Frazier v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
Decision Date | 08 June 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 3D11–580.,3D11–580. |
Citation | 89 So.3d 937 |
Parties | Phyllis FRAZIER, Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Appellees/Cross–Appellants. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gerson & Schwartz, and Philip M. Gerson, Miami, and Edward S. Schwartz, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Carlton Fields, and Benjamine Reid, Miami; Shook, Hardy & Bacon, and William Geraghty and Frank Cruz–Alvarez, Miami; Jones Day, and Gregory G. Katsas; White & Case, and Raoul G. Cantero, Miami, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Before ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
In this Engle-progeny 1 case, the jury returned a special interrogatory verdict in favor of the tobacco company defendants, appellees here, based on the affirmative defense that the plaintiff's, Ms. Frazier's, lawsuit was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1994). Ms. Frazier has appealed the denial of her motions for directed verdict and new trial regarding the limitations issue. Appellees Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds have cross-appealed the circuit court's ruling granting preclusive effect to certain findings by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the twelve-year statute of repose applicable to fraud claims, section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1994).
In the direct appeal, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial for two independently sufficient reasons. First, there was no competent record evidence that “the accumulated effects of the substance [had] manifest[ed] in a way which supplie[d to Ms. Frazier] some evidence of the causal relationship to the manufactured product” 2 before the undisputed limitations bar date of May 5, 1990. For this reason, Ms. Frazier's motion for a directed verdict on the statute of limitations issue should have been granted.
Second, Ms. Frazier made and preserved meritorious objections to the court's adoption of the jury instruction and special interrogatory verdict question submitted by the appellees on the statute of limitations defense. Although this issue becomes moot on the basis of our ruling on the direction of a verdict, we conclude that Ms. Frazier's motion for a new trial was well taken on this issue as well.
In the cross appeal, we affirm the trial court's rulings on both issues.
I. Evidence and Rulings at TrialA. Tobacco Use and Medical History
At the time of the trial in 2010, Ms. Frazier was 65 years old. She began smoking cigarettes at the age of 14 or 15. After numerous attempts to quit smoking, she was successful in 1992, with medical assistance and nicotine patches. Ms. Frazier's medical records disclosed medical treatment for respiratory complaints beginning in approximately 1986. Ms. Frazier and those records described a bout with pneumonia:
In March and April 1987, Ms. Frazier returned to the emergency room with continued complaints of a cough and pain in her ribs. The treating physician diagnosed right middle lobe pneumonia and advised her to return for an x-ray if the symptoms continued. On a second visit, the same doctor diagnosed “recurrent pneumonia and/or bronchitis.” During the first visit, the doctor prescribed erythromycin; subsequently Ms. Frazier was switched to doxycycline for the infection and Percocet for the cough. Importantly, during these visits the treating physician did not refer her to a pulmonologist or order specialized tests for investigation of a possible condition more serious than a short-term infection.
Thereafter, Ms. Frazier moved from Massachusetts to Florida. In October 1987, she visited a walk-in clinic because she had a “bad cold” and a “temperature.” In her trial testimony, she described the incident:
They didn't do any testing of any sort that I had done at the hospital in 1991 when I had the asthma attack. They didn't do a chest x-ray. They didn't do what's called an arterial blood gas where they check the oxygen in your blood.
They didn't give me a nebulizer treatment which is what they did when I had the asthma attack.
They didn't do anything that would have made me think that I had anything but bronchitis. They gave me an antibiotic.
They didn't give me inhalers. I mean they didn't do anything that would—so I didn't—I didn't think it was anything different.
* * * Q: But it sounds like you've got a pretty good understanding now of blood gases and inhalers and some of these other medical terms that you've just referenced in answer to my last question. When did you learn those things?
Ms. Frazier's next relevant medical incident occurred in February 1991—a time well after the statute of limitations bar date. She had developed an upper respiratory infection (she had a sore throat, nasal congestion, and a fever of 102 degrees). She went to an urgent care center and was then admitted to a hospital. The radiologist's report on a chest x-ray taken at that time indicated “changes of COPD,” 3 and Ms. Frazier was told that she had asthma. For the first time, she was referred to a pulmonologist on February 21, 1991. The pulmonologist concluded that Ms. Frazier had an asthmatic bronchitis, but his report expressed a concern for “the possibility of some underlying lung disease on a more chronic basis in view of [her] significant smoking history.” The pulmonologist's consultation report also states that “[s]he denies any history of emphysema or chronic bronchitis,” a statement that is not contradicted by the record in any respect.
In a follow-up in April 1991, the pulmonologist reported that the bronchitis had resolved. In a further follow-up in August 1991, the pulmonologist's records noted tobacco addiction and (for the first time, following the tests ordered in February) “underlying COPD,” and this was noted again during a visit in February 1992. After a follow-up in July 1992, Ms. Frazier's pulmonologist reported that she was a patient “with underlying COPD secondary to her long term tobacco use for the last 30 years.” Over the course of several years, the damage to Ms. Frazier's lungs was classified as “severe COPD” and as emphysema, and by 2001 she was under evaluation for bilateral lung transplants (which she later received).
Before trial, Ms. Frazier sought an order “to preclude speculative testimony of Defendant's expert pulmonologist, Eric Schroeder, M.D., concerning the time frame during which [Ms. Frazier] developed COPD.” In her motion, Ms. Frazier argued that “Dr. Schroeder in this case purports to use the results from a pulmonary function test (PFT) performed on the plaintiff in 1991 to speculate as to what her lung function would have been four to six years earlier, even though no such tests were performed on the plaintiff before 1991 and no physician, even physicians treating her for other respiratory ailments, diagnosed her as having COPD before 1991.” The trial court granted the motion in part, precluding direct testimony regarding Ms. Frazier's state of mind, or her actual or constructive knowledge of her condition.
At trial, however, Dr. Schroeder was permitted to render opinions (over objection), purportedly because of his expertise in pulmonary medicine, that Ms. Frazier's 1986 and 1987 emergency room visits for pneumonia and bronchitis were actually manifestations of COPD and emphysema through “signs and symptoms that would have been apparent to the patient herself.” He also testified, based on Ms. Frazier's 1991 chest x-rays (ordered and evaluated well after the applicable statute of limitations bar date) and her first PFT report from 1993, that it was possible to deduce from them that she must have had COPD in the 1980s. He admitted, however, that this opinion was based on his own experience rather than any scientific research or medical...
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