Fraternity v. Fraternity

Decision Date18 December 2009
Docket Number1080662 and 1081134.
Citation40 So.3d 683
PartiesKAPPA SIGMA FRATERNITY, Kappa Nu Chapterv.Ryan PRICE-WILLIAMS.Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Kappa Nu Chapterv.Ryan Price-Williams.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William E. Pipkin, Jr., of Austill, Lewis & Pipkin, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.

Robert J. Hedge and Charles L. Miller, Jr., of Miller & Hedge, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.

LYONS, Justice.

In appeal no. 1080662, Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Kappa Nu Chapter (“the chapter”), appeals from a March 6, 2009, order of the Mobile Circuit Court that enforced an agreement between the chapter and Ryan Price-Williams settling Price-Williams's action against the chapter. Price-Williams has moved to dismiss that appeal on the basis that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction of the appeal. In appeal no. 1081134, the chapter appeals from an April 16, 2009, order of the Mobile Circuit Court that enforced its March 6, 2009, order. We deny Price-Williams's motion to dismiss appeal no. 1080662, and we affirm the trial court's decisions in both appeals.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Price-Williams was not a member of the chapter but visited a party hosted by the chapter on January 31, 2004. While at the party, Price-Williams was assaulted. The record does not disclose the precise nature of Price-Williams's injuries, but it is undisputed that he sustained significant, permanent injuries as a result of the assault.

On November 28, 2005, Price-Williams sued Kappa Sigma National Fraternity (“the national fraternity”), the chapter, and Gabriel Kevin Dean, Charles Brandon Baber, and Michael Taylor Howard, two of whom were members of the chapter.1 The complaint alleged that Dean, Baber, and Howard had perpetrated the assault and that they had done so as agents of the national fraternity and of the chapter. The first count of the complaint sought recovery from the individual defendants based on the assault and from the national fraternity and the chapter based on a theory of vicarious liability arising from the assault. The second count of the complaint sought recovery from all the defendants, alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly hosted the party. The third count of the complaint sought recovery from the national fraternity and from the chapter, alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly failed to create, implement, and follow rules and regulations that would have prevented the assault.

The national fraternity and the chapter were represented by the same counsel. Although the record does not show when, the parties agree that the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the national fraternity on all counts. The individual defendants never answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in the action. Counsel for the chapter did not represent the individual defendants. The trial court entered a default judgment against the individual defendants on May 10, 2007, but it did not determine the amount of damages to be awarded. As to liability, the chapter was the sole remaining defendant.

The action was tried to a jury beginning on November 17, 2008. After closing arguments on November 20, 2008, but before the jury was charged, Price-Williams and the chapter entered into a confidential settlement agreement. The agreement was not reduced to a writing but was stated before the trial court by counsel for Price-Williams and counsel for the chapter. The record includes the following transcript of their statements:

[Price-Williams's counsel]: Judge, the parties, or at least [Price-Williams] and the [chapter], have reached a settlement. It's confidential. Of course we'll advise the court. The [chapter] has agreed to pay ... to settle their [sic] liability, with the remaining liability an amount to be determined by the court.
[The trial court]: Okay. And you will submit to me a proposed order with the appropriate findings?
“....
[The chapter's counsel]: We'll do a joint stipulation and a proposed order.
“....
[The trial court]: And as far as I am concerned, y'all are free to go, and I will just tell the jury that you shook hands and left and there's nothing else for them to do.
[Price-Williams's counsel]: Uh-huh. That we resolved our differences and without them it would have never gotten resolved.
[Price-Williams's counsel]: And, Judge, as the Court is aware, we had conceded that the [national fraternity] was not liable at summary judgment stage. Because there is still hanging out there the individuals for a short period of time, [the chapter's counsel] needs a-I would assume a [Rule] 54(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] order or-
[The chapter's counsel]: That, or-that, or perhaps we could simply include it in the release-
[Price-Williams's counsel]: That will be-
[The chapter's counsel]: -the national fraternity-
[Price-Williams's counsel]: That will be fine.
[The chapter's counsel]: All I am interested in is-
[Price-Williams's counsel]: Finality.
[The chapter's counsel]: -between you, your client and-
[Price-Williams's counsel]: The fraternity.
[The chapter's counsel]: -my clients.
[Price-Williams's counsel]: That's right. Fraternities. That's right.
[The chapter's counsel]: So that we're-
[Price-Williams's counsel]: We'll include that into the release.
[The trial court]: Okay.
[The chapter's counsel]: And that ought to-that ought to-and then I may come to the court with regard to some sort of a [Rule] 54(b) arrangement.
[The trial court]: That's fine.”

