Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
Citation | 104 F. Supp. 84 |
Decision Date | 31 March 1952 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 5399. |
Parties | FRAVEL v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Maurice J. Pressman, of Baltimore, Md., and Richter, Lord & Farage, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Hall Hammond and Clayton W. Daneker, of Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
This is a personal injury suit brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 inclusive, and the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-43 inclusive. It is before the Court on a motion of the defendant to dismiss the action.
The material facts as alleged by the complaint which, on the motion to dismiss, are to be treated as admitted by defendant, are as follows: On July 6, 1940, about 12:45 a. m., while the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a freight brakeman, on its Cumberland Valley, Pennsylvania, branch, and while acting as a flagman on a train which was then waiting at a switch, a light engine operated by defendant on a westbound track crashed into the train on which the plaintiff was working, as a result of which the plaintiff was thrown about with great force, striking his back on the floor. During the two weeks following the accident, the plaintiff was examined on several occasions at the Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Hospital, by doctors for the defendant, who took x-rays of his back at the defendant's direction, and told him that he had no serious injuries. Approximately two weeks after the accident, the plaintiff was informed by the defendant's claim agent that he had conferred with the defendant's doctors and that the medical information available to the railroad was to the effect that there was nothing wrong with the plaintiff; that he would have nothing to fear as to the after-effects of the accident; that if any injuries should show up later as a result of the accident, the defendant would compensate him for any damages so sustained, and that if the parties were unable to agree on the amount of the damages, he could bring suit against the defendant at any time. In reliance upon these statements and representations of the defendant's doctors and the defendant's claim agent, the plaintiff executed a release to the defendant for which he obtained no consideration, except payment of $50 as his wages for the week that he had lost from work as a result of the accident.
Plaintiff's back continued to trouble him and he continued to experience severe pain in the region of his injury. From time to time he consulted the defendant's doctors regarding this, but he was always informed that he had no serious injury and that his pain would abate with time. The various railroad doctors that the plaintiff consulted also advised him, as time went on, that his pain was the result of a rheumatic condition. Finally, on February 17, 1949, more than eight and a half years after the accident, the plaintiff consulted a physician not connected with the railroad, who diagnosed his back condition as a herniation of the 4th lumbar intervertebral disc, with compression of the lumbar nerve roots, and informed him that this injury would necessitate an operation for the removal of the disc and fusion of the spine, and that in any event, his injury was of a serious and permanent nature. An operation was performed which confirmed this diagnosis. On June 29, 1951, almost eleven years after the accident, the plaintiff commenced this action, claiming damages in the amount of $62,500. The defendant has moved to dismiss it on three grounds: (1) that the alleged cause of action was not commenced within three years from the day it accrued as provided in Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended, 45 U.S. C.A. § 56; (2) that the release which plaintiff executed after the accident is valid and constitutes a complete discharge of defendant from all further liability to plaintiff in connection with the accident; and (3) that the plaintiff is barred by laches from prosecuting this action.
Taking up these grounds alleged by the defendant for dismissal of the action in the order just stated, Section 6, as amended, of the Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56, provides that "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued." In Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253, 15 A.L.R.2d 491, a decision of the Court of Appeals of this, the Fourth Circuit, it was held on a motion by defendant to dismiss the action, that this three year limitation was tolled by the alleged deliberate fraud of a claim agent of the defendant railroad in inducing a seventeen year old boy to delay filing suit beyond the three year period of limitation, by informing him and his father that he would have three years after reaching the age of twenty-one within which to bring the action. The Court said, 178 F.2d 253, at page 255: Then the Court, after analyzing the distinctions between the two classes of statutes of limitations, i. e., the remedial and the substantive, said, 178 F.2d 258-259:
* * * * * *
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Company v. Moore
...L.Ed. 1343, Id., 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 935, at page 941; Toran v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., D.C.Mass., 108 F.Supp. 564; Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C. Md.1952, 104 F.Supp. 84, and see Note 15 A.L.R.2d 500. 20 See Freedom of the Trial Judge, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 1281 at 1298; cf. L. Hand dissentin......
-
Chandlee v. Shockley
...should it be realistic and humane. The spirit, not the letter, should control.' The Scarborough case was followed in Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.D.Md., 104 F.Supp. 84, Toran v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., D.C.D.Mass., 108 F.Supp. 564 (in which Judge Wyzanski said he was free to choo......
-
Fletcher v. Union Pac. R. Co.
...by either it or its agent caused the employee's failure to bring his action within the three-year period. Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. R., 104 F.Supp. 84 (D.Md.1952) (fraud re diagnosis and legal rights). The railroad is equitably estopped even if the misrepresentations upon which the employee......
-
Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal
...395. 4 Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 4 Cir., 178 F.2d 253, 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 935, 4 Cir., 202 F.2d 84; Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C., 104 F.Supp. 84; Toran v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., D.C., 108 F.Supp. 564. 5 The District Court noted, 'The reasoning of (petitioner's) cas......