Freeman v. Weatherford

Decision Date20 June 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 3:12-cv-266
PartiesROBERT FREEMAN, KENNETH BLAYLOCK, JOHNNY DAVIS, BILLY DISHMAN, LaBRON LUKE, JAWORSKI McMURRY, and TIMOTHY PARSONS, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF SONNY WEATHERFORD, SONYA TROUTT, SOUTHERN HEALTHCARE, CHASSITY PILCHER, and MAHAILIAH HUGHES, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Robert Freeman, Johnny Davis, Billy Dishman, and LaBron Luke, each of whom is a state inmate incarcerated at the Sumner County Jail in Gallatin, Tennessee, have filed a complaint purporting to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Sheriff Sonny Weatherford, Jail Administrator Sonya Troutt, Southern Healthcare, Chassity Pilcher, and Court Clerk Mahailiah Hughes.1

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), this Court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner's civil complaint if, as in this case, it is filed in forma pauperis or if it seeks redress from a governmental entity or official. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. After the initial screening, the Court must sua sponte dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if it is determined to be frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibilityin the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). The factual allegations in the pleading "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555. To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570 (2007). A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing a pro se complaint under this standard, the Court must construe the pleading liberally, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept the plaintiff's allegations as true unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The complaint attempts to make out claims based on violations of the plaintiffs' rights under the Tennessee Constitution, as well as under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claims fall under four categories: (1) Safety of Inmates; (2) Sanitation; (3) Medical Care; and (4) Price Gouging. The facts alleged in support of these claims are as follows:

(1) Safety of Inmates:

The plaintiffs2 allege a "lack of safety procedures" generally, as well as problems with the facility including cracks on the floor and ceiling that leaks when it rains. Plaintiffs complain about overcrowding to such an extent that it is a fire hazard, with inmates sleeping on the floor in cells meant to house two people. They complain that misdemeanants are housed with felons, and "Security Threat Group" inmates are housed with minimum security inmates, leading to rival gang fights and extortion of weaker individuals; jail cell doors can be opened with plastic ID cards, leading to dangerous situations; inmates are regularly beaten (whether by other inmates or prison officials is not indicated); paranoid-schizophrenics who do not take their medications are housed with the general prison population and pose a threat to themselves and others. Generally, plaintiffs complain that the absence of structure in the jail community puts "lives . . . at risk everyday." (ECF No. 1-1, at 2.)

(2) Sanitation:

Plaintiffs allege that black mold is growing on shower walls and the ceiling around vents, and has caused a number of inmates to be sick. Stagnant water sits in odorous pools; cleaning supplies are so diluted that they are ineffective; food stains cover the walls; the kitchen is filthy and the food trays frequently have food from the night before still on them; the kitchen workers are not required to wear hairnets, and hair is frequently in the food.

(3) Medical Care:

Plaintiffs complain generally about HIPAA violations and take issue with the fact that some very ill inmates, whom the plaintiffs believe should be quarantined, are not quarantined. The plaintiffs assert that a "bad outbreak of Staph infection" was misdiagnosed as a spider bite. Inmates on suicide watch are put in a cell with metal beds, shelves and concrete, and no one checks on them to make sure they do not injure themselves, and no mental health counseling is provided. The nurses who work for Southern Health Partners, the entity in contract to provide medical services for inmates at the Sumner County Jail, are unprofessional and are afraid to come into the jail pods when the inmates are there. The waiting list to receive any kind of counseling is so long that the counseling is effectively unavailable.

(4) Price Gouging:

Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Weatherford has increased commissary prices and even charges for such products as toilet paper and "hygiene products." He allows Swanson Company employees to "charge inmates for execution fines that should be collected by a collection agency" (ECF No. 1-1, at 3), and appears to be asserting that the Sheriff permits Swanson to deduct money owed to it for commissary items from inmates' trust accounts directly, rather than having to go through an official execution pursuant to the Personal Property Owner's Rights and Garnishment Act of 1978, Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-101 et seq. "Money is owed to the state and not to Swansons, which are the food providers for the commissary. Such payments cannot be made by unemployed inmates due to incarceration. This is extortion and strong armed robbery." (ECF No. 1-1, at 4.) The plaintiffs also complain that they are not allowed to put less than $25 on a phone account or the commissary account unless it is on a money order, and money orders take too long to process. The plaintiffs allege generally that they have no access to television, newspapers, or the law library, and that the food provided by the jail is calorically insufficient, makingthem dependent on obtaining items from the commissary.

Finally, plaintiffs allege that Sumner County Clerk Mahailiah Hughes is "over charging people on their fines." (Id.)

The plaintiffs characterize their suit as a class action. The seek $50,000 in damages from each defendant plus punitive damages. The plaintiffs have not sought injunctive relief.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Parties to the Action

Although each of the plaintiffs has signed the complaint, they also purport to bring a class action. It therefore appears that the plaintiffs are attempting to bring suit not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of other inmates at the Sumner County Jail. Notwithstanding, a party generally may plead or conduct his own case in person, that is, pro se, or through a licensed attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Section 1654 does not allow for unlicensed laymen to represent anyone else other than themselves. Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Turner v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (appeal from multi-district litigation); see also McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966) (individual prohibited from representing anyone other than himself). Moreover, to obtain certification to proceed as a class, the plaintiffs must satisfy the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that one or more members of a class may sue on behalf of all class members only if: (1) the class is too numerous for joinder of all parties; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to all; (3) the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Coleman v. GMAC, 296 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proof in this regard. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 965 (6th Cir. 2005).

The plaintiffs here have made no attempt to shoulder that burden. They have not pleaded the existence or defined the limits of the class. More importantly, however, pro se prisoners are generally not adequate representatives able to fairly represent a class. See e.g., Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F. App'x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000));Howard v. Dougan, No. 99-2232, 2000 WL 876770, *1 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000) ("The district court properly declined to certify the class and appoint Howard as class representative as he is an incarcerated pro se litigant without legal training."); Hammond v. O'Dea, No. 91-5089, 1991 WL 78161, *2 (6th Cir. May 14, 1991) ("[P]ro se prisoners are not adequate representatives fairly able to represent the class."). Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not met the prerequisites for establishing a class action lawsuit, so the Court must conduct its initial review solely of the claims asserted in the complaint by the named plaintiffs.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims

To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a...

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