Frazier v. Manson
Decision Date | 27 February 1979 |
Citation | 410 A.2d 475,176 Conn. 638 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Larry FRAZIER v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Correction. |
Charles D. Gill, Public Defender, for plaintiff.
Stephen J. O'Neill, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for defendant.
Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, JJ.
This matter was instituted as a habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court and was reserved for the advice of this court. The parties have stipulated to the pertinent facts and submitted two questions upon which the advice of this court is sought. 1
The stipulation discloses the following facts: On July 3, 1975, Larry Frazier, hereinafter the plaintiff, was sentenced to a term of not less than 54 nor more than 108 years by the Superior Court in Fairfield County following his conviction on several criminal counts. On October 27, 1975, the sentence review division ordered that the plaintiff be resentenced to a term of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. On November 13, 1975 the plaintiff was resentenced by the Superior Court to a term of not less than 32 years nor more than 64 years. On October 26, 1976, the sentence review division again ordered that the plaintiff be resentenced to a term of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. On December 8, 1976, the plaintiff was resentenced by the Superior Court to a term of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. The plaintiff is currently serving the sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 60 years. The defendant is computing the plaintiff's so-called good time credit on his sentence, based upon the provisions of General Statutes § 18-7. 2 General Statutes § 18-7a, 3 which purports to apply to persons sentenced on and after October 1, 1976, provides, in effect, more good time credit than its predecessor, General Statutes § 18-7. The defendant does not give the plaintiff any good time credit under General Statutes § 18-7a on the sentence he is now serving on the basis that such credit cannot be given to the plaintiff as he was originally sentenced before October 1, 1976.
The first question reserved for our advice is: "Are the provisions of Section 18-7a of the General Statutes applicable to persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment prior to October 1, 1976, to the effect that they are entitled to the 'good time' credits provided for by this statute for the balance of their sentence after October 1, 1976?"
In determining the answer to this question we must consider the language of § 18-7a, as well as that of § 18-7. It is clear that § 18-7a, in its terms, applies to "(a)ny person sentenced to a term of imprisonment, On and after October 1, 1976," (emphasis added) and that § 18-7 specifically applies to a prisoner sentenced prior to October 1, 1976. At the outset of our discussion we point out that this court has held repeatedly that where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26, 29, 357 A.2d 498 (1975), and authorities therein cited. This is consonant with the legislative intent which is found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say. Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 452, 364 A.2d 167 (1975). The statutory language of §§ 18-7a and 18-7 is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, courts cannot, by construction, read into such statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251, 363 A.2d 121 (1975); Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972). To state it otherwise, where the legislative intent is clear, and the language used to express it is unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction. Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36 (1967). Hurlbut v. Lemelin, supra, 155 Conn. 74, 230 A.2d 38. This presumption has particular applicability in this case. Pepin v. Danbury, 171 Conn. 74, 86, 368 A.2d 88, 95 (1976).
There is no repugnancy between the two statutes. In construing a statute courts must presume that a reasonable and rational result was intended. Norwich Land Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 4, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975); Bridgeport v. Stratford, 142 Conn. 634, 644, 116 A.2d 508 (1955). The legislature intended that a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment on and after October 1, 1976, receive good time different from one so sentenced prior to that date; such a result is neither unreasonable nor irrational. The statute, i. e., § 18-7a, must be applied as its words direct. Obuchowski v. Dental Commission, 149 Conn. 257, 265, 178 A.2d 537 (1962). That direction is clear and we follow the principle that we have no choice but to interpret the statutes as they are written. Mancinone v. Warden, 162 Conn. 430, 438, 294 A.2d 564 (1972). The clarity of these two statutes is such that we need not even consider the rule that when two constructions are possible, courts will adopt the one which makes the statute effective and workable, and not that one which leads to difficult and possibly bizarre results. See, e. g., Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 506, 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S.Ct. 911, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973). To apply § 18-7a as the plaintiff urges would thwart the purpose of this statute, which cannot be done; Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, supra, 168 Conn. 31, 357 A.2d 498; and to do so would overturn a plain expression of the legislative will. It is not our function to substitute our own ideas of what might be a wise provision in the place of a clear expression of the legislative will. Dental Commission v. Tru-Fit Plastics, Inc., 159 Conn. 362, 365, 269 A.2d 265 (1970). We are compelled to reject the plaintiff's claim that § 18-7a can legally be applied as he urges. The application of controlling legal principles requires the conclusion that the provisions of General Statutes § 18-7a are not applicable to persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment prior to October 1, 1976, and that such persons are, therefore, not entitled to the good time credits provided by § 18-7a for the balance of their sentence after October 1, 1976. Accordingly, our answer to the first question reserved for our advice is "No."
We turn now to the second question reserved for our advice which is: "If the provision of Section 18-7a of the General Statutes which provides that it applies to '(a)ny person sentenced to a term of imprisonment, on and after October 1, 1976,' denies its application to persons sentenced prior to that date but still serving sentences, then, is that provision invalid as being in violation of such person's rights to equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 20 of the Connecticut Constitution?"
The determination of the applicable standard of review is at the threshold of the consideration of any equal protection claim. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 639, 376 A.2d 359, 370 (1977). Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542-43, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975).
The plaintiff argues that the "strict scrutiny" standard applies, maintaining that he is in a "suspect" classification and claims that there is an infringement of a fundamental right, i. e., his liberty. The defendant, on the other hand, claims that the "rational basis" test is the...
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