Frazier v. W. H. H. Slack & Bro.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1911
• Citation: 85 Vt. 160,81 A. 161
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: FRAZIER v. W. H. H. SLACK & BRO.

81 A. 161

85 Vt. 160

FRAZIER

v. W. H. H. SLACK & BRO.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor.

Oct. 10, 1911.

Exceptions from Windsor County Court; Willard W. Miles, Judge.

Assumpsit by trustee process under the statute for the collection of taxes by William H. Frazier against W. H. H. Slack & Bro. Heard on an agreed statement of facts. Judgment for plaintiff, and both plaintiff and defendants except. Affirmed.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MUXSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ.

Fred C. Davis and Edward R. Buck, for plaintiff.

Herbert H. Blanchard, Herbert G. Tupper, and Edward B. Flinn, for defendants.

MUNSON, J. The plaintiff sues as collector of the town of Springfield to recover taxes assessed against the defendants on the list of 1908, on property leased by the defendants to the Springfield Electric Railway Company for 99 years, which is claimed to have been exempt from general taxation as property belonging to said railway company and acquired and used for railroad business and purposes. P. S. 706, 707, 797. The property in question is set in the list in two parcels, designated as "power house, lot and building," and "house lot and building." The defendants concede that the dwelling house is taxable, if properly listed. It is agreed that the property described as power house, lot and building has been used "for developing and furnishing power, light and heat by the Springfield Electric Railway Company in operating its railroad, and in and about its railroad business, and for no other purpose."

The plaintiff does not question but that this is property which "belongs" to the railway company within the meaning of the statute. His claim is that the words "used for railroad business or purposes" ought not to be construed to include it. He likens the water power and its accessories to the wood lots or coal mines which furnish the fuel which produces the steam that affords the motive power of a steam railway, and supports his claim by a reference to Vermont Central Railroad Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193, where the court distinguished between land which the company was authorized to take as essential to the exercise of its franchise and land purchased for convenience or profit, and held that the latter was taxable. It is not necessary to inquire as to the justness of the comparison drawn by the plaintiff. In the case cited there was a charter exemption from all taxation, and it is well settled that exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed. In re Hickok's Estate, 78 Vt. 259, 62 Atl. 724; Force v. Delta, etc., Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 17 Sup. Ct. 230, 41 L. Ed. 590. Here there is no exemption from taxation, but a classification for the purposes of taxation. A classification made to secure the direct production of a state revenue is presumed to be advantageous to the state, and the same reason which is held to require a strict construction in one case would suggest a liberal construction in the other.

The lease to the railroad company authorizes the use of the power for other than railroad purposes, and it is claimed that the defense fails because it does not appear but that the company intends to put it to other uses in the future. This claim apparently results from the plaintiff's theory that the property subjected to the special tax is only such as might have been taken under the right of eminent domain. But the law of eminent domain is not the criterion in matters of taxation. Stiles v. Newport, 70 Vt. 154, 56 Atl. 662. It was within the power of the Legislature to withdraw this property from general taxation, whether...