Frazier v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 11 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 8:20-cv-2059-HMH-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Richard Junior Frazier, Petitioner, v. Nanette Barnes, Warden Bennettsville Federal Correctional Institution, Respondent. |
Richard Junior Frazier ("Petitioner") is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and is currently incarcerated in South Carolina at the Bennettsville Federal Correctional Institution. Proceeding pro se, Petitioner brings this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, this habeas action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner commenced this action to challenge his sentence by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the "Petition"). [Doc. 1]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Petition filed in this case as well as the records from the sentencing court.1
On June 20, 2001, a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia convicted Petitioner of the crime of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). [Doc. 1 at 1]; see also United States v. Frazier, No. 2:00-cr-00070-RWS-JRS-1 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2001) ("Frazier"), Doc. 71. On August 10, 2001, the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to a term of life imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), the federal three-strikes statute. [Doc. 1 at 1]; see also Frazier, Docs. 75; 76.
On October 15, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. [Doc. 1 at 2]; see also United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
On May 19, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. See Frazier, Doc. 105. The sentencing court denied Petitioner's motion for relief on May 30, 2006. Frazier, Doc. 106.
On June 27, 2016, with authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and assisted by counsel, Petitioner filed a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.2 See Frazier, Docs. 110;112. On June 3, 2019, the sentencing court granted Petitioner's motion to withdraw his § 2255 motion. See Frazier, Docs. 122; 123.
Petitioner now seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. Petitioner contends that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is illegal because his crime of conviction, kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), is not a crime of violence as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). [Doc. 1 at 2.]
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Furthermore, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is notentitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) ( that a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
Unlike a § 2255 motion, which is filed in the sentencing court, a § 2241 petition is filed in the district where the petitioner is incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); In re: Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, "defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255." Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). This is so because a § 2241 petition generally "'attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity,' whereas a § 2255 motion 'attacks the legality of detention.'" Rice v. Lamanna, 451 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1989) (). However, § 2255 includes a savings clause, which permits a district court to consider a § 2241 petition challenging the validity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence when § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Jones, 226 F.3d at 333. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot challenge his federal sentence under § 2241 unless he can satisfy the requirements of the § 2255 savings clause, which states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In other words, as applied here, Petitioner's § 2241 action is barred unless he can demonstrate that the relief available to him under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Nevertheless, "the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion." In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has established a test for evaluating whether a petitioner meets the savings clause under § 2255 when he contests his sentence:
[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018). This savings clause test is a jurisdictional requirement that must be met before the Court can entertain a petition filed pursuant to § 2241. Id. at 426 (). The Court may sua sponte raise subject matter jurisdiction, and the FourthCircuit has held that, if a petitioner cannot meet the savings clause requirements, then the § 2241 petition "must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Rice, 617 F.3d at 807.
Many federal prisoners, such as Petitioner, have erroneously attempted to overturn federal convictions or sentences by filing a § 2241 action. See, e.g., San-Miguel v. Dove, 291 F.3d 257, 259-61 (4th Cir. 2002) (). As noted, § 2255 is not an inadequate or ineffective remedy simply because a motion under § 2255 is unsuccessful, untimely, or successive. In Re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5. In its seminal decision regarding the savings clause requirements under § 2255, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Jones, 226 F.3d at 333 (citations omitted).
The crux of Petitioner's claim is that his sentence is unlawful because his crime of conviction, kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), is not a crime of violence for purposes of mandatory sentencing under the federal three-strikes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). However, Petitioner cannot satisfy the requirements of Wheeler because he has not demonstrated that, subsequent to his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review. See Reynolds v. Joyner, No. 9:18-cv-1809-TMC-BM, 2018 WL 5650035, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2018) (), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5634223 (D.S.C. Oct. 31,...
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