Fredericks v. Thatcher

• Citation: 102 A.2d 882,140 Conn. 605
• Parties: FREDERICKS v. THATCHER. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 02 February 1954
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 882

102 A.2d 882

140 Conn. 605

FREDERICKS v. THATCHER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 2, 1954.

Louis Feinmark, New Haven, with whom was Irving Smirnoff, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Nathan A. Resnik, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Cornelius T. Driscoll, Branford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, QUINLAN and WYNNE, JJ.

WYNNE, Associate Justice.

This is an action for alienation of affections. In it the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The assignments of error pursued are (1) in the trial court's claimed failure to charge as to the effect of a temporary alienation of affections which had terminated prior to, and was claimed not to have been the effective cause of, the ultimate disruption of the plaintiff's marital status; (2) in the trial court's failure to define specifically the term 'wrongful conduct,' used in one portion of the charge; and (3) in certain rulings on evidence.

The plaintiff claimed to have proved the following facts: She married to Earl Fredericks on November 7, 1927. The couple came to New Haven in 1938 or 1939, where he became manager for the Woolworth Company. Thereafter they moved to Hotchkiss Grove, Branford, where they had purchased a home. From the time of their marriage until early in 1947, the plaintiff and her husband were very happy together and he loved and cared for her. His salary at Woolworth's was almost $10,000 a year. A portion of this was used to purchase insurance annuities, the plaintiff being the beneficiary thereon as well as on insurance policies on her husband's life. A joint bank account was maintained. The plaintiff and her husband owned two automobiles, which they used jointly, and they took frequent trips together. From the time of their marriage until early in 1947, they had many friends and visited with them frequently. Up until 1947 the plaintiff and her husband had no domestic difficulties. The last of March, 1947, she became aware that his attitude toward her had changed. He accused her of spying on him and became angry. He began to go out without telling her where he was going, sometimes returning at 1 or 2 a. m. and at other times not returning all night. He became sarcastic to her. Finally she began to find letters to her husband from the defendant. These were in endearing terms and disclosed that the defendant and the plaintiff's husband were seeing each other at the former's apartment and elsewhere. Because of these letters and the conduct of the plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff suffered great emotional strain, required modical treatment and was advised by her doctor that she or her husband had to leave the home. Her husband left and was gone about three months. During the period from March, 1947, until December, 1949, he used physical violence on the plaintiff and threatened her that someone would die if the letters she had found were ever used. After she learned of her husband's relationship with the defendant, she suffered a nervous reaction and lost twenty pounds. She finally brought a divorce suit against her husband and obtained a decree on November 9, 1950. Less than two weeks latter, her former husband and the defendant were married.

It was the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's husband had become seriously affected, mentally and physically, as a result of an automobile accident in December, 1946. She further claimed that sometime after this accident a relationship grew up between her and the plaintiff's husband. She claimed that this relationship was terminated by a letter she wrote him near the end of 1948 or the first part of 1949. This letter was in evidence, and the defendant argues that it was a letter of renunciation and rejection and claimed that from the time of her writing it, up to the time the plaintiff began her divorce action, there was no communication of any kind between the defendant and the plaintiff's husband.

It is argued that the defendant was entitled to a specific charge bearing on her claim that, if there had been only a temporary alienation which had ceased long before the destruction of the marital life and was not the cause of it, the plaintiff was entitled to damages only for that temporary alienation. The defendant excepted to the failure of the court to deal specifically with this situation. The court...