Fredrick v. Georgia

• Decision Date: 03 January 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-173
• Parties: DANTE G. FREDRICK, Petitioner, v. STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

DANTE G. FREDRICK, Petitioner, v. STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-173

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION

January 3, 2017

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Dante G. Fredrick ("Fredrick"), who is currently housed at Valdosta State Prison in Valdosta, Georgia, has submitted a Petition for a writ of mandamus. (Doc. 1.) Fredrick also filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) For the reasons which follow, the Court DENIES Fredrick's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS his Petition. Additionally, Fredrick should be DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

BACKGROUND

Fredrick filed his Complaint against the State of Georgia on December 11, 2015. (Doc. 1.) In his Complaint, Fredrick takes issue with his convictions obtained in the Glynn County Superior Court and State Court. Fredrick maintains that that the Glynn County Clerk's Office, the Judges of Glynn County, the District Attorney's Office, and the Solicitor General's Office have failed to take actions requested by him and related to his convictions. Fredrick alleges that these various actors have violated his rights to due process and he has "13 convictions in [the state courts] against the policy of law." (Id. at p. 2.) He petitions this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering state officials to "immediately cease these irreparable injurys [sic] and violation of the Constitution against petitioner." (Id. at p. 6.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fredrick seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Fredrick's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

DISCUSSION¹

I. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

Fredrick brings this action as a petition for a writ of mandamus. However, federal courts can only issue writs of mandamus to "compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Federal courts do not have the jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus directing state officials in the performance of their duties. Lawrence v. Miami-Dade Cty. State Attorney Office, 272 Fed. App'x. 781 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Because the only relief Lawrence sought was a writ of mandamus compelling action from state officials, not federal officials, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief and did not err in dismissing the petition."); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty. Super. Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).² Therefore, federal district courts have repeatedly held that they lackjurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus as to state officials. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2012) ("Federal district courts do not have the authority to issue writs of mandamus to direct state officials in the performance of their duties."). Because Fredrick only names the State of Georgia in his Complaint and asks this Court to order state officials to take action, the Court should DISMISS his claims for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman

Fredrick's Complaint centers on his prior convictions in Glynn County Superior Court and State Court. However, the Complaint indicates that his conviction has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, called into question by a federal court's issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise overturned. (Doc. 1.) As Fredrick is seeking relief based on these convictions, this Court is precluded from reviewing his claims by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court reasoned:

We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed ondirect appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added).

Under Heck, a plaintiff who is attempting "to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," must make a showing that his conviction, sentence, or other criminal judgment was reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an appropriate state tribunal, or called into question in a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under Section 1983. Id. at 489. Furthermore, to the extent a plaintiff contends that a favorable ruling on his Section 1983 claims would not invalidate his conviction, sentence, confinement, or other criminal judgment, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this contention in order for his claims to proceed. Id. at 487.

Although Heck involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages, Heck's holding has been extended to...