Freeman v. Kansas

• Decision Date: 29 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 97-2530-DES.,97-2530-DES.
• Citation: 128 F.Supp.2d 1311
• Parties: Cara FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. State of KANSAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

128 F.Supp.2d 1311

Cara FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. State of KANSAS, Defendant.

No. 97-2530-DES.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

January 29, 2001.

Michael M. Jackson, Topeka, KS, for plaintiff.

Jeffrey A. Chanay, Entz & Chanay, Topeka, KS, Joseph Brian Cox, Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Topeka, KS, Michael D Burrichter, Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Legal Services, Topeka, KS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant State of Kansas's motion for summary judgment as to the temporary employee issue (Doc. 115) and motion for summary judgment as to the remaining issues (Doc. 116). For the reasons set forth below, the State of Kansas's motion for summary judgment as to the temporary employee issue is denied, and its motion for summary judgment as to the remaining issues is granted.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants State of Kansas ("the State") and Key Staffing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss. The court dismissed plaintiff's claims of discrimination based on national origin, age, and disability but allowed plaintiff's claim of race discrimination to proceed. Both defendants later filed motions for summary judgment as to plaintiff's race discrimination claim. The court granted Key Staffing's motion for summary judgment. The State's motion for summary judgment is currently before the court. Plaintiff claims she was subjected to adverse treatment and discharged by the State because of her race. The following facts concerning plaintiff's race discrimination claim are either uncontroverted or, if controverted, are construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff, who is black, was employed by Key Staffing, a temporary employment agency that places temporary employees with contracting employers. From January 13, 1997, through March 13, 1997, plaintiff was assigned to work at the Kansas Department of Revenue. Her primary job duties included document checking, specifically to check notices of security interests ("NSI"), filing, and typing envelopes. The State assigned Germean Chisholm-Bean, a black female, to train plaintiff as to her work duties. Plaintiff claims she was given unequal training as compared to other white employees.

Plaintiff proceeded to perform her work duties over the next two months. Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed by her supervisor, Harold Baldwin ("Baldwin"), and her co-workers during this time. The specific incidents will be discussed below. Although plaintiff was reprimanded regarding the quality of her work, plaintiff was never written up. Two days before she was discharged, plaintiff got into an argument with Karol Skelton ("Skelton"). Skelton was also a Key Staffing employee assigned to work at the State, with almost four months seniority over plaintiff. Skelton's job duties included those of plaintiff, but also included data entry into the computer.

Marge Bailey ("Bailey"), bureau chief of Titles and Registrations, investigated the argument by questioning plaintiff's co-workers, who informed her plaintiff was loud and screamed at Skelton, who did not yell back. In the past, Bailey had received reports that plaintiff was sleeping at work, having problems performing her duties, and was rude to a supervisor. Based on this information, Bailey decided to request that plaintiff be removed. On March 13, 1997, Bailey informed Key Staffing that the State no longer wanted plaintiff's services, and plaintiff was escorted off the State's property by a security officer.

On May 6, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) alleging race discrimination. On October 17, 1997, plaintiff filed the present action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court shall render summary judgment upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The rule provides that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir.1993). The movant may discharge its burden "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the nonmovant must do more than merely show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (interpreting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Rule 56(c) requires the court to enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Such a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmovant's case renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir.1998). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence or determine whether the claims have merit, but merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a finder of fact to return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Essentially, the court performs the threshold inquiry of determining whether a trial is necessary. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

The State of Kansas has two motions for summary judgment pending before the court. The first motion requests that the court grant summary judgment on the temporary employee issue. The State claims it was not plaintiff's employer, and therefore, not liable under Title VII. The second motion requests summary judgment on the remaining issues of plaintiff's race discrimination claims. The State claims the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, unequal training, or harassment, and even if she did, plaintiff has not shown the State's explanation for her treatment was pretext. Each motion for summary judgment is addressed below.

A. State of Kansas's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Temporary Employee Issue

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for "an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff's employment status is "both a jurisdictional question and an aspect of [her] substantive claim" of discrimination. Zinn v. McKune, 143 F.3d 1353, 1356 (10th Cir.1998) (citing Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir.1987)). To bring a claim of discrimination, plaintiff must show that "she is personally entitled to relief under the statute because she has an employment relationship with the [defendant] as required by 42 U.S.C § 2000e(f)." Id. at 1356-57. The State argues that it is not the employer of the plaintiff, as the State was the client of the temporary employment agency that employed plaintiff, and therefore, it can not be liable to plaintiff under Title VII.

The standard used to determine whether plaintiff is an employee of the State for purposes of Title VII is set forth in Lambertsen v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir.1996). In Lambertsen, the court applied the hybrid test to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists under Title VII. Lambertsen, 79 F.3d at 1028. "Under the hybrid test, the main focus of the court's inquiry is the employer's right to control the `means and manner' of the worker's performance." Id. (citing Oestman v. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir.1992)). The hybrid test also requires the court to consider the following factors:

(1) the kind of occupation at issue, with reference to whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the employer or the employee furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties.

Id. The court must look to the totality of the circumstances: no one factor is determinative. Id.

Several factors weigh against finding that the State was plaintiff's employer. It is undisputed that plaintiff was an employee of Key Staffing. Plaintiff understood that her employer was Key Staffing and that...