Frayne v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Highland Park
Decision Date | 16 June 2021 |
Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-0268-18 |
Parties | DEANA FRAYNE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK, MIDDLESEX COUNTY, ISRAEL SOTO, and KELLY WYSOCZANSKI, Respondents-Respondents. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Hoffman, Suter and Smith.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of Education, Docket No. 316-12/16.
Deana Frayne, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Tiffany D. Togarelli, argued the cause for respondents Highland Park Board of Education, Israel Soto and Kelly Wysoczanski (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Eric L. Harrison, of counsel and on the brief; James V. Mazewski, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Commissioner of Education (Amna T. Toor, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
Plaintiff Deanna Frayne appeals from an August 9, 2018 Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) Final Decision finding that her petition alleging the Highland Park Board of Education (Board) violated her tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 is time-barred pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). Plaintiff also argues the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents imposition of the time bar. We affirm the Commissioner's decision for the reasons set forth below.
The Highland Park Board of Education (Board) hired plaintiff to serve as a non-tenure track first grade maternity leave replacement for the 2008-2009 school year. The Board continued plaintiff's employment in the non-tenure track role for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years.
Thereafter, the Board employed plaintiff as a tenure track first grade teacher for the 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 school years. On May 5, 2015, plaintiff signed a contract with the Board to continue as a tenure track first grade teacher for the 2015-2016 school year. On June 25, 2015, before commencement of the 2015-2016 school year, the Board served plaintiff with aletter advising her that her employment would be terminated effective August 23, 2015.
In the letter, the Board asserted plaintiff's attendance, classroom performance, and overall behavior over the past several years had been exceedingly poor. The letter also cited a parent-teacher incident where plaintiff recorded a conversation between her and a parent without that parent's consent. The letter was plaintiff's second written notice of unsatisfactory performance within thirty days.1
In addition to the Board's June 25, 2015 letter to plaintiff, the Board also presented plaintiff a proposed "Agreement and Mutual Release," dated June 24, 2015, which offered plaintiff continuing health benefits and sixty days' worth of salary in exchange for her waiving the sixty-day termination notice period, accepting termination, and releasing any potential claims against the Board. The first page of this proposed agreement contained this relevant language:
Plaintiff declined to execute the proposed agreement. Next, on July 13, 2015, the Board served plaintiff a letter advising that, "pursuant to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8),2 on Monday, July 20, 2015, the Board will discuss a personnel matter which could affect your employment in this school district." The Board met publicly on August 23, 2015, and in a unanimous 9-0 vote, terminated plaintiff's employment.
Ten months later, in June 2016, plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court challenging her termination and asserting that she had been a tenured employee at the time the Board fired her. The Law Division judge transferred the determination of plaintiff's tenure rights to the Commissioner, while staying allother claims. The Board moved for summary decision, arguing that plaintiff failed to assert her claim of tenure within the ninety-day period required by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).
The administrative law judge (ALJ) found the Board's written communications to plaintiff on June 24-25, 2015 placed her on notice that any tenure status she believed she had was being challenged by the Board. The ALJ also found plaintiff was well beyond the ninety-day period during which she could file a petition with the Commissioner to assert and protect her tenure rights.
The ALJ issued an initial decision dismissing plaintiff's tenure claim. The Commissioner issued a final decision adopting the ALJ's findings on August 9, 2018. Plaintiff appealed challenging the Commissioner's decision.3 She contends her tenure action should not be time-barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
"[We] have 'a limited role' in the review of [agency] decisions." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). "[A] 'strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to [an agency decision].'" In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994)). "In order to reverse an agency's judgment, [we] must find the agency's decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 ( )(quoting Henry, 81 N.J. at 579-80). The burden of proving that an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable is on the challenger. Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)).
We "may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a different result." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and superiorknowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). Furthermore, "[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference." In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997).
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 establishes a May 15 deadline by which boards of education must offer written contracts of employment to certain non-tenured teaching staff or provide them with notice they will not be rehired. It reads:
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3 addresses the initiation of a contested case before the Commissioner and provides in pertinent part:
A school board has "broad discretionary authority in the granting of tenure" and the decision not to grant tenure "need not be grounded on unsatisfactory classroom or professional performance for there are many unrelated but nonetheless equally valid reasons why a board . . . may conclude that tenure should not be granted." Donaldson v. Bd. of Educ., 65 N.J. 236, 241 (1974).
The ninety-day rule has been strictly construed by the courts and consistently applied. See Nissman v Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super 373, 380-81 (App. Div....
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