Freeman v. Adams
| Decision Date | 19 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:12CV86 SNLJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | PAUL DAVID FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN ADAMS and CITY OF SIKESTON, MISSOURI, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on defendants Franklin Adams and City of Sikeston's joint motion for summary judgment (ECF #72). The motion is fully briefed and is ready for disposition. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Paul David Freeman filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law action against defendants Sikeston Public Safety Officer Franklin Adams (Officer Adams) and the City of Sikeston, Missouri (the City). In his amended complaint plaintiff alleges that the actions of defendants violated his constitutional rights when Officer Adams allegedly: (1) stopped and frisked plaintiff on two occasions in July 2011 without probable cause; (2) arrested plaintiff without probable cause on November 3, 2011; (3) used excessive force in arresting plaintiff on November 3, 2011; (4) caused plaintiff's parole to be revoked due to the unlawful arrest on November 3, 2011; and (5) falsely told individualsin the community that plaintiff was a police informant. Plaintiff further alleges that the City was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's constitutional rights and failed to supervise and discipline Officer Adams resulting in his unconstitutional actions against plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff makes a state law defamation claim based on the allegation that Officer Adams told individuals that plaintiff was a police informant.
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that Officer Adams is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: (1) the two encounters between plaintiff and Officer Adams in July 2011 were consensual; (2) Officer Adams had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on November 3, 2011; (3) Officer Adams's use of his canine unit, Eros, to apprehend plaintiff during that arrest was objectively reasonable because plaintiff is a violent felon that Officer Adams was investigating for reportedly brandishing a weapon; (4) plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate a causal link between Officer Adams's conduct and the revocation of plaintiff's parole; and (5) Officer Adams did not tell anyone that plaintiff was a police informant and plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence demonstrating otherwise. Further, defendants argue that the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's constitutional claims because: (1) there was no underlying violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (2) there is no respondeat superior liability or vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence that any such violation was the result of a policy, custom, or practice of the City. As to plaintiff's failure to supervise and discipline claim, the City argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence that the City wasdeliberately indifferent to prior similar unconstitutional acts of its officers. Finally, the City contends that plaintiff has not produced evidence to support his state law defamation claim and, in any event, the claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties." State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2004). "Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law." Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). A fact is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in his favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for him. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "If 'opposing parties tell two different stories,' the court must review the record, determine which facts are materialand genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party - as long as those facts are not 'so blatantly contradicted by the record . . . that no reasonable jury could believe' them." Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The court is required, however, to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
Before addressing the merits of the summary judgment motion, the Court will address two preliminary matters raised by plaintiff in his response to the motion. First, plaintiff maintains that he has not been able to obtain all of the evidence that he believes exists through discovery and requests a continuance for additional time to conduct discovery. Plaintiff did not file a separate motion, but instead, merely included this request in his memorandum of law in opposition to the motion. The governing rule isFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which allows the Court to defer considering the summary judgment motion or to deny it, "[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)(1).
"The Court has discretion to determine whether the parties have had adequate time for discovery." Fischer v. Steward, 4:07CV1798 ERW, 2008 WL 1766875, at *1 (E.D. Mo. April 14, 2008) (quoting Stanback v. Best Diversified Products, Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 1999). "If a party opposes summary judgment based on inadequate opportunity to conduct discovery, the party must make a showing 'that discovery has been inadequate.'" Id. (quoting Robinson v. Terex Corp., 439 F.3d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 2006)). "Mere speculation that the nonmoving party controls relevant facts is an insufficient basis for a Rule 56(d) continuance." Kuehne v. Citimortage, Inc., 4:10CV1902 DDN, 2012 WL 1205754, at *5 (E.D. Mo. April 11, 2012).
In support of his request, plaintiff alleges that the defendants have not provided documents and other evidence during discovery that he believes exists and that he needs more time to obtain affidavits from his witnesses.1 This matter has been pending since May 2012. The original discovery deadline was January 15, 2013, which was later extended to March 13, 2013. Plaintiff was also granted an extension of time for his response to this motion. As evidenced by plaintiff's response, he has submitted and defendants have responded to, numerous discovery requests. Included in the documentsfiled by plaintiff in opposition to the motion are defendants' responses to a request for production, four requests for admissions, and two sets of interrogatories. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel with regard to discovery, which was taken up and ruled on by the Court. The motion to compel referenced four sets of interrogatories, including 76 interrogatories more than the 25 allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1), and objected to the sufficiency of defendants' 51 page response to the many requests for admissions. Is it apparent that plaintiff understands and utilized the discovery process in this matter and has had adequate time to conduct discovery. The Court will, therefore, deny plaintiff's request for a continuance.
Second, plaintiff filed objections to facts and opinions contained in the affidavit of Officer Adams that plaintiff claims are "extrinsic and immaterial."2 Plaintiff objects to information related to the 911 call and Officer Adams's knowledge as to plaintiff's prior felony conviction for armed robbery in which he shot and seriously injured an individual.3 This Court has reviewed the affidavit testimony of Officer Adams in light of the objections made by plaintiff - hearsay, not based on personal knowledge, assumes facts not in evidence or material to the issues, inadmissible opinion evidence, and unrelated evidence - and overrules the objections. The 911 call and plaintiff's prior violent felony conviction involving a weapon are relevant to the circumstances and issuessurrounding plaintiff's arrest on November 3, 2011. Further,...
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