Freeman v. Burson, 89-46-I

• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee
• Writing for the Court: DROWOTA; FONES; FONES
• Citation: 802 S.W.2d 210
• Parties: Mary Rebecca FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles W. BURSON, Defendant-Appellee. 802 S.W.2d 210
• Docket Number: No. 89-46-I,89-46-I
• Decision Date: 01 October 1990

Page 210

802 S.W.2d 210 Mary Rebecca FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charles W. BURSON, Defendant-Appellee. No. 89-46-I. 802 S.W.2d 210 Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Nashville. Oct. 1, 1990.

John E. Herbison, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, defendant-appellee pro se and Michael W. Catalano, Deputy Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

DROWOTA, Chief Justice.

Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 2-7-111 prohibits the solicitation of votes and the display of campaign materials within a 100-foot radius of polling places on election day. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 2-19-119 fixes criminal penalties for violations of Section 2-7-111. Plaintiff brought suit in Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of these statutes and a declaratory judgment that the statutes are unconstitutional under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The Chancellor held the statutes constitutional and dismissed Plaintiff's suit. For the following reasons, we now reverse the Chancellor's judgment.

Plaintiff, Mary Rebecca Freeman, is a resident of Davidson County who has served on a local party executive committee many times. She testified that she has been a candidate for office, has managed local campaigns, and has worked actively in state-wide elections.

Plaintiff testified that personal solicitation and other election place campaigning methods are especially important in district-specific races because mass media is prohibitively expensive and is ineffective to target small locales and minor issues. Plaintiff stated that the 100-foot ban on personal solicitation and display or distribution of campaign materials has limited her ability to communicate with voters. Her proof showed that in some instances the 100-foot boundary extends onto the sidewalks and streets adjacent to the polling places. In other instances it permits some

Page 211

campaign activity on the grounds of the polling place if the grounds are sufficiently large. Plaintiff also testified that she had seen some commercial solicitation occur at polling places.

On behalf of the State, Constance Ann Alexander, the Davidson County Registrar and former executive secretary for the election commission, testified about the conduct of elections. She stated that she had personally observed campaign workers thrusting handbills into the windows of voters' cars on the polling premises. She had never observed commercial or religious solicitation within the 100-foot boundary. She testified additionally that she was aware the 100-foot boundary sometimes extended into the street.

In Ms. Alexander's view, elimination of the boundary would result in disruption and confusion, especially in larger and more heated elections. She testified that without the 100-foot boundary there would be a greater possibility for error in tabulating votes and in keeping track of the voters. Additionally, voting locations would be overcrowded, and people would campaign inside polling places. Ms. Alexander's specific testimony about confusion, error, and disruption, however, related to the numbers of persons present in the polling place itself.

In a memorandum opinion filed April 26, 1989, the Chancellor upheld the challenged statutes, finding that Section 2-7-111 was a content-neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner restriction; that the 100-foot boundary served a compelling state interest in protecting voters from interference, harassment, and intimidation during the voting process; and that there was an alternative channel for Plaintiff to exercise her free speech rights outside the 100-foot boundary. Because the constitutionality of statutes are the sole determinative issues, Plaintiff's appeal from the Chancellor's judgment is directly to this Court pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 16-4-108.

Plaintiff argues that the statutes at issue facially violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec. 19, Article I, Sec. 8, and Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The principal statute challenged in this instance, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 2-7-111, states in relevant part:

(a) The officer of elections shall have the sample ballots, voting instructions, and other materials which are to be posted placed in conspicuous positions inside the polling place for the use of voters. The officer shall measure off one hundred feet (100') from the entrances to the building in which the election is to be held and place boundary signs at that distance. Provided, however, in any county having a population of:

not less than nor more than

 13,600 13,610
                 16,350 16,450
                 24,590 24,600
                 28,500 28,560
                 41,800 41,900
                 50,175 50,275
                 54,375 54,475
                 56,000 56,100
                 67,500 67,600
                 77,700 77,800
                 85,725 85,825
                

all according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the officer shall measure off three hundred feet (300') from the entrances to the building in which the election is to be held and place boundary signs at that distance.

(b) Within the appropriate boundary as established in subsection (a), and the building in which the polling place is located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position on a question are prohibited. No campaign posters, signs or other campaign literature may be displayed on or in any building or on the grounds of any building in which a polling place is located. ¹

Page 212

The above statute regulates political speech, which is the most highly protected form of speech. "Indeed, the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." EU v. San Francisco City Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). See also Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1987). The State argues, though, that Section 2-7-111 is a constitutionally valid time, place, and manner restriction of political speech.

The State may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of expressive conduct as long as the restrictions "are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)). In order for Section 2-7-111 to qualify as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, the State must first show that the statute is content-neutral. The State insists that the statute is content-neutral because it does not discriminate against speakers or ideas and furthers an important governmental interest--the integrity and orderliness of the voting process--unrelated to the restriction of communication. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). While the State admits that the statute on its face criminalizes only political speech and political activity, the State points out that the statute does not discriminate on the basis of political viewpoints. The State contends that the rationale of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) is controlling.

City of Renton dealt with an ordinance which...