The trial court then dismissed the jury.

Subsequently, a disagreement arose between Price-Williams and the chapter regarding the terms of the settlement. Price-Williams argued that he intended to release only the national fraternity and the chapter, not the individual defendants-either as individuals or as agents of the chapter. The chapter argued that the settlement agreement included a release of the national fraternity, the chapter, and the individual defendants in their capacities as agents of the chapter. The chapter contended that the only claims Price-Williams had reserved were claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. On December 23, 2008, Price-Williams and the chapter each filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement according to those respective interpretations.

On January 5, 2009, before the trial court ruled on the parties' motions to enforce the settlement agreement, it entered an order assessing damages against the individual defendants. The trial court made detailed findings of fact regarding the events underlying Price-Williams's claims and the liability of the individual defendants. Regarding the first count of the complaint, it concluded that each of the individual defendants had acted negligently and wantonly with respect to the assault. The trial court determined that Howard was not a member of the chapter but that Dean and Baber were members and officers of the chapter and that they “were responsible for maintaining order at the fraternity house through the implementation and enforcement of an appropriate risk management program” for the chapter. Dean and Baber held those duties on the night of the party at which Price-Williams was assaulted. Regarding the second and third counts of the complaint, the trial court held that Dean and Baber, in hosting the party and failing to create, implement, and follow rules and regulations that would have prevented the assault, acted negligently and wantonly and were liable to Price-Williams. Based on its findings, the trial court awarded Price-Williams $500,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages against the individual defendants. The trial court noted:

“The total amount of the verdict is therefore $1,250,000. It is the intention of this court that the verdict represents the total damages to be awarded [Price-Williams] for all damage[ ] suffered by him as a result of [the assault] and that the individual defendants are entitled to a setoff of the amount paid to [Price-Williams] by [the chapter] as a result of the confidential pro tanto settlement.”

On January 14, 2009, the chapter responded to Price-Williams's motion to enforce the settlement agreement and supplemented its own motion. Price-Williams then responded to the chapter's supplement. On January 30, 2009, the chapter moved, under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's January 5, 2009, judgment assessing damages against the individual defendants.

In its Rule 59 motion, the chapter argued that in the January 5, 2009, judgment the trial court had authority only to determine the amount of damages and that it had improperly made determinations regarding liability; had improperly entered judgments against the individual defendants with respect to the third count of the complaint, which had been stated only against the national fraternity and the chapter; and had improperly made determinations regarding the existence of an agency relationship between Dean and Baber and the chapter. Price-Williams moved to strike the chapter's Rule 59 motion, arguing that the chapter lacked standing because the judgment was against only the individual defendants and counsel for the chapter did not represent the individual defendants.

At a February 6, 2009, hearing on the motions to enforce the settlement agreement, the trial court denied the chapter's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment assessing damages against the individual defendants. In discussing the terms of the settlement agreement with counsel, the trial court noted that if the chapter was concerned with fully protecting itself, the release could include language releasing the chapter and its agents. Price-Williams's counsel explained his position that the chapter's concern was with vicarious liability and that a broader release of the chapter's “agents” would affect Price-Williams's ability to recover from a liability-insurance carrier based on coverage of two of the individual defendant...

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