Freeman v. Anderson City Police Dep't

Decision Date18 February 2022
Docket NumberC/A 8:21-cv-03872-JMC-JDA
PartiesPrecias Kajuanna Freeman, Plaintiff, v. Anderson City Police Department, Pam Warden, Ray Lyn Haggan, Bramlette Dewey, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Precias Kajuanna Freeman (Plaintiff), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated her constitutional rights. [Docs. 1; 12.] Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. [Docs. 2; 9.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Anderson City Police Department is subject to summary dismissal from this action. The action remains pending against the remaining Defendants.[1]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Spartanburg County Detention Center.[2] [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action alleging Defendants violated her constitutional rights by filing a Complaint on November 24, 2021.[3][Id. at 4; 12.] The undersigned conducted a review of the Complaint and, by Order dated December 1, 2021, directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies of her original Complaint identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 10.] Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, which was entered on December 20, 2021. [Doc. 12.] Having reviewed the Amended Complaint, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has cured the pleading deficiencies of her original Complaint and that service of process should be authorized as to all Defendants but the Anderson City Police Department, which is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that certain officers employed by the Anderson City Police Department violated her personal safety and were deliberately indifferent in violation of the Eighth Amendment, resulting in serious injury. [Id. at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the named Defendants failed to administer medical assistance to Plaintiff after she was physically attacked by another inmate. [Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff alleges that the incident occurred on November 25, 2018, in the women's pod of the Anderson City Police Department's Detention Center. [Id. at 5.]

For her injuries, Plaintiff contends she suffered head trauma contusions, bruises to the left and right side of her face blood draining from her ears, headaches, dizziness, nausea, elevated blood pressure, black eyes, insomnia, and chipped teeth. [Id. at 6.] For her relief, Plaintiff seeks to be reimbursed for her medical expenses and to be compensated for her emotional and mental distress. [Id.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleadings remain subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Anderson City Police Department is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See e.g., Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Police departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions).

Accordingly, the Anderson City Police Department is entitled to summary dismissal as a Defendant from this § 1983 action. Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Warden, Haggan, and Dewey are sufficient to survive initial review and the Amended Complaint will be served as to those Defendants only.

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss the Anderson City Police Department from this action. This action remains pending against the remaining Defendants.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

250 East North Street, Suite 2300

Greenville, South Carolina 29601

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United...

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