Frederick v. Marquette, Houghton &Amp; Ontonagon Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1877
• Citation: 37 Mich. 342
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles Frederick v. The Marquette, Houghton & Ontonagon Railroad Co

37 Mich. 342

Charles Frederick v. The Marquette, Houghton & Ontonagon Railroad Co

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 16, 1877

Argued June 15, 1877

Error to Marquette. (Williams J.)

Case. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Ball & Owen for plaintiff in error cited Quimby v. Vanderbilt 17 N.Y. 306; Van Buskirk v. Roberts 31 N.Y. 661; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed 75 Ill. 125; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co v. Griffin 68 Ill. 499.

W. P Healy and G. V. N. Lothrop for defendant in error cited Downs v. N. Y. & N.H. R. R. 36 Conn. 287; Hibbard v. N. Y & E. R. R. 15 N.Y. 470; Townsend v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. 56 N.Y. 298.

Marston, J. Cooley, C. J., Graves, J., Campbell, J. concurred.

OPINION

Marston, J.

This is an action on the case brought to recover damages for being unlawfully ejected and put off a train of cars by the conductor of the train. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that on the evening of January 29th, 1876, he went to the regular ticket office of the defendant at Ishpeming and asked for a ticket to Marquette, presenting to the agent in charge of the office one dollar from which to make payment therefor; that the agent received the money, handed plaintiff a ticket and some change, retaining sixty-five cents for the ticket, the regular fare to Marquette; that plaintiff did not attempt to read what was on his ticket, nor did he count the change received back until next morning or notice it until then; that he went on board the train bound for Marquette, and after the train left the station the conductor took up the ticket, giving him no check to indicate his destination, but at the time telling him his ticket was only for Morgan; that when the train reached Morgan the conductor told the plaintiff he must get off there or pay more fare; that if he wanted to go to Marquette he must pay thirty-five cents more. Plaintiff insisted he had paid his fare and purchased his ticket to Marquette and refused to pay the additional fare, whereupon he was ejected from the train, etc. On the part of the defendant evidence was given tending to show that the ticket purchased and presented to the conductor was in fact a ticket for Morgan and not for Marquette. Under the pleadings and charge of the court other evidence in the case and questions sought to be raised need not be referred to, and as the real gist of the action was for the expulsion from the cars by the conductor, the above statement is deemed sufficient to a proper understanding of the case.

An erroneous impression seems to prevail with many that where the conductor of a passenger train ejects therefrom a passenger who has paid his fare to a point beyond, but has lost or mislaid his ticket, or whose ticket does not entitle him to proceed farther, or upon that train, that the company is liable in an action at law for all damages which the party may in any way have sustained in consequence of the delay, mortification, injury to his health or otherwise, and that the passenger is under no obligation to prevent or lessen the damages by payment of the necessary additional fare to entitle him to complete his journey without interruption. Although such damages were claimed in this case, under our present view it will be unnecessary to discuss this question any farther at present.

What then is the duty of the conductor in a case like the present? and what are the passenger's rights? In considering these questions we cannot shut our eyes to the manner and method which railroad companies and common carriers generally have adopted in order to successfully carry on their business. The view to be taken of these questions must be a practical one, even although it may work, perhaps, injustice in some special and particular cases, resulting however in great part if not wholly from other causes. In Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, Mr. Justice Manning in speaking of the rules and regulations of common carriers, said "all rules and regulations must be reasonable, and to be so, they should have for their object the accommodation of the passengers. Under this head we include everything calculated to render the transportation most comfortable and least annoying to passengers generally; not to one, or two, or any given number carried at a particular time, but to a large majority of the passengers ordinarily carried. Such rules and regulations should also be of a permanent nature, and not be made for a particular occasion or emergency."

It is within the common knowledge or experience of all travelers that the uniform and perhaps the universal practice is for railroad companies to issue tickets to passengers with the places designated thereon from whence and to which the passenger is to be carried; that these tickets are presented to the conductor or person in charge of the train and that he accepts unhesitatingly of such tickets as evidence of the contract entered into between the passenger and his principal. It is equally well known that the conductor has but seldom if ever any other means of ascertaining, within time to be of any avail, the terms of the contract, unless he relies upon the statement of the passenger, contradicted as it would be by the ticket produced, and that even in a very large majority of cases, owing to the amount of business done, the agent in charge of the office, and who sold the ticket, could give but very little if any information upon the subject. That this system of issuing tickets, in a very large majority of cases works well, causing but very little, if any annoyance to passengers generally, must be admitted. There of course will be cases, where a passenger who has lost his ticket, or where through mistake the wrong ticket has been delivered to him, will be obliged to pay his fare a second time in order to pursue his journey without delay, and if unable to do this, as will sometimes be the case, very great delay and injury may result therefrom. Such delay and injury would not be the natural result of the loss of a ticket or breach of the contract, but would be, at least in part, in consequence of the pecuniary circumstances of the party. Such cases are exceptional,...