Frazier v. Se. Ga. Health Sys.
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-21 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | CEDRICK FRAZIER and TAMARA FRAZIER, Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHEAST GEORGIA HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court are Defendants' partial motions for summary judgment. Dkt. Nos. 181, 182. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. Dkt. Nos. 181-1, 182-1, 183 201, 202, 213, 214, 217, 220, 221. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
This case arises out of Plaintiff Cedrick Frazier's surgery and post-operation treatment at Southeast Georgia Health System, Inc. (“SGHS”), in January and February of 2020. Dkt. No. 77.
On December 27, 2019, Defendant Dr. Sherman Stevenson examined Mr. Frazier and diagnosed him with a severe left-sided deviated septum. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 18:63:11-22; Dkt. No 181-15 at 78 ().
Plaintiff Tamara Frazier, Mr. Frazier's wife, accompanied Mr. Frazier to the December 27, 2019 visit. Dkt. No. 181-13 at 10:32:16-22. Mrs. Frazier recalls that Dr. Stevenson used a headlight to look into her husband's mouth and down his throat. Id. at 10:33:6-13. Plaintiffs do not recall everything Dr. Stevenson said during the December 27, 2019 visit, but they do remember Dr. Stevenson explaining that Mr. Frazier could continue using medications to try to get some relief but that the better option might be a septoplasty and reduction of inferior turbinates. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 18:65:15-66:21; Dkt. No. 181-13 at 10:33:1511:35:6; Dkt. No. 77 ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 181-14 at 25:97:10-19 ().
During the December 27, 2019 visit, Dr. Stevenson verbally reviewed both Mr. Frazier's diagnosis and the nature and purpose of the procedure with Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 181-1 ¶ 47; Dkt. No. 201-1 ¶ 47. Dr. Stevenson testified that during this visit, he also reviewed the material risks of the procedure, including risks of infection and bleeding, temporary pain and numbness around the front of the nose, teeth, and lips, and the risks of anesthesia that the anesthesiologist also typically reviews with the patient on the day of surgery along with an additional anesthesiology consent. Dkt. No. 181-14 at 19:75:22-76:10, 20:77:2-20, 30:119:45, 30:117:18-119:3, 31:122:25-123:15. Dr. Stevenson also testified that he reviewed the likelihood of success of the procedure, the practical alternatives to the procedure, and Mr. Frazier's prognosis if he rejected the procedure. Id. at 25:97:1019, 26:102:7-103:18. Plaintiffs, however, dispute whether Dr. Stevenson orally reviewed the material risks of the procedure, but, ultimately, do not recall everything Dr. Stevenson said during this visit. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 11:35:9-15.
Mr. Frazier underwent the septoplasty and inferior turbinate reduction procedure on January 21, 2020. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 8:1921. That day, before the surgery took place, Mr. Frazier signed the Patient Consent for Anesthesia (“Anesthesia Consent Form”) after reading and discussing it with nurse Rachel Faircloth and anesthesiologist Dr. Kristin West. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 23:84:385:12, 23:85:13-24:88:22.
At that same time, Mr. Frazier also signed Defendants' Informed Consent for Procedure Form (“Informed Consent Form”). Id. at 2-3; see also Dkt. No. 181-16 (). However, Mr. Frazier claims that Nurse Faircloth explained that the form, titled “Southeast Georgia Health System Informed Consent for Procedure/Treatment[,]” was only for the purpose of administering Mr. Frazier medication to help bring his pulse rate down on the day of surgery. Dkt. No. 181-2 at 18:64:11-65:5. Mr. Frazier further contends Nurse Faircloth presented him only the second page of the Informed Consent Form and that he did not see the first page. Id. 20:71:1672:4, 21:76:19-77:2.
Mr. Frazier saw Dr. Stevenson in the pre-operation area before his surgery but contends that when he saw Dr. Stevenson, Mr. Frazier was “medicated” and getting drowsy. Id. at 23:83:5-84:2.
Plaintiffs contend that because of the surgery, Mr. Frazier “suffers with chronic pain syndrome within the setting of trigeminal neuralgia, front teeth numbness, persistent headaches, nasofacial pain episodes,” and nosebleeds. Dkt. No. 77 ¶¶ 16, 31.
On at least two occasions, on April 20, 2020, and October 26, 2020, Plaintiffs requested from Defendants copies of Mr. Frazier's medical records. Dkt. No. 77 ¶¶ 126, 132. Requests for medical records are handled by the Medical Records and Resource Management department. Dkt. No. 83-3. Plaintiffs contend that the medical records Defendants' produced in response to their requests were fabricated, incomplete, and not provided in the time required by Georgia law. Dkt. No. 77 ¶¶ 100-13, 125-35.
In their second amended complaint brought against Defendants SGHS, Dr. Stevenson, and Cooperative Healthcare Services, Inc. (doing business as Southeast Georgia Physician Associates-Ear, Nose & Throat), Plaintiffs allege Defendants committed professional negligence, failed to acquire informed consent, committed fraud, and altered and fabricated portions of Mr. Frazier's medical records. Dkt. No. 77. Defendants now move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims in two separate motions. Dkt. Nos. 181, 182. In the first motion, Defendants argue they satisfied the legal requirements for informed consent. Dkt. No. 181-1 at 14-25. In the second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”) and O.C.G.A. § 31-33-2 (“Records Claims”) fail as a matter of law, and that they are entitled to partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. Dkt. No. 183 at 3-11.
Summary judgment “shall” be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” where the evidence would allow “a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
A fact is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Factual disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not sufficient to survive summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325.
If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in one of two ways. First, the nonmovant “may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was ‘overlooked or ignored' by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Second, the nonmovant “may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.” Id. at 1117. Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden with nothing more “than a repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only proper but required.” Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 103334 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' informed consent claims because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants' compliance with Georgia's informed consent statute. Dkt. No. 181-1 at 15-16. Plaintiffs insist Defendants failed to apprise Mr. Frazier of the information required by O.C.G.A. § 31-9.6.1(a) (“Informed Consent Statute”) because Defendants' Informed Consent Form “does not meet the requirements under the Georgia informed consent law and Rules of Georgia Composite Medical Board at Chapter 360-14, including Exhibit (360-14) B.” Dkt. No. 77 ¶¶ 69-80, 104.
As an initial matter, during a hearing before the Court, Plaintiffs conceded that Defendants' Informed Consent Form is consistent with the Informed Consent Statute. Dkt. No. 219. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sufficiency of Defendants' Informed Consent Form.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to show there is a genuine issue of material fact on their claim that Defendants failed to provide the Informed Consent Statute's required disclosures.
The Informed Consent Statute provides: “any person who undergoes any surgical procedure under general anesthesia spinal anesthesia, or major regional anesthesia . . . must consent to such procedure...
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