Frederick v. PRO. TRUCK DRIVER TRAINING SCHOOL

• Decision Date: 04 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1-00-3962.,1-00-3962.
• Citation: 262 Ill.Dec. 535,765 N.E.2d 1143,328 Ill. App.3d 472
• Parties: Jerry FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROFESSIONAL TRUCK DRIVER TRAINING SCHOOL, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

765 N.E.2d 1143

328 Ill. App.3d 472

262 Ill.Dec. 535

Jerry FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROFESSIONAL TRUCK DRIVER TRAINING SCHOOL, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-00-3962.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

March 4, 2002.

Brian J. McManus, Thomas J. Loucks, Brian J. McManus, Jr., Brian J. McManus & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John J. Meehan, Law Offices of John J. Meehan, Chicago, for Defendant-Appellee.

Presiding Justice COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Jerry Frederick filed suit against defendant Professional Truck Driver Training School, Inc., seeking recovery for injuries sustained when plaintiff slipped and fell exiting a semi-truck while participating in defendant's driver training program. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant where defendant owed a duty to plaintiff either to remove the snow and ice that accumulated on the bottom step of the semi-truck or warn plaintiff of its presence. In support of this argument, plaintiff asserts: (1) the snow and ice on the step was an unnatural accumulation; (2) defendant had a statutory duty to provide a safe vehicle for training; (3) defendant voluntarily assumed a duty to remove the snow and ice from the step and either failed to remove it or removed it negligently; and (4) defendant had a contractual duty to remove snow and ice from the step. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 2, 1996, plaintiff was participating in his second day of training at defendant's truck driving school. On this particular day, classes were conducted outside in the "yard" where each student was to take a turn climbing into the cab of the truck, placing the truck into gear, driving the truck forward, backing the truck up and then exiting the truck.

Plaintiff climbed into the cab of the truck without incident. Plaintiff proceeded to shift the truck into gear, drive the truck forward and back the truck up two or three times. When he concluded the exercise, plaintiff shifted the truck into park and began to exit the truck. Plaintiff opened the driver's side door and placed both of his feet on the top step while holding the handrails on either side of the door. Plaintiff then stepped onto the bottom step with his right foot and slipped on ice and snow that had accumulated on the step. Plaintiff's left foot was still on the top step when he fell backward, twisting his body to the right and injuring his left knee.

On April 13, 1998, plaintiff filed a one count complaint alleging that defendant carelessly and negligently:

"a. failed to remove packed snow and ice from the steps of one of its training trucks prior to instigating training on said vehicle;

b. permitted an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice to remain on one of its training trucks for a long period of time when the same presented a hazard for all those lawfully entering and exiting said training truck;

c. failed to warn its students of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the steps on the training truck whose steps were in an unsafe condition for entering and exiting;

d. failed to apply salt and other non-slip substances to the unnatural accumulations of snow and ice on the steps of said training truck in a timely fashion; [and]

e. failed to report the dangerous condition of said training truck to those persons who had maintenance responsibilities for said training truck in order that said steps could be made safe for use[.]"

Defendant subsequently filed an answer denying each allegation of negligence made by plaintiff in his complaint and asserting the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.

On January 31, 2000, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiff and asserting that the accumulation of ice and snow on the truck's bottom step was "natural." Copies of pertinent portions of plaintiff's deposition were attached to the motion.

In response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff alleged that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff because: (1) the accumulation of ice and snow on the truck's bottom step was "unnatural;" (2) defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff agreeing to provide "supervision;" and (3) section 6-410 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-410 (West 2000)) and section 1060.110 of the Illinois Administrative Code (92 Adm.Code § 1060.110 (1996)) required defendant to provide a safe vehicle for its students to use during training.

The trial court entered an agreed order granting defendant leave to file a reply brief. On April 11, 2000, defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's response to its motion for summary judgment arguing that: (1) plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing that the snow and ice on the truck step was created by "something other than the falling snow or the boots of the students;" (2) the enrollment contract did not create a duty to remove unnatural accumulations of snow or ice because the contract failed to address premises liability; and (3) the statutes cited by plaintiff in his response did not create a duty to remove natural accumulations of snow or ice because the statutes pertain to the mechanics of a truck and there is no issue that a mechanical condition caused plaintiff to slip and fall.

On June 1, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment. After hearing both parties' arguments, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. In rendering its decision, the trial court found that it was undisputed that the cause of the plaintiff's fall was an accumulation of ice or snow on the step. The trial court found, however, that plaintiff failed to present any evidence, even by reasonable inference, that "it was not a natural accumulation." The trial court also found that plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendant owed plaintiff a contractual duty to remove ice and snow. According to the trial court, "[t]he student enrollment agreement [said] nothing about snow removal or even the upkeep of the premises." The trial court made no finding whether a statutory duty was created pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle or Administrative Codes.

Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied on October 19, 2000. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to remove what it determined to be a natural accumulation of ice and snow on the steps of the semi-truck and consequently granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. Our review of the circuit court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Natale v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 314 Ill.App.3d 885, 888, 247 Ill.Dec. 916, 733 N.E.2d 380 (2000)

. Summary judgment is properly granted where "the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when taken together in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fremont Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 317 Ill.App.3d 67, 73, 250 Ill. Dec. 624, 739 N.E.2d 85 (2000). "In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court shall construe the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent." Fillpot v. Midway Airlines, Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 237, 241, 198 Ill.Dec. 775, 633 N.E.2d 237 (1994). Summary judgment is a "drastic means of disposing of litigation." Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 113, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). "Therefore, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed material facts or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact." Espinoza, 165 Ill.2d at 114,

208 Ill.Dec. 662,

649 N.E.2d 1323.

"[T]he question of whether a duty has been breached is a factual one, left to the trier of fact to resolve." Fillpot, 261 Ill.App.3d at 241, 198 Ill.Dec. 775, 633 N.E.2d 237. However, the "question of whether a duty exists is a question of law, and where no duty exists, summary judgment is proper because there is no possible recovery for plaintiff as a matter of law." Ordman v. Dacon Management Corp., 261 Ill.App.3d 275, 278, 199 Ill.Dec. 316, 633 N.E.2d 1307 (1994).

1. Natural vs. Unnatural Accumulation

Plaintiff first argues that a question of fact exists as to "whether the snow on the step was a result of an unnatural accumulation which occurred over time." According to plaintiff, his testimony, the weather records he presented and "logic" demonstrate that the condition of the step on the day of the accident could not have been the result of any natural "climatic conditions." Based on this assertion, plaintiff concludes that the snow must have accumulated on the semi-truck steps over a long period of time, thus making the accumulation "unnatural."

It is well established that "natural accumulations of ice and snow, which were not caused or aggravated by the business or property owner, are not a basis for liability." Serritos v. Chicago Transit Authority, 153 Ill.App.3d 265, 269, 106 Ill.Dec. 243, 505 N.E.2d 1034 (1987). "Consequently, the owner of a business has no duty to remove or take other precautions against dangers inherent in natural accumulations of snow and ice." Serritos, 153 Ill.App.3d at 269, 106 Ill.Dec. 243, 505 N.E.2d 1034. "To establish a duty, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing of an unnatural accumulation or an aggravation of a natural condition before recovery will be allowed." Choi v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 217...