Freeman v. Easley

• Citation: 117 Ill. 317,7 N.E. 656
• Parties: FREEMAN and others v. EASLEY and others.
• Decision Date: 12 June 1886
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

117 Ill. 317

7 N.E. 656

FREEMAN and others

v.EASLEY and others.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 12, 1886.

Appeal from Jackson.

Hill & Martin

, for appellants.

W. J. Allen, J. M. Freels, and Smith & Stephens, for appellees.

SCOTT, C. J.

On the twenty-second day of March, 1880, John D. Freeman made and published what purports to be his last will and testament, and afterwards, on the fifth day of April, in the same year, he departed this life. The will was executed with the usual formalities, and was admitted to probate in Jackson county, where the testator had lately resided. On the twenty-eighth of October, 1880, the bill in this case was filed in the circuit court of Jackson county by a part of the heirs of the testator against the executor named in the bill, the widow, and a portion of the other heirs who are named as devisees, to set aside the will on the ground the testator, at the time of making and executing the same, was not of sound and disposing mind, and that he was wholly incapable of making a valid will. An answer filed by defendant, and the replication thereto, put the matters and things alleged in the bill at issue, and thereupon the court directed an issue at law to be made up whether the writing referred to in the pleadings, and purporting to be the last will and testament of John D. Freeman, was his last will and testament or not. Although the bill in this case was exhibited at the December term, 1880, of the circuit court, the cause was continued from term to term, and no trial was had until the March term, 1884, of that court. The cause was then submitted to a jury upon the evidence introduced; but, as they were unable to agree upon a verdict, they were discharged from the further consideration of the matters submitted to them. No other trial was had until on the sixth day of February, 1886, when the case was again submitted to a jury, who, after hearing the evidence, found by their verdict ‘the instrument in question not to be the last will and testament of John D. Freeman,’ and thereupon the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the instrument in writing purporting to be the last will and testament of John D. Freeman, deceased, and the probate thereof, be set aside and declared null and void. From that decree the defendants bring the case to this court on appeal.

Without expressing any opinion as to the weight of the testimony touching the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of making the instrument alleged to be his last will and testament, it is thought that, in view of the conflicting character of the evidence, the present decree must be reversed on account of the seventh instruction of the series given by the court on behalf of complainants. It is as follows:

‘If you should believe from the evidence that, at the time of the execution of the instrument (the validity of which is in question) by J. D. Freeman, he was so diseased mentally as not to be of sound mind, then your verdict should be for complainants.’

Obviously this charge does not state the law accurately, and, in view of what may be fairly said of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence, it must have been hurtful to the defense. No doubt it is true a party may be so diseased mentally as not to be of sound mind, and yet he might possess what the law terms a ‘disposing mind;’ that is, the mental capacity to know and understand what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and upon whom he will bestow his bounty. It is a rule of law that a person who is capable of transacting ordinary business is also capable of making a valid will. In Meeker v. Meeker, 75 Ill. 260, it was held by this court the derangement or imbecility to incapacitate the person from making a valid will must be of that character which renders him incapable of understanding the effects and consequences of his acts. A test usually recognized is, the party must be capable of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life, so that he may comprehend what disposition he may wish to make of his property, and be able to select the subjects of his bounty. Nothing more is required, and so the authorities in this state uniformly hold. Meeker v. Meeker, supra; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397, and subsequent cases that follow the doctrine of the cases cited.

Medical testimony in this record is to the effect that, in all cases of diseases of the body, the mind is in some degree affected, and the party might be said to be of ‘unsound mind,’ and still be capable of transacting ordinary business such as is done in daily life. In this case the testator suffered greatly from severe bodily disease, and no doubt his mind was affected to a degree it might be, at least in a partial sense, unsound; but the jury should not for that reason...