Frederick v. Serv. Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC
| Decision Date | 14 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:14-cv-01647-RDP |
| Parties | BRANDI FREDERICK, Plaintiff, v. SERVICE EXPERTS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on Defendants Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC ("Service Experts")'s and Scott Freeman's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 42), filed February 10, 2016. The Motion is fully briefed. (Docs. # 42, 54, 55). After careful review, and for the following reasons, the court concludes that the Motion is due to be granted.
The court presumes the parties are familiar with the history of how this case has come before it for the second time on removal, and will not repeat that history again here. On November 5, 2016, the court dismissed Defendant GE Capital ("GE") from this case with prejudice. (Docs. # 38, 39). Plaintiff had only alleged claims against GE under the federal civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). (See Doc. # 1-8). Subsequently, Service Experts and Freeman filed this Motion, arguing that the RICO claims against Service Experts should be dismissed for the same reasons they were dismissed against GE, and asserting that all claims against Freeman should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Doc. # 42). Service Experts and Freeman thereafter filed an Amended Answer to accurately reflect information revealed during discovery. (Doc. # 48).
In March 2007, Plaintiff purchased from Defendant Service Experts, through its employee Becky Collins,1 a new Trane HVAC unit. (Doc. # 1-8 at ¶¶ 8-9, 13). Plaintiff also bought from Service Experts and Collins an extended manufacturer warranty for that unit—or so she thought. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-21). In June 2011, Plaintiff's HVAC unit began functioning poorly and she had it inspected. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). The inspector asserted that the warranty Plaintiff had purchased would cover the repairs. (Id. at ¶ 29). However, the inspector's office could not locate Plaintiff or her HVAC unit's serial number in the Trane database. (Id. at ¶ 30).
On June 25, 2011, Plaintiff contacted Service Experts and spoke with Defendant Freeman, the Manager of Operations and Service at Service Experts's Birmingham office. (Doc. # 1-8 at ¶ 31). He informed Plaintiff that she had not purchased an extended warranty. (Id.). Rather, she had purchased from Service Experts and Collins an insurance policy through Defendant Equiguard, Inc.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33).
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging (on behalf of herself and, with respect to certain claims, a putative class of similarly situated individuals) that Service Experts and Freeman, with the assistance of other Defendants (that is, GE and Equiguard), among other things, committed fraudulent sales practices, breached various contracts, and engaged in racketeering. (Doc. # 1-8). Plaintiff alleges that Service Experts's role in the purported racketeering scheme to defraud involved sending, or causing GE to send, to Plaintiff and the purported class -- via the mail ande-mails -- fraudulent statements, invoices for installment payments on the HVAC unit and the warranty, and notices of those statements and invoices. (Id.). Plaintiff has averred Service Experts received payments, sent via a check in the mail or over its online payment website, for the warranty that she thought she purchased, and that Service Experts would use these moneys to finance the alleged scheme with the assistance of GE.3 (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that, by its actions, Service Experts is liable under the civil RICO statute on the basis of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in the form of fraudulent invoices. (Id.). Counts Ten through Twelve of the Amended Complaint allege, respectively, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a), 1692(c), and 1692(d), by GE, Service Experts, and Equiguard. (Id.).
Concerning Freeman, only two paragraphs in the RICO and other class portions of the Amended Complaint mentioned him by name. (See Doc. # 1-8 at ¶ 108, 111. There were no specific allegations against him individually in any of the other seven counts. (See Doc. # 1-8). Although Plaintiff stated that "Service Experts, Freeman, Collins, and their Fictitious Defendant equivalents shall collectively be referred to as the 'Service Expert Defendants,'" (id. at ¶ 7), six of the seven individual state law causes of action referenced only Service Experts or Collins individually. (See Doc. # 1-8). Only Count III (Suppression) requested relief against "Defendants, jointly and severally." (See id. at ¶ 53).
In its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Service Experts seeks dismissal of counts ten through twelve as to itself, and Freeman seeks dismissal of all claims against him. (See Doc. # 42). Both Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts supporting the RICO claims, and likewise has insufficiently pleaded the predicate acts. (Id.). Additionally, they argue that the Amended Complaint does not assert any claims against Freeman due to thedearth of factual allegations regarding him, and the lack of a request for any damages from him. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that it has pleaded valid and specific RICO claims as to both Service Experts and Freeman (or, at least with regards to Section 1962(c) for Freeman). (Doc. # 54). Alternatively, if the court determines Defendants' Motion is due to be granted, Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to address the "technicalities that are curable by amendment and not insurmountable obstacles to stating a RICO claim." (Id. at 22). Concerning the request for leave to amend, Defendants contend that, because the court has entered a Scheduling Order in this case and the amendment deadline contained therein has passed, (1) the "good cause" standard of Rule 16(b) applies (Doc. # 55), and (2) Plaintiff has not shown good cause. (Id.). Therefore, they argue, leave to amend should be denied. (Id.).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial. The standard is a familiar one. "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see Bank of New York Mellon v. Estrada, No. 12-cv-5952, 2013 WL 3811999, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2013) . The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1301.
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Pipes v. City of Falkville, Ala., No. 12-cv-2885, 2013 WL 3367105, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 5, 2013) (); see also Losey v. Warden, 521 Fed. Appx. 717, 719 (11th Cir. 2013) . Accordingly, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Losey, 521 Fed. Appx. at 719 ().
A complaint states a plausible claim for relief "when [a] plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed facts are not needed, a plaintiff is obligated to provide as grounds for entitlement to relief more than mere labels and conclusions. Id. Formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action do not satisfy a plaintiff's burden. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. A plausible claim for relief requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to support the claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Further, "[i]n the Eleventh Circuit, where substantive RICO violations are based upon fraud, the 'allegations must comply not only with the plausibility criteria articulated in Twomblyand Iqbal but also with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.'"4 Adell v. Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Assn. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010)); accord Liquidation Commn. of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2008) (); cf. Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 9(b), a plaintiff pursuing a RICO complaint must allege: "(1) the precise statements, documents, or...
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