Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-7644,81-7644 |
| Citation | 700 F.2d 1339 |
| Parties | 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 517, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,455 Melvin FREEMAN, for Himself and for all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. MOTOR CONVOY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Douglas Spencer, Intervenor-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John R. Myer, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-intervenor.
Clyde E. Murphy, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jones, Bird & Howell, Alexander E. Wilson, III, Forrest W. Hunter, Atlanta, Ga., for Motor Convoy Inc. Roland P. Wilder, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Int. Broth. of teamsters.
Frederick C. McLam, Decatur, Ga., for Teamsters Local Union No. 528.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before HILL and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and SCOTT *, District Judge.
Plaintiff Melvin Freeman, a black employee, brought this action against his employer, Motor Convoy, Inc., and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers (hereinafter 'Teamsters International') and Local 528, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers (hereinafter 'Local 528'), alleging racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter 'Title VII'), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (hereinafter 'Section 1981'), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. Motor Convoy is an interstate carrier of motor vehicles with its main office located in Atlanta, Georgia. The complaint alleges that Motor Convoy discriminated against black employees at its Atlanta, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama terminals. Local 528 of Teamsters International is the exclusive bargaining representative of the Company's employees at the Atlanta facility.
The job classifications at Motor Convoy fall into three major categories: drivers, shop employees and yard employees. 1 The positions in the shop department include welder-mechanic, mechanic, advanced apprentice mechanic, helper, greaser and tire man. The yard department positions include janitor, porter and washer. The driving, welder-mechanic and mechanic positions are the most desirable and highest paying jobs.
The employees of Motor Convoy are covered by the National Masters Automobile Transporters Agreement and the Central and Southern Conference Supplemental Agreements. The National Agreement authorizes the local unions to establish a seniority system. Prior to 1976, the seniority system under the Central and Southern Conference Supplemental Agreement provided that an employee who transferred to another job classification would forfeit the seniority rights he had acquired in his former job classification. Consequently, an employee could not carry over his seniority upon transferring to another position.
Plaintiff Freeman initially filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter 'EEOC') alleging that Motor Convoy discriminated against black employees in violation of Title VII. Upon receiving notification of his right to sue, plaintiff Freeman brought this action alleging that Motor Convoy had engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and Section 1981 by assigning black employees to the lower paying and less desirable jobs, denying black employees transfers or promotions to higher paying jobs, and denying black employees over-time work and on-the-job training. In addition, the complaint alleged that Motor Convoy and the defendant unions violated Title VII and Section 1981 by negotiating and maintaining collective bargaining agreements which did not allow transfers with full carry-over seniority. With respect to his individual claim, plaintiff Freeman alleged that although he had performed the duties of a mechanic since July 2, 1965, he was not classified as a mechanic and did not receive the pay rate of a mechanic until January 10, 1970. Furthermore, plaintiff Freeman alleged that the transfer restrictions in the collective bargaining agreement prevented him from obtaining a driving position.
Douglas Spencer, a black employee, filed similar charges of discrimination with EEOC and, following notification of his right to sue, intervened. In addition to the allegations set forth in plaintiff Freeman's complaint, Spencer alleged that Motor Convoy engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring black employees only for lower paying jobs and hiring white employees while qualified black employees were on layoff status. With respect to his individual claim, Spencer alleged that he had been assigned to lower paying jobs and had been "bumped" on several occasions by white employees who had previously held higher paying jobs but had less seniority. Spencer further alleged that while he was laid off, vacancies existed in higher paying and more desirable job classifications for which he was qualified.
The district court certified the case as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and defined the class as "all black employees of Motor Convoy, Inc., excluding office and supervisory personnel, who are employed, or were employed and have been discharged or laid off since July 2, 1965, within the Southern Conference of Teamsters." 68 F.R.D. 196, 203 (N.D.Ga.1974). 2 The certified class included employees at the Company's terminals in Atlanta, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama.
