la Freda v. Woodward

• Decision Date: 10 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 5.,5.
• Citation: 15 A.2d 798
• Parties: LA FREDA et al. v. WOODWARD et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

15 A.2d 798

LA FREDA et al.

v. WOODWARD et al.

No. 5.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Oct. 10, 1940.

Appeal from Supreme Court Action by Sadie T. La Freda and John La Freda against Howard Reid Woodward and another, executors of the last will and testament of William H. Woodward, deceased, and others, for injuries sustained by plaintiff Sadie T. La Freda as result of a fall upon defendants' premises. From a judgment of nonsuit, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Parsons, Larecque & Borden, of Red Bank (Theodore D. Parsons, of Red Bank, of counsel), for appellants.

Kalisch & Kalisch, of Newark (Isidor Kalisch, of Newark, of counsel), for respondents.

HEHER, Justice.

The appeal is from a judgment of nonsuit in an action ex delicto for negligence against a landlord arising from a fall upon the demised premises suffered by an invitee of the tenant.

These are the material facts and circumstances: On December 4, 1935, the landowner, William H. Woodward, leased to Dr. Maurice A. Aaronson, a practicing physician, the two story dwelling house known as No. 12 Washington Street, in the City of Long Branch. A draft of lease prepared in accordance with the landowner's instructions, but not actually executed, fixed the term at one year, and provided that the leased premises were "to be used professionally" by the lessee "in his practice as a doctor of medicine;" and, while the real estate broker, who negotiated the tenancy contract as the landowner's agent, testified that he informed his principal that the prospective tenant "wanted to rent the premises as a Medical Center," he acknowledged that the unexecuted instrument fully embodied "the terms of the agreement of lease" and "the purposes for which the property was to be used." The lessee devoted the first floor of the premises to the practice of his profession (he sublet the second floor); and, on March 17, 1937, while the tenancy still subsisted on the original terms, the plaintiff, Sadie T. LaFreda, a patient of the lessee, fell on a footway extending from the front porch of the building a distance of twelve feet to the public sidewalk, as she was departing from the premises after having received medical treatment, and sustained injury. This pathway was within the leased premises. It was three feet wide, and constructed of concrete; and the contention was that "the heel of" this plaintiff's "right foot caught in one of the crevices of" the walk.

There was evidence tending to show that the concrete surface was in a state of disrepair, due to wear and tear and the ravages of the elements, and that it was not of "ordinary" and "proper thickness," and was constructed of substance not of "a proper mixture;" and the specifications of negligence, variously stated, were (a) the landlord's failure to "maintain" the footway "in a safe and proper condition," and to keep it "in good repair," and to "prevent" it "from becoming a nuisance or dangerous and hazardous to the life and limb of those lawfully using" it; (b) its construction "with structural defects," in that there was "no proper base or foundation," and there were "insufficient cement and improper drainage," and so a nuisance, and the leasing of the premises in that condition, the landowner knowing that the lessee "intended to use" them "for public or semi-public purposes;" and (c) carelessness in the making of repairs.

It is conceded that there was an utter lack of evidence to sustain specification (c). The contract did not impose upon the landlord the duty of making repairs during the subsistence of the tenancy; and he did not, gratuitously or otherwise, undertake the making of repairs to the demised premises prior to the mishap made the subject of this action.

Nor was there a structural defect in the legal view. It was a condition of disrepair merely. While it is probable that a heavier surface would have been more durable, this is not per se a determinative consideration as regards faulty construction. So far as is revealed by the evidence, the condition dangerous to life and limb was not the result of improper construction, but rather the breakdown of the pavement through the wastage of time and use.

The initial insistence of appellants is that, "where a landlord leases a building for a public or semi-public use, the public is deemed to be invited to make such use thereof by the owner, and the latter cannot evade responsibility of exercising due care to make it reasonably safe by demising it to a tenant."

More specifically, it is said that, in thus leasing the premises, the landowner "acted with knowledge that the premises were rented for the explicit purpose of professional offices," and that "the premises were to be used by patients and those of necessity accompanying the patients to a doctor's office," and therefore the "premises were by this lease devoted to a public office," and the landowner is liable for injuries resulting from the existent "dangerous condition" to those "who rightfully came thereon pursuant to the use to which the premises were to be devoted" —citing Eckman v. Atlantic Lodge, 68 N.J.L. 10, 52 A. 293; Smith v. Delaware River Amusement Co., 76 N.J.L. 461, 69 A. 970; Johnson v. Zemel, 109 N.J.L. 197, 160 A. 356; Martin v. Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364, 168 A. 612.

But the principle of these cases is not applicable here. It is the established general rule in this state that, upon the letting of a house or lands, there is no implied warranty or condition that the premises are fit and suitable for the purpose specified, or for the use to which the lessee proposes to devote them, or indeed for any purpose; and the landlord is therefore under no liability for injuries sustained by the tenant, or his family, by reason of the ruinous condition of the demised premises, unless there has been fraudulent concealment of a latent defect. The doctrine of covenants implied from the letting "has been held in great strictness in this State." The rule of caveat emptor governs generally. And it is likewise the rule, also grounded in the common law, that a landlord is under no greater duty to persons who come upon the leased lands, by invitation of the tenant, than he is to the tenant himself. Such usually enter the premises under the same title as the lessee, and not at the invitation of the landlord, express or implied, and are therefore so identified with the tenant as ordinarily to have no greater rights against the landlord as respects injuries sustained therein than has the tenant. Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331, 344, 43 Am.Rep. 380; Mullen v. Rainear, 45 N.J.L. 520; Clyne v. Helmes, 61 N.J.L. 358, 39 A. 767; Siggins v. McGill, 72 N.J.L. 263, 62 A. 411, 3 L.R.A., N.S., 316, 111 Am.St.Rep. 666; Reilly v. Feldman, 103 N.J.L. 517, 138 A. 307. See, also, Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N.E. 117, 1 Am.St.Rep. 469; Baum v. Ahlborn, 210 Mass. 336, 96 N.E. 671; Fraser v. Kruger, 8 Cir., 298 F. 693; Huggett v. Miers [1908] 2 K.B. 278, 1 B.R.C. 97, 77 L.J.K.B., N.S., 710, 99 L.R., N.S., 326, 24 Times L.R. 582.

The ratio decidendi of Eckman v. Atlantic Lodge, supra, is that the owner of a building "constructed for public purposes holds out to the public, by letting it for such purposes, that it is safe; and, further, that the owner is bound to use reasonable care to see that it has been properly constructed, and is maintained in a fit condition for the purposes for which it is used; and that he is responsible for injuries resulting from his failure in that regard which are received by persons who are present on public occasions, whether as spectators or as employes." To the same effect is the case of Johnson v. Zemel, supra. And in Martin v. Asbury Park, supra [111 N.J.L. 364, 168 A. 613], this court considered the exception— one more apparent than real when its rationale is considered—as limited to those cases in which the premises were "designed for use by the public for public purposes and use by large numbers of persons." See, also, Mead v. Baum, 76 N.J.L. 337, 69 A. 962.

While these cases have reference to buildings "designed" or "constructed" for "public or semi-public use," there would seem to be no reason in principle why buildings "devoted" to such purposes by stipulation of the parties should have an essentially different classification, for the basis of the direct liability imposed upon the landlord is that, by the nature of the use, he is deemed to have extended an invitation to the public to make such use thereof, and so is under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of those who shall respond to the invitation. Compare Phillips v. Library Co., 55 N.J.L. 307, 27 A. 478; Clyne v. Helmes, supra. Therein lies the limitation of the principle.

It remains to consider what constitutes...