Frauenfeld v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 70370

• Decision Date: 23 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 70370,70370
• Parties: MATTHEW FRAUENFELD, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE KERRY LOUISE EARLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and THE STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

MATTHEW FRAUENFELD, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK;AND THE HONORABLE KERRY LOUISE EARLEY,DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents,and THE STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OFMOTOR VEHICLES, Real Party in Interest.

No. 70370

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

May 23, 2016

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenges the district court's refusal to expedite a petition for judicial review of a driver's license revocation on the ground that the revocation period will expire on May 30, 2016, arguably rendering the proceedings moot under Langston v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 110 Nev. 342, 871 P.2d 362 (1994).

Having reviewed petitioner Matthew Frauenfeld's petition and appendices, as well as real party in interest State of Nevada, Department of Motor Vehicles' answer thereto, we conclude that our extraordinary intervention is not warranted. NRS 34.160 (mandamus is available to compel a legally required action); NRS 34.320 (prohibition is available to arrest acts taken in excess of jurisdiction); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (noting that the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted). In particular, Frauenfeld challenged his license revocation in a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge and has alleged no violation of that process. Although he asserts that his case cannot receive full judicial review without expediting that procedure, he has not demonstrated that this interferes with his constitutional right to due process. See State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety v. Root, 113 Nev. 942, 947, 944 P.2d 784, 787 (1997); see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11, (1979) (discussing due process rights with respect to driver's license revocation procedures); Carroll v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 907 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("There is no constitutional due process right to judicial review of an administrative decision.").

Further, NRS 233B.133(6) provides that "[t]he court, for good cause, may extend the times allowed in this section for filing memoranda." Frauenfeld has not shown that the briefing deadlines set forth in NRS 233B.133 are necessarily subject to shortening as well as extension, despite the statute's failure to so state. See In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230, 233-34 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutory minimum notice periods for summary judgment hearings).

Finally, we are not convinced that the future deprivation alleged—Frauenfeld's inability to pursue his challenge to theadministrative decision and revocation after the revocation period's expiration—will necessarily come to pass. In Langston, we concluded that the expiration of the driver's license revocation period rendered the appeal moot. 110 Nev. at 343-44, 871 P.2d at 363. In that case, however, the appellant had not...