Following a non-jury trial on the issue of liability, the court entered an order on December 11, 1975. 409 F.Supp. 1100 (N.D.Ga.1976). The court determined that the relevant statistical evidence corroborated by the testimony of certain employees established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 3 Concluding that Motor Convoy had failed to produce sufficient rebuttal evidence, the court held that Motor Convoy had violated Title VII and Section 1981 by engaging in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring, assigning jobs and providing on-the-job training. The district court further found that the collective bargaining agreements which prohibited transfers with carry-over seniority perpetuated the effects of the Company's discriminatory employment practices by discouraging black employees from seeking transfers to the higher paying and more desirable jobs. Accordingly, the court held that Motor Convoy and the defendant unions were jointly and severally liable under Title VII and Section 1981 for the discriminatory effects of the seniority system incorporated in the collective bargaining agreements.
The district court granted plaintiffs immediate injunctive relief by enjoining Motor Convoy from further engaging in any unlawful employment practices. The court also ordered Motor Convoy to provide each member of the class an opportunity to transfer with full carry-over seniority to another job classification when a vacancy occurred for which the class member was qualified. Finally, the court established procedures for the remedial phase of the case.
Shortly after the entry of the December 11, 1975 court order, Article 26 of the National Agreement was amended as follows:
In those terminals where classification seniority applies, the parties agree that in filling vacancies with qualified employees which occur subsequent to the execution of this Agreement, the principle of carry-over terminal seniority shall be recognized. In the event that the Employer and the Local Union fail to formulate a Ryder which provides for the filling of vacancies consistent with the foregoing provision, the Joint Area Committees shall have such authority.
In implementing this provision, Motor Convoy and Local 528 agreed to a plan which provided for a one-time transfer with carry-over seniority for each employee to any position for which the employee was qualified. The one-time transfers took place in September of 1978. Thereafter, the plan provided that all transfers to fill permanent vacancies would be with full carry-over seniority.
Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order of December 11, 1975. The case, however, was remanded for further consideration in light of the intervening decision of the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The Court in Teamsters concluded that "the unmistakable purpose of Sec. 703(h) was to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII." Id. at 352, 97 S.Ct. at 1863. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." Id. at 353-354, 97 S.Ct. at 1863-1864. Consequently, under Teamsters the fact that a seniority system has a discriminatory effect is by itself an insufficient basis for finding liability. Rather, a showing of a discriminatory purpose in negotiating and maintaining the seniority system is required.
On remand, the district court determined that additional findings of fact were necessary to determine whether the defendant unions were absolved from liability in light of Teamsters. However, the court concluded that Teamsters did not affect Motor Convoy's liability and adhered to its original finding that the Company had engaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of discrimination against black employees. The district court vacated its original order of December 11, 1975 and referred the case to a Special Master to determine whether the seniority system was bona fide under Section 703(h) of Title VII in light of Teamsters. In addition, the Special Master was instructed to determine which members of the class were entitled to individual relief and whether general injunctive relief was warranted.
Following an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bunn v. Bowen
...with exceptional success. Id.; Craik v. Minnesota State University Board, 738 F.2d 348, 350-51 (8th Cir.1984); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1357 (11th Cir.1983); National Association of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at The issue counsel for plaintiff raise in this litigation......
-
Wagner v. Taylor
...1104, 94 S.Ct. 737, 38 L.Ed.2d 559 (1973); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir.1983); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir.1983).56 In addition to holding that Wagner had not met the normal preconditions to class certification, the District ......
-
Spell v. McDaniel
...exceptional representation in combination with exceptional success. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S.Ct. at 1940; Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1357 (11th Cir.1983); Maciera v. Pagan, 698 F.2d at 41; National Association of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1328-29; Copeland v. Mar......
-
Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Exp., Inc.
...(N.D.Ga.1975). Questions concerning class certification are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir.1983). The question of class certification is a procedural one, distinct from the merits of the action. Garcia v. Gloor, ......