Frazier v. City of Gadsden

• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:13-CV-757-VEH
• Parties: MICHAEL D. FRAZIER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GADSDEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

MICHAEL D. FRAZIER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GADSDEN, Defendant.

Case No.: 4:13-CV-757-VEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

May 13, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction and Procedural History

The trial of this employment lawsuit arising under Title VII began on August 24, 2015, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Michael D. Frazier ("Mr. Frazier") on August 28, 2015. (Doc. 66); (see also Docs. 81-85 (five volumes of trial transcript proceedings)). The jury awarded Mr. Frazier $20,000 in compensatory damages (Doc. 66-1 at 2 ¶ 3) on his race discrimination claim against Defendant City of Gadsden ("COG"). On August 28, 2015, the court entered a final judgment in Mr. Frazier's favor. (Doc. 67).

Pending before the court and briefed by the parties are the following seven post-judgment motions:

• COG's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Or Alternatively Motion for New Trial, Or Alternatively Motion To Alter, Amend, Or Vacate (Doc. 88) (the "Post-Judgment Motion") filed on September 25, 2016;

• COG's Amended Motion for Leave To File Amended Rule 50 and 59 Motions (Doc. 101) (the "Amended Post-Judgment Motion") filed on October 9, 2015;

• Mr. Frazier's Rule 59(e) Motion for Equitable Relief: Pre-judgment Interest (Doc. 73) (the "Pre-Judgment Interest Motion") filed on September 3, 2015;

• Mr. Frazier's Motion for Equitable Relief: Instatement Or Front Pay (Doc. 74) (the "Instatement Motion") filed on September 4, 2015;

• Mr. Frazier's Motion To Strike Affidavit of Dr. Michael Morris (Doc. 99) (the "Strike Motion") filed on October 7, 2015;

• Mr. Frazier's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Request for Briefing Schedule (Doc. 69) (the "Fee Motion") filed on September 2, 2015; and

• Mr. Frazier's Motion for Leave To Supplement Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Doc. 69) and Evidentiary Submission (Doc. 78) with Interim Attorney Time Records (Doc. 108) (the "Supplemental Fee Motion") filed on October 9, 2015.¹

After carefully considering all of the parties' contentions,² COG's Post-Judgment and Amended Post-Judgment Motions are DENIED. Alternatively, COG's Amended Post-Judgment Motion is TERMED as MOOT. Further, Mr. Frazier's Post-Judgment Motions are GRANTED IN PART, TERMED as MOOT IN PART, and otherwise are DENIED. The court first addresses the merits of COG's Post-Judgment Motion and Amended Post-Judgement Motion.

II. COG's Post-Judgment Motion and Amended Post-Judgment Motion

A. Preliminary Considerations

In its initial Post-Judgment Motion, COG contends that Mr. Frazier's "evidence was insufficient for its [sic] race discrimination claims to go to the jury." (Doc. 90 at 3).³ COG limits the scope of his relief within its Post-Judgment Motion to obtaining a "judgment as a matter of law." (Doc. 88 at 1 ¶ 2; see also id. at 2 ("WHEREFORE, defendant moves for said judgment.")). COG unhelpfully omits under which rule or rules it is seeking post-judgment relief within its Post-Judgment Motion.

The title of COG's brief indicates that it supports COG's "Renewed Motion for Judgment As a Matter of Law, Or Alternatively Motion for New Trial, Or Alternatively Motion To Alter, Amend, Or Vacate." (Doc. 90 at 1). However, despitethis multifaceted title, the only standard of review expressly invoked by COG is one for deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law. (See Doc. 90 at 3 ("The standard to be used by the district court in deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law.")). Immediately after identifying judgment as a matter of law as the applicable standard, COG cites to Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that a motion for judgment n.o.v. "should be granted only if the evidence points so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that no reasonable person could draw a contrary conclusion." 971 F.2d at 711. Further COG's brief, like its Post-Judgment Motion, is devoid of any procedural road map for the court to follow when attempting to address the relief ineffectively sought by COG.

In its Amended Post-Judgment Motion, COG mentions Rule 50 and Rule 59 (Doc. 101 at 1) and specifically requests that this court consider the "inadvertent omission" (Doc. 101 at 2 ¶ 1) of judicial estoppel as a defense to Mr. Frazier's "Motion for Equitable Relief, [and] also [as part of] . . . defendant's motions under Rules 50 and 59." (Doc. 101 at 1; id. at 4 ¶¶ 4, 5). Against this ambiguous backdrop, the court endeavors to address COG's Post-Judgment and Amended Post-Judgment Motions.

B. COG's Renewed JMOL Under Rule 50

Despite the murkiness of COG's filings in terms of the procedural rulesinvoked, the court construes them to, at a minimum, include a post-judgment motion made pursuant to Rule 50 (the "Renewed JMOL"). Rule 50 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.

(1) In General. If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:

(A) resolve the issue against the party; and

(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

(2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.

(b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment-or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged-the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)-(b).

Within the Eleventh Circuit, a renewed motion under Rule 50(b) must be based upon the same grounds as the original motion.

The fact that Rule 50(b) uses the word "renew[ed]" makes clear that a Rule 50(b) motion should be decided in the same way it would have been decided prior to the jury's verdict, and that the jury's particular findings are not germane to the legal analysis. See, e.g., [Doe v.] Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d [891,] 903 [(11th Cir. 2004)]("This Court repeatedly has made clear that any renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) must be based upon the same grounds as the original request for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a) at the close of the evidence and prior to the case being submitted to the jury."); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 842 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a Rule 50(b) motion "may be used to renew consideration of issues initially raised in a pre-verdict motion [under Rule 50(a)]," but that the court cannot consider matters not raised in the initial motion). The jury's findings should be excluded from the decision-making calculus on a Rule 50(b) motion, other than to ask whether there was sufficient evidence, as a legal matter, from which a reasonable jury could find for the party who prevailed at trial.

Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).

The Eleventh Circuit has described the application of the Rule 50 standard as follows:

This Court reviews a Rule 50 motion de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Telecomm. Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 830 (11th Cir. 2004). The motion should be deniedonly if reasonable and fair-minded persons exercising impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id., but we review all evidence in the record and "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party [without] mak[ing] credibility determinations or weigh[ing] the evidence," Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing the record, we "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. at 151. Therefore, we "should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the nonmoving party must provide more than a scintilla of evidence that there is a substantial conflict in evidence to support a jury question." Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 160 F.3d 697, 701 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mee Industries v. Dow Chemical Co., 608 F.3d 1202, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2010).

Before the jury got the case, COG moved for judgment as a matter of law two separate times. (See CM/ECF minute entry dated Aug. 27, 2015). During the first instance after Mr. Frazier rested, COG contended that the evidence was insufficient to show that John Crane ("Chief Crane") took into account Mr. Frazier's race when disqualifying him as a candidate to become a police officer. (...