Frederick Rodgers v. United States
Decision Date | 07 April 1902 |
Docket Number | No. 317,317 |
Citation | 185 U.S. 83,37 Ct.Cl. 552,22 S.Ct. 582,46 L.Ed. 816 |
Parties | FREDERICK RODGERS, Appt. , v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from the court of claims. The claimant, Frederick Rodgers, a rear admiral of the line of the Navy, brought suit to recover the sum of $3,358,13, which he claims as the balance due him on account of pay and allowances for the period between March 3, 1899, and March 2, 1901. The claim is founded upon the law of Congress known as the 'navy personnel act,' which was approved on March 3, 1899, and entitled 'An Act to Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States.' 30 Stat. at L. 1004, chap. 413.
The applicable sections are 7 and 13, which, omitting irrelevant portions, read:
service in the grade of ensign, shall, after passing the examinations now required by law, be eligible to promotion to the grade of lieutenant (junior grade): Provided, That when the office of chief of bureau is filled by an officer below the rank of rear admiral, said officers shall, while holding said office, have the rank of rear admiral and receive the same pay and allowance as are now allowed a brigadier general in the Army: And provided, further, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the retirement of officers who now have the rank or relative rank of commodore with the rank and pay of that grade. . . .
By § 1466 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it was, among other things, provided:
* * * * *
'Rear admirals with major generals.
'Commodores with brigadier generals.
'Captains with colonels.'
The findings show that the claimant was appointed and commissioned a rear admiral on March 3, 1899. From that date until March 2, 1901, he was one of the rear admirals 'embraced in the nine lower numbers of that grade.' He served on shore from March 3, 1899, to February 13, 1901, and for the rest of the time at sea. While at sea he received the same pay as was allowed a brigadier general in the Army,' and while on shore he received pay at the same rate less 15 per cent, together with commutation in lieu of allowance of quarters. Judgment was rendered in favor of the United States (36 Ct. Cl. 266), from which judgment the claimant took this appeal.
Messrs. James H. Hayden and Joseph K. McCammon for appellant.
Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. John Q. Thompson for appellee.
This case involves a mere question of statutory construction. The matter of military and naval salaries is one exclusively within the control of Congress. The courts may neither increase nor decrease them, correct any supposed inequalities, nor in any manner set aside or modify the action of the legislative branch of the government in respect thereto. If there be inequality, injustice, it can be corrected alone by Congress, and the courts may not interfere.
The primary rule of statutory construction is, of course, to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Whenever that is apparent it dominates and interprets the language used. But when the intent is a debatable question, and there is nothing on the face of the statute which clearly indicates such intent, there are certain minor and subsidiary rules by which courts are guided in determining the true construction.
In the case at bar neither the words of the statute nor the circumstances and conditions of this legislation make perfectly clear the intent of Congress. If we look alone upon § 13, we may well conclude that Congress had one thought in its mind, while if we turn to § 7 another and somewhat different intent is apparent. Section 13 suggests a complete parallel in the matter of pay between all the officers of the Navy and those of the Army according to their several ranks. Sec- tion 7, on the other hand, points to a special exception in respect to one half the officers of a certain rank in the Navy. The ingenious and plausible arguments made by counsel on the respective sides clearly show that it is a debatable question whether Congress intended that after the 1st of July, 1899, there should be only one uniform rule controlling the pay of all the respective officers of the Army and the Navy, or whether as to one half of the rear admirals a different rule was contemplated. Under those circumstances of doubt we turn to other rules of statutory construction.
Before noticing them it is well to understand exactly the contentions of the parties. The claimant insists that the first proviso in § 7 establishes a complete but temporary rule for the payment of the nine lower members of the grade of rear admiral; that no provisions of other sections of this statute, or of any other statute, limit or qualify the right of the nine junior rear admirals to the full pay given by statute to a brigadier general. On the other hand, the government contends that the proviso is subject to the general rule which obtains in respect to all other naval officers, of a 15 per cent difference between the pay when on shore duty and that when at sea. Again, the claimant insists that by § 13, after the 30th day of June, 1899, all rear admirals became entitled to the pay and allowances of major generals in the army, and that the proviso in § 7, in respect to the nine junior rear admirals, was temporary in its nature, and expired on the 30th of June, 1899; while the government contends that the distinction between the nine senior and the nine junior rear admirals is a permanent provision, and did not cease to have force on the 30th of June, 1899.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and nor expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. In other words, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general,—the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special, the fact that the one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as re- maining an exception to the general, and the general will not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the special. In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 570, sub nom. Re Kang-Gi-Shun-Ca, 27 L. ed. 1030, 1035, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396, 405, this court said:
'The language of the exception is special and express; the words relied on as a repeal are general and inconclusive. The rule is generalia specialibus non derogant. 'The general principle to be applied,' said Bovill, Ch. J., in Thorpe v. Adams, L. R. 6 C. P. 135, 'to the construction of acts of Parliament, is that a general act is not to be...
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