduced Bill No. 18–11 in June 2011 to amend § 33–80(a)(7) by limiting effect bargaining to the "amelioration" of the effect on employees when the county's exercise of rights under § 33–80(b) "causes a loss of jobs in the [bargaining] unit." The bill also deleted the special impasse procedure under § 33–81(c) with respect to effect bargaining.

At the County Council hearing on the bill, the county Police Chief listed the kinds of administrative directives that were subject to effect bargaining. He estimated that bargaining over a minor issue normally required between two weeks and 90 days, without impasse arbitration, that impasse arbitration added an additional two to three months, and that a " significant" matter could take up to two years to resolve. He noted that the county's attempt to create a mandatory electronic reporting system was delayed by three years of bargaining and that he still was required to send all communications to officers in paper form because they had refused to establish county e-mail accounts.

The bill was passed by the County Council in July 2011 and was signed by the County Executive on August 1. Pursuant to § 112 of the Montgomery County Charter, the law took effect October 31, 2011—91 days after it was signed. FOP promptly commenced an effort to refer the law to referendum pursuant to § 114 of the County Charter and Art. 11–F, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution

. That drive ultimately proved successful. Petitioners were able to collect more than the required number of signatures (five percent of the qualified voters in the county), whereupon the county challenged the validity of several thousand of those signatures. That challenge was not resolved until August 12, 2012, when this Court concluded that the signatures were valid. See FOP Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Co., 427 Md. 522, 50 A.3d 8 (2012) (per curiam Order explained later in 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013) ).

Upon the filing of our per curiam Order, Bill No. 18–11 was slated to appear on the ballot at the November 6, 2012 general election as Question B, whether the bill should become law. A "yes" answer would sustain the law; a "no" vote would nullify it. In accordance with § 115 of the County Charter, the effect of the law which, as noted, had taken effect the previous October, was stayed pending the result of the referendum.³

Both sides commenced their respective campaigns to capture the hearts and minds of the county voters.

The County Executive, Isiah Leggett, believing that the requirement of effect bargaining had significantly hampered the ability of the Police Chief to efficiently manage the operation of the County Police Department, directed an effort by the County government to encourage county voters to vote "yes" on Question B. The effort was managed in large part by Patrick Lacefield, Director of the County Office of Public Information. Leggett authorized Lacefield to spend up to $200,000 from the funds appropriated by the County Council to his office in furtherance of the effort.

Lacefield ultimately...