Freeman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 12 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-02569 (CKK) |
| Parties | MARCELLUS R. FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion.
Plaintiff, Marcellus R. Freeman, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this matter on September 10, 2019. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff initially sued various judges, prosecutors, employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), and the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, alleging violations of the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Id. at 1-7, 10, 12. Plaintiff also alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id. at 2, 6, 11, 12. Plaintiff attested that Defendants improperly and unlawfully used and disclosed his full social security number. Id. at 2, 6, 7, 9, 10. He demanded monetary damages, including compensation for alleged breaches of contract, in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 12-15.
On November 12, 2019, the Court dismissed all claims other than those proceeding pursuant to the Privacy Act. See 11/12/19 Ord., ECF No. 7. The Court found that, insofar as Plaintiff demanded monetary damages for alleged Bivens violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, any such claims failed on the basis of sovereign and judicial immunity. Id. at 2. The Court also found that the Complaint contained no factual allegations to support a claim for breach of contract. Id. Last, the Court dismissed all Defendants other than BOP, finding that the only proper defendant in a Privacy Act action is the agency maintaining the challenged record, and that the Act does not cover federal courts, individuals, or District of Columbia government agencies. Id. at 1-2.
The matter was then assigned to this Court on November 14, 2019 and, on November 22, 2019, an Order Establishing Procedures, ECF No. 9, issued. The Order provided instruction that "[w]here a party fails to file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to a given motion, the Court may treat the motion as conceded." Id. ¶ 10(B). After an extension, on February 12, 2020, BOP - the single remaining defendant - filed a timely Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support ("MTD Mem."), ECF Nos. 17, 17-1, in response to the Complaint. The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 16, on February 14, 2020, see Ord., ECF No. 18.
On the same date, the Court also issued an Order, advising Plaintiff of his obligations to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules of this Court. See Feb. 14, 2020 Order ("Fox Neal Ord."), ECF No. 19; see also Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Court further ordered that Plaintiff file an opposition or other response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by March 30, 2020. See Fox Neal Ord. at 2. Plaintiff was again forewarned that if he failed to file a timely response, the Court would rule on the Motion without the benefit of his position. Id. To date, Plaintiff has not filed any opposition or response, and has not otherwise complied with this Court's Order.
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "treat a complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant a plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Where an action is brought by a pro se plaintiff, as in the instant matter, a district court has an obligation "to consider his filings as a whole before dismissing a complaint," Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), because such complaints are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nevertheless, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the court accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. at 678. "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679.
A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. "Theplausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A pleading must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice." Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "willfully produced, filed, and stored" his social security number, and "failed to report the full display" of Plaintiff's social security number "generated throughout their systems[,] exposing Plaintiff to devastating consequences and unwanted invasions of personal privacy." Compl. at 7. More specifically, he alleges that Defendant exposed his social security number "in its entirety on Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports and charging instruments held on display in [D.C. Department of Corrections and BOP] records systems which has caused and continue[s] to cause Plaintiff to suffer and sustain intentional infliction of emotional distress which has potentially devastating consequences in violation of the Privacy Act[.]" Id. at 9. He alleges that he became aware of these alleged infractions on August 23, 2019, when he "reviewed documents generated from [BOP] systems which displayed Plaintiff's private, personal, and confidential social security number." Id.
Plaintiff seeks a determination as to: (1) whether or not Defendant violated BOP policy "by displaying" his social security number "in its entirety within the [BOP] record system for thepurpose of identifying Plaintiff[;]" and (2) whether or not Defendant "failed to report the fact1" that Plaintiff's social security number "was on display in [the] Federal Bureau of Prisons Record System, D.C. Department of Corrections System and the United States Attorney's [O]ffice system." Id. at 6.
"The Privacy Act regulates the 'collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information' about individuals by federal agencies." Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004)). Subsection (g)(1) of the Privacy Act establishes the circumstances in which a plaintiff may seek civil remedies and recognizes "a civil action for agency misconduct fitting within any of four categories [and] makes separate provision for the redress of each." Chao, 540 U.S. at 618; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A)-(D).
"The first two categories cover deficient management of records: subsection (g)(1)(A) provides for the correction of any inaccurate or otherwise improper material in a record, and subsection (g)(1)(B) provides a right of access against any agency refusing to allow an individual to inspect a record kept on him." Chao, 540 U.S. at 618. "The two remaining categories deal with derelictions having consequences beyond the statutory violations per se." Id. at 619. "Subsection (g)(1)(C) describes an agency's failure to maintain an adequate record on an individual, when the result is a determination 'adverse' to that person." Id. "Subsection (g)(1)(D) speaks of a violation when someone suffers an 'adverse effect' from any other failure to hew to the terms of the Act." Id. Suits under subsections (g)(1)(C) and (D) require a showing that "the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful" and that the plaintiff sustained "actual damages." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)). Here, Plaintiff ostensibly attempts to bring claims for (1) improperdisclosure; and (2) correction of the purported improper material within Defendant's systems of records.
A claim for improper disclosure arises under "catchall" subsection § 552a(g)(1)(D),2 and consists of four elements: (1) the information in question is a "record" is contained within "a system of records[;]" (2) the agency improperly "disclosed" the information; (3) an adverse impact resulted from the disclosure; and (4) the agency's disclosure was willful or intentional. Logan v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, ...
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