Freeman v. Rochester Psychiatric Ctr.
| Decision Date | 30 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | 16-CV-6668T |
| Parties | DWAYNE FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. ROCHESTER PSYCHIATRIC CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Plaintiff Dwayne Freeman ("Freeman") filed this action against Rochester Psychiatric Center ("RPC") asserting a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq., arising out of his employment with and subsequent termination from RPC. (Docket # 1). Currently pending before the Court is Freeman's second motion to amend the complaint. (Docket # 84). For the reasons discussed below, Freeman's motion to amend is granted in part, and I recommend that the motion be denied in part.
Freeman's original complaint asserted twenty-five causes of action against ten defendants. (Docket # 1). It included claims for violations of Freeman's procedural due process rights (Counts 1-8, 21-24), substantive due process rights (Counts 9-16), and equal protection rights (Counts 17-20), and for a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Count 25).(Id.). The claims were asserted against RPC, several of its employees, including Christopher Kirisits ("Kirisits"), Phil Griffin ("Griffin"), Colomba Misseritti ("Misseritti"), Doug Lee ("Lee"), Cynthia Crowell ("Crowell"), Linda Gray ("Gray"), and Lidia Colak ("Colak"), Thomas Rinaldo ("Rinaldo"), an attorney and arbitrator, and Andrew Cuomo ("Cuomo"), the Governor of New York. (Id.). In a Decision and Order dated February 6, 2017, the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss all defendants except RPC and all claims except the Section 504 claim. (Docket # 17).
Freeman sought reconsideration of the District Court's decision and to amend the complaint, seeking to reallege the dismissed claims against all of the previously named defendants. (Docket ## 23, 24). Those motions were denied. (Docket # 43).
On February 16, 2018, Freeman filed the pending motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Docket # 84). A review of Freeman's motion and the proposed amended complaint demonstrates that Freeman seeks leave to allege fifty-three additional causes of action against twenty new defendants. (Docket ## 84, 84-1). First, Freeman seeks to reassert the twenty-four causes of action that the District Court has already dismissed and that Freeman has already been denied leave to replead. (Compare Docket # 1 at ¶¶ 137-294 (Counts 1-24) with Docket # 23 at 29-55 at ¶¶ 137-294 (Counts 1-24) with Docket ## 84 and 84-1 at ¶¶ 151-313 (Counts 1-24)). Additionally, Freeman seeks to assert essentially the same causes of action - alleging violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights and his equal protection rights - against Cuomo. (Docket # 84-1 at ¶¶ 411-513, 521-64 (Counts 35-49 and 51-54)). Freeman also seeks to add as defendants Lise Gelernter ("Gelernter"), an arbitrator, and to assert a procedural due process claim against her (Docket ## 84 at 36, ¶ 21; 84-1 at ¶¶ 383-94 (Count 32)) and Catherine Leahy Scott ("Scott"), the New York State Inspector General, and to assert asubstantive due process claim against her (Docket ## 84 at 38, ¶ 29; 84-1 at ¶¶ 514-20 (Count 50)). The due process claims against Gelernter and Scott rely upon essentially the same factual allegations as the proposed due process claims against Cuomo and the other defendants.
In addition to the claims he previously alleged, Freeman seeks to assert several new causes of action against several new defendants (Docket # 84-1 at ¶¶ 343-82, 395-410 (Counts 28-31 and 33-34)) and to assert Section 504 claims against the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") and the New York State Justice Center ("Justice Center") (Docket ## 84 at 38-39, ¶¶ 28, 31; 84-1 at ¶¶ 325-42) (Counts 26 and 27). The new causes of action include a claim against RPC, OMH and the Justice Center pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (Docket # 84-1 at ¶¶ 343-53 (Count 28)); a claim against OMH and RPC pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (id. at ¶¶ 354-61 (Count 29)); a claim against Kirisits, Gray, Lee, Misseritti and Griffin that they violated Freeman's equal protection rights by treating him differently based upon his gender (id. at ¶¶ 362-74 (Count 30)); a claim against Kirisits, Vicky Eudell ("Eudell"), Lee, Colak, Crowell, Matthew Matney ("Matney"), John Burrows ("Burrows"), and Griffin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for abuse of process (id. at ¶¶ 375-82 (Count 31)); and claims against Kirisits, Cuomo, Griffin, Misseritti, Lee, Crowell, Gray, Colak, Rinaldo, Gelernter, Burrows, Matney, Eudell, Linda Ronda ("Ronda"), Justice Center Officer, B.E.R. Field Agent, and B.E.R. Director pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act (id. at ¶¶ 395-410) (Counts 33 and 34)).
Defendant opposes the motion to amend, maintaining that the proposed amendments are futile, and that the proposed complaint and proposed addition of new defendants violate Rules 8, 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket # 101). Regardingthe proposed Title VII and ADA claims, defendant maintains that they are futile because Freeman failed to timely seek relief from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. at 3). Regarding the proposed abuse of process claim, RPC maintains that it is barred as a matter of law because Freeman failed to pursue an Article 78 proceeding. (Id.). Additionally, defendant contends that any claims asserted against the arbitrators Gelernter and Rinaldo are futile because they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. (Id. at 4). To the extent Freeman seeks to assert any state law claims, defendant argues, such claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id. at 4-5). Finally, defendant contends that any claims against Cuomo and Scott are barred because the doctrine of repondeat superior is inapplicable to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 5).
In reply, Freeman maintains that his proposed amended complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the length of the pleading owes to the number of claims and defendants at issue. (Docket # 109 at 1-3). With respect to the Title VII and ADA claims, Freeman argues that his claims are timely because the last adverse employment action occurred on April 16, 2016, and he filed this action on October 11, 2016, approximately 176 days later. (Id. at 4-5). He further urges this Court to waive the EEOC filing requirement. (Id.). As to the abuse of process claims, Freeman maintains that they are Section 1983 claims which are not required to be litigated first through an Article 78 proceeding. (Id. at 6). Regarding Gelernter, Freeman disputes that she enjoys absolute judicial immunity. (Id. at 6-7). As to the claims against Cuomo and Scott, Freeman contends that he has adequately pled their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. (Id. at 8-11). Finally, Freeman asserts that the District Court's previous decisions are not binding because he seeks to assert claims against the defendants in different capacities than he did in his previous complaints. (Id. at 12).
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that once the time for amending a pleading as of right has expired, a party may request leave of the court to amend, which shall be "freely give[n] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by the party seeking leave to amend may be a proper subject of relief, the party should be afforded the opportunity to test the claim on its merits. See United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chi., 889 F.2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir. 1989). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
While the court retains discretion to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a), "[the] outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id. at 182; Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Evans v. Syracuse City Sch. Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
Despite the ordinarily lenient standard imposed, if the amendment proposed by the moving party is futile, "it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend." Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d at 131. The determination whether a proposed amendment is futile is made under the same standard as that used to determine whether a claim would be subject to a motion to dismiss. See Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy, 212 F.R.D. 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) . The proposed amended claim must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, it "must allege facts that are not merely consistent with the conclusion that the defendant violated the law, but which actively and plausibly suggest that conclusion." Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Sengillo v. Valeo Elec. Sys., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 310, 312 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (appl...
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