Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Miami, SC14–1639

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: QUINCE, J.
• Citation: 243 So.3d 894
• Parties: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MIAMI LODGE 20, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, et al., Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. SC14–1639,SC14–1639
• Decision Date: 17 May 2018

243 So.3d 894

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MIAMI LODGE 20, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, et al., Respondents.

No. SC14–1639

Supreme Court of Florida.

[May 17, 2018]

Robert D. Klausner, Stuart Kaufman, Adam P. Levinson, Paul Daragjati, and Anna R. Klausner Parish of Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson, Plantation, Florida, for Petitioner

Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney, and Kevin R. Jones, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Miami, Florida; and Michael Mattimore and Luke Savage of Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent City of Miami

Mark A. Touby and Richard A. Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc., International Association of Firefighters, AFL–CIO

QUINCE, J.

We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami , 143 So.3d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Hollywood Fire Fighters, Local 1375, IAFF, Inc. v. City of Hollywood , 133 So.3d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the decision of the Third District.

FACTS

On June 28, 2010, Respondent, the City of Miami, declared a "financial urgency" and invoked the process set forth in section 447.4095, Florida Statutes (2010), which provides:

Financial urgency—In the event of a financial urgency requiring modification of an agreement, the chief executive officer or his or her representative and the bargaining agent or its representative shall meet as soon as possible to negotiate the impact of the financial urgency. If after a reasonable period of negotiation which shall not exceed 14 days, a dispute exists between the public employer and the bargaining agent, an impasse shall be deemed to have occurred, and one of the parties shall so declare in writing to the other party and to the commission. The parties shall then proceed pursuant to the provisions of s. 447.403. An unfair labor practice charge shall not be filed during the 14 days

243 So.3d 897

during which negotiations are occurring pursuant to this section.

§ 447.4095, Fla. Stat. (2010). In response, Petitioner, Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 (FOP), moved for a declaratory judgment against the City and challenged the facial constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it is void for vagueness, deprives the FOP of due process, and denies equal protection. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and the FOP appealed. The Third District affirmed the trial court. Fraternal Order of Police , 143 So.3d at 954. Petitioner then sought review, and we accepted jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner raises a facial challenge to section 447.4095, Florida Statutes, arguing that it is void for vagueness, violates due process, and denies equal protection. Whether a statute is constitutional is a pure question of law that is reviewed de novo. Scott v. Williams , 107 So.3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2013).

In a facial challenge, our review is limited. Abdool v. Bondi , 141 So.3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014). We consider only the text of the statute, not its specific application to a particular set of circumstances. Id. To succeed on a facial challenge, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally valid. Id. Generally, legislative acts are afforded a presumption of constitutionality and we will construe the challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome when possible. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard , 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005).

First, Petitioner contends that section 447.4095 is impermissibly vague. A statute is void for vagueness when persons of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. Samples v. Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n , 114 So.3d 912, 919–20 (Fla. 2013). A statute is also void for vagueness if it lends itself to arbitrary enforcement at an officer's discretion. D'Alemberte v. Anderson , 349 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1977). Petitioner argues that section 447.4095 is vague because the legislature did not define the term "financial urgency." According to Petitioner, this allows a city unfettered discretion to unilaterally modify an agreement because the legislature did not define what circumstances must be met before a financial urgency can be declared. In support of this claim, Petitioner points to the staff analysis for the bill, which notes that...