Freeling v. Sebring
Decision Date | 27 October 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 6688.,6688. |
Citation | 296 F.2d 244 |
Parties | James R. FREELING, Appellant, v. Carl B. SEBRING, individually and as Banking Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma; Capitol State Company, an Oklahoma corporation; Capitol Hill State Bank, an Oklahoma corporation; Capitol Hill State Bank and Trust Co., an Oklahoma Banking corporation; John J. Houlihan; Martin Legere; Grand Bank of Bahamas, Ltd., a Bahama Islands Corp., Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, a Connecticut corporation; Westchester Fire Insurance Co. of New York, a New York corporation, and Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation, a corporation, individually and as Liquidator of the Capitol Hill State Bank, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Sam W. Moore, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.
Finis O. Stewart, John H. Cantrell and Bryce A. Baggett, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellees.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court dismissing, for want of federal jurisdiction, an action based on the existence of a substantial question arising under the laws of the United States.
The pertinent facts are that Appellee-Sebring, acting in his capacity as Oklahoma State Banking Commissioner, closed the Capitol Hill State Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) as liquidating agent therefor. Appellant-Freeling is a depositor, stockholder and the deposed president of the bank. The appointment of the F.D.I.C. to act for the State Banking Commissioner as liquidating agent of the bank is specifically authorized under the law of the State of Oklahoma1 and permission to so act is extended to it by federal statutory authority providing that, "(W)henever any insured State bank * * * shall have been closed * * * the Corporation shall accept appointment as receiver thereof, if such appointment is tendered by the authority having supervision of such bank and is authorized or permitted by State law." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e).
The amenability of the F.D.I.C. to civil process is governed by 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819, empowering it to sue and be sued, and providing further that, "(A)ll suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States: Provided, (T)hat any such suit to which the Corporation is a party in its capacity as receiver of a State bank and which involves only the rights or obligations of depositors, creditors, stockholders, and such State bank under State law shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States." Congress thus has authorized the F.D.I.C. to act simultaneously in the dual capacity of a federal insuror and as a state receiver and has discerningly provided for federal jurisdiction of claims against it as a federal insuror, while denying federal jurisdiction over claims arising out of its activities as a state agent.
Appellant seems to concede, as he must, that federal jurisdiction is here dependent upon the allegations lodged against the F.D.I.C. The critical issue therefore is whether the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Anjopa Paper & Board Manufacturing Co., 93218.
...of Law, pp. 96-97, nevertheless, as contemplated by statute, F.D.I.C. does in fact function in different capacities. See Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244 (10 Cir. 1961). And generally suits against a receiver "are in effect only against the receivership; he being regarded as in the nature ......
-
Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine
...bank" raised a claim against the FDIC as receiver of a state bank, over which the federal court lacked jurisdiction. Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244, 246 (10th Cir.1961). By contrast, the FDIC acted as a corporation in asserting a claim against bank directors for corporate mismanagement w......
-
Gunter v. Hutcheson
...Cir. 1978); FDIC v. Godshall, 558 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1977); FDIC v. Glickman, 450 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1971); Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir. 1961). In Ashley and Godshall, moreover, the courts held that transactions between the FDIC as receiver and FDIC as corporate in......
-
In re Collins Securities Corp.
...752 F.2d 80, 81 (4th Cir.1984); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157, 161 (6th Cir.1978); Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir.1961). When acting in its corporate capacity, the FSLIC is operating as a distinctly separate entity from its receivership capa......