Freedom of Info. Officer v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n

Decision Date22 September 2015
Docket NumberNo. 19371.,19371.
Citation122 A.3d 1217,318 Conn. 769
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesFREEDOM OF INFORMATION OFFICER, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, executive director and general counsel, for the appellant-appellee (named defendant).

Jacqueline Hoell, assistant attorney general, with whom were Henry A. Salton, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J.

The present case arises from the ruling of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), that the defendant Ron Robillard was entitled to the disclosure of documents in the possession of the plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) and its Freedom of Information Officer (information officer), under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1–200 et seq. The commission appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision. The plaintiffs cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the documents were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient and were, thus, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 52–146e. We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the commission, and further agree with the plaintiffs that the documents at issue are exempt from disclosure under § 52–146e. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. The plaintiffs received a request under the act from Robillard for any records concerning a person named Amy Archer Gilligan for the period of time from 1924 through 1962. Gilligan was a patient at a facility now known as Connecticut Valley Hospital (hospital) following her conviction for second degree murder for the arsenic poisoning of a resident of her nursing home. Gilligan's life is widely considered to be the basis for the play and movie entitled “Arsenic and Old Lace.” The plaintiffs provided Robillard with copies of those records pertaining to Gilligan that it deemed were disclosable under the act. Robillard was notified by the plaintiffs that other records, deemed exempt from disclosure under the act, were withheld.

Robillard then filed a complaint with the commission alleging that the plaintiffs violated the act by failing to provide these records concerning the confinement of Gilligan. After a full hearing and an in camera inspection of the records before a hearing officer of the commission, the commission adopted the proposed findings and decision of the hearing officer. In its memorandum of decision, the hearing commission found that some of the records submitted for in camera review were exempt from disclosure as psychiatric records under § 52–146e. The commission found that two documents submitted for in camera inspection were exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1–210(b)(10) as “communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship....” The commission found that the rest of the records submitted for in camera review did not qualify as psychiatric records or attorney client communications, but were “on their face medical records....” The commission found that the medical records were not exempt from disclosure under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. The commission further found that the medical records were not exempt from disclosure under the act because Gilligan is deceased and, therefore, there can be no invasion of privacy under § 1–210(b)(2).

The plaintiffs then filed an administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 4–183 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiffs made the following claims: (1) The [commission] erroneously applied Connecticut's psychiatric-patient privilege by allowing disclosure of certain of the documents requested by Robillard, (2) the [commission] erroneously applied the § 1–210(b)(2) exemption from disclosure under the [act], and (3) the [commission] erroneously interpreted the department's claimed exemption under HIPAA.” The trial court found that the commission properly applied § 52–146e, with the exception of two documents that the court ordered partially redacted as to diagnosis. The trial court further found that the commission properly applied § 1–210(b)(2), but found that the plaintiffs had met their burden under § 1–210(b)(2) as to the physical and dental examination records contained in the documents, finding that they were not a legitimate matter of public concern and would be highly offensive if disclosed. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the plaintiffs' appeal as to those physical and dental examination records. The commission appealed and the plaintiffs cross appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred those appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51–199(c) and Practice Book § 65–2.

On appeal to this court, the commission claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision that Gilligan's medical records were not exempt from disclosure. In the cross appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that all of the records at issue were not exempt from disclosure under § 52–146e.1 We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision and that the trial court improperly concluded that all of the records at issue were not exempt from disclosure under § 52–146e.

I

The commission asserts that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision that Gilligan's medical records were not exempt from disclosure.2 Specifically, the commission asserts that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved because their personal privacy interest was not affected by its decision. Further, the commission claims that the plaintiffs lack standing because they cannot assert the privacy interests of their deceased client. In response, the plaintiffs assert that they had standing to appeal from the commission's decision that Gilligan's medical records were not exempt from disclosure under § 1–210(b)(2) because they were aggrieved by the decision of the commission. We agree with the plaintiffs.

“As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. If a party is found to lack [aggrievement], the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record....

“Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.... The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time ... [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.... The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d 292 (2007).

“Only parties aggrieved by the decision of the [commission] have standing to take appeals to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 1–21i(d). Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.... These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy.

“As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great ... [and] need not be primarily economic....

“In appeals pursuant to § 1–21i(d), we have translated these general principles into a twofold test for aggrievement that requires a showing of: (1) a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [commission] decision; and (2) a special and injurious effect on this specific interest.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 648–49, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989).

Although the commission does not expressly address why the plaintiffs are not aggrieved, it seems to assert that because they are merely the holder of the public records at issue here, they are not affected by any disclosure and are not the appropriate parties to provide evidence as to why disclosure would...

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